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From the Editor
The Autumn issue of Parameters opens with a forum featuring two
contributions that highlight some important Challenges for US Civil-Military
Relations. The first contribution, “Policy Revolt: Army Opposition to
the Korea Withdrawal Plan” by Eric Setzekorn, argues senior US Army
leaders adopted a Fabian strategy of indirect resistance to Carter’s desire
to reduce the number of troops stationed in Korea. The strategy worked.
But the author leaves us wondering whether that success was a positive
development for US civil-military relations. The second article, “The
Walter Reed Scandal and the All-Volunteer Force” by Richard Malish,
provides intriguing evidence that the American public might have put
the AVF on a pedestal high enough that it harms civil-military relations.
Our second forum, On Alliances and Coalitions, offers three essays
addressing the importance of integrating disparate perspectives under
a common strategy. The first article, “Fighting and Learning in the
Great War: Four Lessons in Coalition Warfare” by Kelly Grieco,
describes the key insights the United States and its allies drew, or ought
to have drawn, during the First World War. All of these, as Grieco
shows, have immediate relevance today. The second contribution to
the forum, Vinay Kaura’s article “India-US Relations: From Distant
Partners to an Alliance” suggests American and Indian interests are
converging in a manner that makes an alliance between them, hitherto
inconceivable, now a worthy objective. Paul Vera Delzo’s “Toward a
Whole-of-Government Approach: Revamping Peru’s Strategy Process”
describes how Peru can obtain greater efficiency and effectiveness from
its strategies by integrating all government agencies.
The final forum, On Clausewitz, presents two articles that challenge
nontraditional interpretations of On War. Richard Milburn’s “Reclaiming
Clausewitz’s Theory of Victory” takes on Emile Simpson’s “Clausewitz’s
Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict” (Parameters Winter
2017–18). Milburn rejects Simpson’s view and maintains Clausewitz’s
theory of victory remains relevant in the twenty-first century. Brandon
Euhus’s “A Clausewitzian Response to ‘Hyperwarfare’ ” urges military
planners to remember the human dimension of war, as expounded upon
by military writers from Thucydides to Mao Zedong, is ultimately the
decisive one. ~AJE
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Challenges for CivilMilitary Relations

Policy Revolt: Army Opposition
to the Korea Withdrawal Plan
Eric B. Setzekorn
©2018 Eric B. Setzekorn

ABSTRACT: In the mid-1970s, Jimmy Carter, first as a candidate
and later as president, announced his intention to remove US forces
from the Korean peninsula. By publicly opposing the plan as part
of a Fabian strategy, senior Army leaders gained public support of
their position and the president suspended the planned withdrawal.

D

irect military opposition to national policy is rare and generally
unsuccessful. In the late 1970s, however, senior Army officers
in Korea directly opposed President Jimmy Carter’s goal of
withdrawing US troops from the Korean peninsula. After the relief of one
general officer, they adopted an indirect strategy that included inflating
threat assessments of North Korea and cultivating ties with congressional
members skeptical of Carter’s plan. These efforts succeeded, and Carter
decided in 1979 to suspend the withdrawal of US troops. This episode
illustrates a fundamental ethical and bureaucratic tension between
servicemembers’ desires to influence defense policy, particularly in
regions or on topics where the military has long-standing connections
and expertise, and their desire to serve their civilian masters honorably.
This article describes how Army officers effectively circumvented official
policy by using bureaucratic measures that also protected them from
being relieved from duty.
Studies of disagreements between presidential administrations and
military officers abound. But most focus on major crisis events—such as
Harry S. Truman’s firing of General Douglas MacArthur or the actions,
or inactions, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Vietnam—which obscure a
much wider range of civil-military interactions that often shape defense
policies. Recent academic attention on the relief of officers and military
resignations unfortunately highlights rare situations rather than the dayto-day policy process.1 The debate on military resignations is particularly
puerile because only one Army general officer, Major General Edwin A.
Walker, has resigned since World War II.2
Rather than opposing policy directly, US officers have had more
success with a Fabian strategy of gradually leveraging Congress, the
1      James M. Dubik, “Taking a ‘Pro’ Position on Principled Resignation,” Armed Forces and Society
43, no. 1 (January 2017): 17–28; Jim Golby, “Beyond the Resignation Debate: A New Framework for
Civil-Military Dialogue,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 18–46; Peter D. Feaver, “Resign
in Protest? A Cure Worse Than Most Diseases,” Armed Forces and Society 43, no. 1 (January 2017):
29–40; and Don M. Snider, “Should General Dempsey Resign? Army Professionals and the Moral
Space for Dissent,” Strategic Studies Institute, October 21, 2014.
2      Warren Weaver Jr., “Pension Restored for Gen. Walker,” New York Times, July 24, 1983, 17.

Dr. Eric B. Setzekorn,
an historian with the
US Army Center of
Military History and
an adjunct professor
at George Washington
University, recently
published The Rise and
Fall of an Officer Corps:
The Republic of China
Military, 1942–1955.
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media, and elements of the bureaucracy, such as the intelligence services,
to exhaust a presidential administration’s resolve. Roman General Fabius
delayed and obstructed the Carthaginian General Hannibal in a similar
manner. In a direct battle, presidential authority can be overpowering.
In such cases, an administration has every incentive to demonstrate its
power. In contrast, a recalcitrant institution, which is decentralized and
has deep connections to other organizations, can force an administration
to expend irreplaceable time and capital in the political equivalent of a
guerilla war.
General Colin Powell’s successful effort to stop President Bill
Clinton’s gays-in-the-military initiative provides a classic example
of a Fabian strategy in civil-military relations. Through consultation
with sympathetic members of Congress from both parties, a network
of retired generals, and public statements that obliquely encouraged
critiques of the president, Powell slowed the implementation of an
announced policy. After a nearly yearlong delay, a much different “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy emerged that maintained a ban on homosexuals
serving openly in the US military.3
The actions of Army officers, particularly those of the United
Nations Commander, and later Chief of Staff of the Army, General John
W. Vessey Jr., in delaying and rallying opposition to stop presidential
decisions to withdraw troops from Korea is a more impressive
demonstration of the Army’s institutional power. In the late 1970’s,
Vessey was outside Washington, DC, and the Army, still reeling from
Vietnam, had little public support.
Moreover, the dispute centered on military basing overseas, a subject
that did not have a natural domestic political constituency to energize
public opinion. As in the Powell case, Army officers working to stop
the withdrawal noted a lack of consultation before President Carter’s
decision, which was perceived as both a flawed policy process and
disrespectful to the military. The Army made the topic a public debate
where it could use specialized information and professional expertise to
stymie a presidential policy that clashed with the Army’s assessments of
America’s national security interests.

A Leader, for a Change

In the post-Watergate election of 1976, Georgia Governor Jimmy
Carter projected an image that conveyed transparency and simplicity in
government, using the campaign slogan “A Leader, for a Change.” During
the campaign, he made vague statements about phasing out US troops
in South Korea, explaining, “he favored taking US troops out of Korea
and would be prepared to begin as soon as he became President.” 4 Some
reports indicated analysts from the Brookings Institution convinced
3      Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2003), 201–4; and Daniel Bessner and Eric Lorber, “Toward a Theory of
Civil-Military Punishment,” Armed Forces and Society 38, no. 4 (October 2012): 658–61.
4      Don Oberdorfer, “Carter’s Decision on Korea Traced Back to January, 1975,” Washington Post,
June 12, 1977.
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Carter to believe “the large US presence in South Korea amounted to a
‘trip wire’ that could automatically involve the United States in another
Asian land war.” 5 These analysts, many of whom would later work for
the Carter administration, argued for the United States to draw down
forces overseas to focus primarily on Japan, leaving Korea and Taiwan
as tangential Third World security interests.6
Carter was also drawing on a new generation of foreign policy
analysts who were shaped by what they perceived to be the lessons of
Vietnam, foremost among them an overreach in American objectives
and an excessive use of military force. Many of Carter’s policies,
particularly those for East Asia and Korea, were formulated by Jerome
Cohen, a well-known peace activist with an antimilitary reputation, who
had no military experience and was a staunch critic of South Korean
President Park Chung Hee’s human rights abuses. On June 23, 1976,
Carter implied military support would be contingent on larger issues
in the bilateral relationship and on subjective moral assessments rather
than an objective security policy:
I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea
on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with
both South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it should be made clear to
the South Korean Government that its internal oppression is repugnant to
our people, and undermines the support of our commitment there.7

Carter’s withdrawal plan fulfilled several key political goals. First,
it offered Carter an opportunity to reinforce his moral policies and to
provide a high-minded rationale for the withdrawal. Second, removing
US forces from Korea provided the president the option to commit
forces elsewhere. Lastly, withdrawal respected the public’s skepticism of
foreign military engagement, particularly in Asia, giving Carter an easy
political win.
During his first months in office, Carter attempted to create policies
and strategies that reflected his campaign promises, and the withdrawal
of ground forces from Korea was given high priority. He immediately
directed the Policy Review Committee (PRC) to reexamine US policies
toward the Korean peninsula before March 7, 1977. 8 Normally the
member of the National Security Council with a primary interest in
the issue chaired the committee. But despite the military nature of the
issue, the State Department’s Cyrus Vance led the committee. As the
5      Larry A. Niksch, “U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: Past Shortcomings and Future
Prospects,” Asian Survey 21 (March 1981): 326–28; and Steven L. Rearden and Kenneth R. Foulks,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1977–1980 (Washington DC: Office of Joint History,
2015), 154.
6      Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman, Setting National Priorities:
The 1975 Budget (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974), 129.
7      Jimmy Carter, “Relations between the World’s Democracies” (speech, Foreign Policy
Association, New York, NY, June 23, 1976) Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed
November 14, 2018.
8      Jimmy Carter to the Attorney General, memorandum, “Korea: Presidential Review
Memorandum/NSC-13,” January 29, 1977, Washington, DC, Carter Presidential Library and
Museum, accessed November 27, 2018.
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administration sought to accelerate the process to reach a predetermined conclusion, senior officials also endeavored to limit military
participation. On February 2, 1977, National Security Advisor
Zbigneiw Brzezinski’s staff successfully cancelled Vessey’s upcoming
Congressional testimony based upon the general’s opposition to
the withdrawal.9
Early in the review process, the administration appeared to have
already decided its policy to the point that Department of Defense input
would merely be a formality. To many, Vice President Walter Mondale’s
public statement, “We will phase down our ground forces only in close
consultation and cooperation with the Governments of Japan and
South Korea,” confirmed the policy had already been decided.10 In
fact, Carter privately confirmed he had reached a decision on March
5, 1977—before comments or discussion from the State Department,
Defense Department, or Central Intelligence Agency—when he gave
a handwritten note to Brzezinski and Vance: “American forces will be
withdrawn. Air cover continued.” 11 Since the president announced the
4-to-5 year withdrawal schedule nearly two months before the policy
became official, many in the bureaucracy felt no genuine discussion had
occurred.12 The review had been a check-the-block exercise centered not
on whether to withdraw but how.
Overall, the president’s development of a new national security policy
regarding the Korean peninsula was severely flawed. The administration
made poorly considered campaign promises official through a sham
process that excluded major sources of information indicative of Samuel
Huntington’s observation: “The problem of the modern state is not
armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician.” 13 Driven by
his desire to be a popular politician, Carter created severe tension with
his primary experts on South Korea—US Army officers.

An Army in Opposition

The withdrawal plan was not popular with US Army officers in
South Korea. As the Korean War approached a stalemate in 1953, the
US presence there rapidly declined from roughly 400,000 troops to a
stable deterrent force of roughly 55,000 personnel, mostly assigned to
two Army divisions. During the 1950s and early 1960s, an assignment to
   9      Michael Armacost to Zbigniew Brzezinski, memorandum, 0297, “General Vessey’s Testimony
on Korean Troop Withdrawals,” February 2, 1977, container 1, NSA 26, records of the Office of the
National Security Advisor (Brzezinski), Carter Presidential Library and Museum.
10      Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea: A
Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1978), 20.
11      “Handwritten Note from Jimmy Carter for Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance, 5 March
1977,” in The Carter Chill: US-ROK-DPRK Trilateral Relations, 1976–1979 (Washington DC: North
Korea International Documentation Project, n.d.), 77.
12      Humphrey and Glenn, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, 20; and Jimmy Carter to the Vice President,
Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Policy in Korea Presidential Directive/NSC-12,”
May 5, 1977, Washington, DC, Carter Presidential Library and Museum, accessed November 27, 2018.
13      Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 20.
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Korea served as a stepping-stone to higher rank. Both General Lyman
L. Lemnitzer and General George H. Decker commanded the Eighth
Army in Korea before serving as the chief of staff of the Army.
After the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, senior Army
leaders, in the role of United Nations commander, wielded tremendous
influence within South Korea. Ambassador William Gleysteen remarked
that General Richard G. Stilwell “knew he was very important to the
Koreans, because ‘he’ provided security and military assistance to
them—not to mention use of the Command’s golf course and clubs. The
embassy, on the other hand, was usually the source of complaints and
problems.” 14 During the late 1970s, the increasingly authoritarian South
Korean government led by Park Chung Hee looked for support from
America’s military officers rather than the State Department’s civilian
officials. Many Americans, including Vessey, who was the commander
of US and UN forces in Korea, felt the senior US commander had more
access to Park than the US ambassador.15
Shortly after Carter was sworn in, Vessey expressed his misgivings
on the withdrawal plan publicly to the Washington Post and privately to
the president. While the general’s arguments were not in-line with the
president’s thinking, the withdrawal policy was technically still under
review and there were no official guidelines restricting the discussion
of it.16 Other senior Army leaders were also critical of the policy.
Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, commander of I Corps in Korea,
wrote an article supporting a robust US presence in South Korea. But a
prepublication review determined his views were “contrary to policy.” 17
During a visit to Korea in late April 1977, Chief of Staff of the
Army Bernard W. Rogers told senior military leaders that, despite the
ongoing policy review, “the decision in my opinion has been made to
withdraw the forces, and what remains is how they will be withdrawn—
what schedule and what numbers for each milestone.” 18 Presidential
Directive/National Security Council 12 (PD/NSC-12) confirmed his
opinion. One brigade would leave South Korea before December 1978;
the second, June 1980.19 The State and Defense Departments received
tasking memorandums and military assistance plans for the withdrawal.
Army officers in Korea continued to see the withdrawal plan as
ill-considered and hastily approved. Moreover, “an informal plan”
14      William H. Gleysteen Jr. (ambassador to South Korea from 1978–81), interview with
Thomas Stern, June 10, 1997 (Arlington, VA: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project [ADST], 2000), 132.
15      Gen John W. Vessey Jr. (commanding general of the Eighth US Army; commander of US
Forces, Korea; and commander in chief of the United Nations command in Korea from 1976–79),
interview 19 with Thomas Saylor, August 29, 2012 (Saint Paul, MN: Concordia University, 2014), 24.
16      Vessey, interview 20, September 6, 2012, 12–13.
17      John H. Cushman, Korea 1976–1978—A Memoir (self-pub., October 2013), 25.
18      Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea Before
the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 95th cong. 83
(1977) (statement of Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff of the Army).
19      Jimmy Carter to the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Policy
in Korea Presidential Directive/NSC-12,” May 5, 1977, Washington, DC, Carter Presidential Library
and Museum, accessed November 27, 2018.
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among senior Army officers “gradually took shape in opposition
to troop withdrawal.” 20 Three weeks after the president signed PD/
NSC-12, Major General John K. Singlaub, chief of staff of US forces
in Korea, made comments understood to be off-the-record during an
interview with Washington Post reporter John Saar in Seoul.21 The most
inflammatory segment of the interview captured Singlaub’s contention,
“If U.S. ground troops are withdrawn on the schedule suggested, it
will lead to war.” 22 Within the Washington bureaucracy, Singlaub’s
comments regarding the dangerous and destabilizing policy further
polarized the president’s White House staff and their opponents in the
State and Defense Departments.23
Within Carter’s inner circle, the issue of a withdrawal from Korea
was less important than increasing presidential power and preparing for
upcoming bureaucratic battles. Hamilton Jordan, a close personal friend
of Carter and a senior political strategist, wrote, “This is an opportunity
for you to firmly establish the position of your administration on
the question of civilian control of the military establishment. . . . It
is important for the military establishment to realize that when they
challenge your decisions and judgements, they do so at the risk of their
own careers.” 24
On May 21, 1977, President Carter officially relieved General Singlaub
of his position as a result of his comments. The action discouraged
direct challenges to presidential decisions but increased debate. Thomas
Stern, a Foreign Service officer stationed in Seoul remarked, “Singlaub
took it upon himself to challenge Carter publicly on this whole question
of troop withdrawal. That helped to raise the issue in both public and
private channels.” 25 Public commentators agreed, “White House drama
served only to give [the Singlaub affair] far more significance and
substance than it deserved.” 26
The high-profile dispute provided an opening for Congress to
hold hearings and potentially slow Carter’s withdrawal plan. During
congressional testimony, Singlaub reiterated the consultation process
had been rushed and had shunned the input of military officers.27
The testimony also revealed the United Nations Command in Korea
formally requested a rationale for the decision and the long-range
20      James V. Young, Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 43.
21      John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century (New York,
Summit Books, 1991), 385–86.
22      John Saar, “U.S. General: Korea Pullout Risks War,” Washington Post, May 19, 1977.
23      John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, 385–86; and William H. Gleysteen Jr., Massive Entanglement,
Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 23.
24      Hamilton Jordan to President Carter, “General Singlaub,” n.d., container 37, Office of the
Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan’s Confidential Files, Singlaub, General, container 37, folder
for General Singlaub, series of Hamilton Jordan’s Confidential Files, collection of the Office of the
Chief of Staff Files, Carter Presidential Library and Museum, accessed November 27, 2018.
25      John T. Bennett and Thomas Stern, interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, October 2, 1987,
(Arlington, VA: ADST, Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 2000), 17.
26      “The Singlaub Affair,” Washington Post, May 24, 1977.
27      Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision, 9.
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policy objectives because of the military’s exclusion from the matter.28
Singlaub’s testimony cited the growing number of intelligence reports on
the increased North Korean threat.29
The hearings led to a sharp increase in studies of and senior official
visits to Korea. Military officers actively presented facts and opinions
to friendly congressmen. Once a relationship was developed between
a senior officer and Congress, visits and “fact-finding” trips could
further present the Army’s message opposing the withdrawal. Vessey
remarked, “I don’t say that I searched for them. I think that would be
inaccurate. But I found out who they were.” The general “welcomed
them on their trips to Korea and then made sure that they were taken to
the Demilitarized Zone and could see the situation there, and had good
briefings on both the strengths and weaknesses of the armed forces of
the Republic of Korea as well as our own. I don’t think we did anything that
I would call dishonest or misleading. On the other hand, we certainly didn’t tell them
that President Carter’s plan was a good idea.” 30
While Army leaders built connections and influence in Congress,
the administration also strengthened its position. During his June 8,
1977, commencement address at the United States Military Academy,
Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander Jr. took a hard line on military
subordination. He outlined three distinct forums, with variable degrees
of independence. First, military officers were free to offer opinions
within their chain of command until a decision was reached. Second,
when appearing before Congress, an officer is free to express a personal
opinion but is bound to cite and support policy. Lastly, when dealing
with the media, an officer should know when a policy is established or
still under discussion and express that to the media. Alexander warned,
“Attempts to achieve outside the chain of command what one could
not achieve inside the chain of command are out of keeping with this
tradition [of the president as commander in chief] and inconsistent with
military professionalism.” 31
As the White House and civilian officials attempted to continue
tightening the framework for public discussion by Army leaders,
Congress continued the hearings, which provided a forum for military
officers to cast doubt on Carter’s Korea policy throughout the summer
of 1977. The commander of I Corps in Korea, the current and retired
commander of US Forces Korea, the commander of Pacific Air Forces,
the commander in chief of the Pacific Command, the Army chief of
staff, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs were all called to testify
on the Korea withdrawal plan. Each expressed reservations about the
withdrawal plan. And their testimony was used by Carter’s congressional
opponents and hawkish Democrats to strengthen their arguments.
28      Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision, 10.
29      Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, 401.
30      Vessey, interview 21, September 13, 2012, 5 (emphasis added).
31      Headquarters Air Force, message, 172355Z, ”Statements by Defense Officials,” June 1977,
quoted in Felix F. Moran, “Free Speech, the Military, and the National Interest,” Air University Review
31, no. 4 (May–June 1980): 112.
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Testifying in August, Chief of Staff of the Army General Rogers was
asked, “Were the Joint Chiefs ever asked whether troops should be
withdrawn from Korea?” He responded bluntly, “They were not.”
Under oath, Rogers also testified he had no idea when the
announced withdrawal should begin. When asked about the value of
American troops in South Korea, Rogers stated, “I think it makes two
contributions. First, as a deterrent, and second, if under conditions of
combat the national command authority released the 2d Division for use
by 8th Army, it could make a contribution in the area of war-fighting
capability as well.” 32 The ongoing hearings were highly effective in
shaping opposition to Carter’s policies. By late July, official polls showed
52 percent of Americans disapproved of Carter’s withdrawal plan.33
In addition to working closely with Congress to cast doubt on official
policy, military officers cultivated intelligence that magnified the North
Korean threat. Due to a lack of human intelligence, estimates of North
Korea’s forces had been constrained to satellite imagery. In January 1978,
Vessey asked for an assessment of North Korea’s military capabilities.34
The Defense Intelligence Agency produced a report in May 1978 that
sharply increased both the size and the capability of North Korean
forces, identifying more than three entirely new combat divisions.35
Disseminating these revised threat assessments put additional pressure
on the Carter administration to delay or to halt the withdrawal program.
On April 21, 1978, Carter delayed the first increment of withdrawals.
While the redeployment of 2,600 noncombat elements and a combat
battalion by the end of the year would proceed as planned, two of the
combat battalions scheduled for withdrawal in 1978 would remain, at
least until 1979.36 Military officers were not subtle in rejoicing. One
wrote, “At last, a reprieve!” 37 On July 29, 1979, Carter announced the
suspension of US troop withdrawals from Korea. The administration
remembered the military opposition, and in 1979, Vessey was passed
over for the position of chief of staff.38

Conclusion

Although President Carter demonstrated his official power by
relieving Singlaub, he was less successful at stopping Vessey from
pursuing a Fabian strategy that increased the political costs and security
32      Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision, 95–71.
33      “Public Likes Carter, Survey Finds, More for His Style than Programs,” New York Times/
CBS News Poll, July 29, 1977, 1; Larry K. Niksch, “US Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: Past
Shortcomings and Future Prospects,” Asian Survey 21, no. 3 (March 1981), 329.
34      Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 478.
35      Joe Wood, “Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea,” Studies in
Intelligence 40, no. 4 (1996): 98, 106.
36      Steven L. Rearden and Kenneth R. Foulks Jr., The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
1977–1980 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2015), 158.
37      Ward M. Le Hardy, “Where the Dawn Comes Up Like Thunder: The Army’s Future Role in
the Pacific,” Parameters 8, no. 4 (1978): 37.
38      Young, Eye on Korea, 46–47.
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risks of withdrawing forces from Korea. The Army’s ability to oppose
presidential policy and win the political debate was due to a congruence
of domestic political factors and bureaucratic skills. First, the Army
leveraged its position in South Korea to present itself as the expert
voice on the North Korean threat and South Korean requirements.
Second, the Army provided an issue that polarized congressional
Democrats, allowing military officers to serve as “expert witnesses,”
which was critical to creating a nonpolitical narrative. Lastly, the
statements and testimony of Army leaders focused on the short time
span of deliberations and the rushed nature of the process. This oblique
criticism highlighted the Carter administration’s opaque policy process
and politicized decision-making.
Although Army leaders were clearly manipulative and pushed the
boundaries of professional ethics, they effectively halted a deeply flawed
withdrawal policy. Viewed from a distance of forty years, President
Carter’s politicized policy process and shortsighted mentality of
reducing deterrence capabilities on the Korean Peninsula were clearly
dangerous. Singlaub and Vessey, as the subject matter experts on the
American military role in South Korea, should have been consulted. Yet
the generals’ actions led to a more comprehensive debate of American
security policy in Korea. As the case of the aborted Korean withdrawal
highlights, Army leaders can successfully challenge presidential policies.
But the question is should they?
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The Walter Reed Scandal and
the All-Volunteer Force
Richard G. Malish
ABSTRACT: This article describes the Walter Reed scandal of 2007
and what it tells us about the relationship of America to its allvolunteer force. It then offers suggestions for leadership strategies
to monitor the relationship to avoid future surprises.

I

n February 2007, as 20,000 US troops surged into Iraq to stabilize
an insurgency and curb an emerging civil war, the Washington Post
published a series of articles describing shameful conditions at Walter
Reed Army Medical Center, the United States Army’s flagship hospital
and main hub for receiving soldiers evacuated from hostilities overseas.
The articles depicted a system that provided state-of-the-art medical
care, but which had broken down in multiple ways. Physical conditions in
some of the barracks were squalid; clear signs of neglect such as “mouse
droppings, belly-up cockroaches, stained carpets, [and] cheap mattresses”
were found in some buildings.1 Outpatient soldiers were neglected,
“chewed out by superiors,” treated with “petty condescension,” and
required to navigate a “bureaucratic maze” to receive basic treatment
and benefits.2
Public reactions of fury and outrage were immediately expressed in
congressional hearings, media reports, and opinion pieces.3 Interest in
the scandal was intense with “more than three-in-ten Americans (31%)
[paying] very close attention.” 4 In 2007 and 2008, the Pew Research
Center reported a “highly critical” public; 72 percent of respondents said
“the government [did] not give enough support to soldiers who have
served in Iraq and Afghanistan.” 5
It was unclear how such neglect could happen—at Walter Reed
of all places—and how America’s heroes could be so mistreated. The
public struggled to understand how the leadership at Walter Reed was
not aware of the conditions, or worse, thought they were acceptable. The
Post articles may have focused on a single hospital, but they touched on
an extensive system and seemingly widespread attitudes. Consequently,
1      Dana Priest and Anne Hull, “Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration at Army’s Top Medical
Facility,” Washington Post, February 18, 2007.
2      Priest and Hull, “Soldiers Face Neglect”; and Guy Raz, “Pentagon Tackles Criticism of
Military Hospital,” NPR, February 23, 2007.
3      David Stout, “General Steps Down in Walter Reed Furor,” New York Times, March 12, 2007;
Johanna Neuman and Adam Schreck, “Outrage and Apologies over Care at Walter Reed,” Los Angeles
Times, March 6, 2007; and “The Wider Shame of Walter Reed,” New York Times, March 7, 2007.
4      “Public Tunes In to Walter Reed Story,” Pew Research Center, March 15, 2007.
5     “Public Continues To Fault Government for Troop Care,” Pew Research Center, March 19, 2008.
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the implications were far-reaching. Government and senior military
leaders stood accused of being insensitive to the needs of those asked to
sacrifice so much for the nation.
This article suggests the events at Walter Reed illustrate how
extraordinary public esteem for America’s modern all-volunteer force
(AVF) might place unexpected constraints on its use. In the years leading
up to the scandal, public adulation of the military created a significant
yet unexposed gap in perceptions between wounded soldiers and the
establishment that managed them. Walter Reed’s leaders did not realize
they were dealing with a clientele whose relationship with the public
differed from their own.
This blind spot existed for many reasons, including the hospital
staff’s familiarity with the AVF, which obscured its ability to perceive
the military through the public’s lens. This perception, influenced by
myth and crafted by tact, is now beginning to reach a design that is
decades-old. The public had moved faster to accept a special status for
its military than had the US government.
A victim of its success, the government now faces repercussions of
broader significance. Because of the differences of perception between
soldiers and their caretaking establishment, the public may increasingly
intervene to protect and to safeguard its military. The result may place
constraints upon the nation’s use of its military as an instrument of
national power.

The All-Volunteer Force

Soldiers who received care in Walter Reed from 2002 to 2007 had a
different relationship with the public than servicemembers at any other
time in American history. A 2011 Pew poll found that 90 percent of
Americans “felt proud of the soldiers serving in the military” during
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.6 The force was commonly described
as “heroic.” 7 In fact, positive public support for the military continues
to be so pervasive that it is hard to remember or to justify any other
paradigm. Nevertheless, history demonstrates considerable variation
in the relationship between the public and the military. As recently as
the Vietnam War, the military was the object of the American public’s
“ire.” 8 Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz used his famous trinity to
indicate that war and its features of reason, chance, and passion make
the relationship between soldier, people, and government unbalanced,
unpredictable, and subject to change.9 The current relationship between
the American people and its military is, generationally speaking, new
and evolving.
6      “War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era: Executive Summary,” Pew Research Center,
October 5, 2011.
7      Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Vintage Books, 2015), 135.
8             LTG Eric B. Schoomaker (USA Retired) (42nd surgeon general of the Army; former
commanding general US Army Medical Command), interview with the author, April 6, 2018.
9      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976).

TOC

Challenges for Civil-Military Relations

Malish

17

Members of today’s AVF are unknown to the vast majority of
Americans. In spite of conducting combat operations in two theaters,
the US military is the smallest since the 1930s.10 In the Second World
War, roughly 50 percent of males between the ages of 18 and 49 served;
however, today “less than 0.5 percent of the population serves in the
armed forces.” 11 Hence, few Americans have personal connections to
the military. Anonymity is important because it provides a blank slate
upon which to superimpose one’s personal judgements of agency and
motivation. As author James Wright states, “If we have no personal
relationships with those who are fighting our wars, then we think of
war as a geopolitical drama, and we think of those fighting it as heroic
action figures.” 12 Essayist and critic William Deresiewicz, elaborates
on the lack of personal familiarity with members of the military as an
important factor of modern-day military hero worship:
The greater the sacrifice that has fallen . . . the members of the military and
their families, the more we have gone from supporting our troops to putting
them on a pedestal. In the Second World War, everybody fought. Soldiers
were not remote figures to most of us; they were us. Now, instead of sharing
the burden, we sentimentalize it. It’s a lot easier to idealize the people who
are fighting than it is to send your kid to join them.13

These observations are useful for reasons other than illustrating the
impact of anonymity. They acknowledge the agency, or actions, of the
uniformed services at war: the military fights and sacrifices to the benefit
of national interests. The public is thankful because it understands the
military shoulders the weight of society’s physically and psychically
injurious work. In 2011, eighty-three percent of those polled quantified
the sacrifice as “a lot.” 14 Indeed, patients at Walter Reed during this
period had made enormous, and in many cases permanent, sacrifices
while serving.
Finally, and most importantly, the volunteer paradigm facilitates
the widespread public perception of altruism in the military. Willingly
sacrificing comfort to address community-afflicting problems that
normal institutions have failed to solve, the AVF conveys motivations
that harmonize with repeated and reinforced narratives of superheroism.
As a result, Americans worship their military. Commonly expressed
as patriotism, the designation of altruism toward the modern US allvolunteer force is so pervasive that even non-American contemporary
military historians make the connection.15

10      Jim Tice, “Army Shrinks to Smallest Level since before World War II,” Army Times,
May 7, 2016.
11      Karl W. Eikenberry and David M. Kennedy, “Americans and Their Military, Drifting Apart,”
New York Times, May 26, 2013.
12      James Wright, Those Who Have Borne the Battle: A History of America’s Wars and Those Who Fought
Them (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012), 276.
13      William Deresiewicz, “An Empty Regard,” New York Times, August 20, 2011.
14      Paul Taylor, ed., The Military-Civilian Gap: War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era (Washington,
DC: Pew Research Center, 2011), 2.
15      John Keegan, “The Making of the American GI,” Time, December 29, 2003.
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Without attribution of patriotic motivation, anonymous militaries
may be perceived as victims, pawns, or worse. Five years into the
Vietnam War, for example, opinion polls about the political and moral
merits of the conflict were as negative in scale as those of the Iraq War
in 2007.16 Yet, only 27 percent of the US population thought favorably
of the force conscripted to fight in Vietnam.17

The Establishment

Public adulation of the military creates a significant perception gap
between the AVF and those with the power to manage it. In regards to
Walter Reed, this includes senior officers, civilian leaders, and staff.
Because of the heroic status of Walter Reed patients, one can
understand how the public would expect the government to provide
world-class medical care and the best amenities. The Washington Post
articles, in revealing a different reality, shattered such expectations.
The public’s outrage fueled decisive and immediate action by Congress
and the secretary of defense. Within two weeks of the articles, the
establishment began to purge itself of its perceived wrongdoers.
Secretary of the Army Francis J. Harvey relieved Major General George
W. Weightman, Walter Reed’s senior commander. Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates endorsed the firing: “The care and welfare of our
wounded men and women in uniform depend on the highest standard
of excellence and commitment that we can muster as a government.
When this standard is not met, I will insist on direct corrective action.” 18
The “direct corrective action” did not spare Harvey, whom Gates
fired two days later.19 Shortly thereafter, Acting Secretary of the Army
Preston M. “Pete” Geren announced the retirement of Army Surgeon
General Lieutenant General Kevin C. Kiley.20 When the smoke cleared,
command of Walter Reed rested in the hands of then Major General
Eric B. Schoomaker who was charged with charting a course that was
consistent with congressional, senior leader, and public expectations.
Nonetheless, Army medicine never recovered from the damage. In 2017,
the Army role in managing hospitals was bestowed upon the newly
formed Defense Health Agency.21
As the Walter Reed scandal illustrates, the more the public ascribes
heroic motivation to its fighting class, the higher American expectations
will be for supporting, managing, and leading it and the lower the
tolerance will be for shortcomings. In contrast to that of soldiers, public
16      Jodie T. Allen, Nilanthi Samaranayake, and James Albrittain Jr., “Iraq and Vietnam: A Crucial
Difference in Opinion,” Pew Research Center, March 22, 2007.
17     Allen, Samaranayake, and Albrittain, “Iraq and Vietnam.”
18     Associated Press, “General in Charge of Walter Reed Hospital Has Been Relieved of
Command,” USA Today, March 1, 2007.
19     Chuck Callahan, Forty Days of Winter—Walter Reed and the Washington Post February–March
2007 (Washington, DC), briefing slides; and Michael Abramowitz and Steve Vogel, “Army Secretary
Ousted,” Washington Post, March 3, 2007.
20     Associated Press, “Army’s Surgeon General To Retire,” NBC News, March 12, 2007.
21     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130
Stat. 2000 (2016).
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perception of the establishment has varied little over time. It may never
reach the heroic threshold of the force it supports. And senior military
leaders forever forfeit their heroic stature when they join the ranks of the
institutions that require defending.
To discern the origin of these distinctions, it is useful to evaluate
the establishment using the same triad of factors used to understand
perceptions of the AVF: familiarity, agency, and motivation. First, the
senior military and civilian ranks are fewer in number than the mass
of the AVF. In the internet-enabled era of information, actions and
decisions are available to the public in detail never before seen. As a
result, they cannot exist anonymously and therefore cannot benefit
from the public attribution of characteristics derived from romanticized
myth. Second, while they have strategic-level capability and agency,
they neither fight nor sacrifice. Instead, they pursue the nation’s work in
conditions of comfort and safety. Most importantly, the public perceives
their motivations differently from that of the junior ranks. Congressman
Seth Moulton, a former Marine Corps officer, uses the following
language: “The highest ranks [have become populated], by careerists,
people who have gotten where they are by checking all the boxes and not
taking risks.” 22 Moreover, opinion pieces, books, blogs, academic works,
and political cartoons commonly attribute self-serving motivations and
bureaucratic behaviors to the establishment.23
Schoomaker recognized Walter Reed’s early public affairs strategy
paid little attention to the perception gap between AVF and senior
leadership.24 Even after sacking senior leaders, “we [continued to] put
general officers in front of [the media] and when we did, we exacerbated
the distance between the public and us.” 25 The ages and ranks appearing
in the media confirmed the public’s biases. Instead of seeing the heroism
previously displayed by those in the senior military ranks, the public
perceived the generals and senior leaders as self-serving bureaucrats. To
rectify this issue, Schoomaker intentionally minimized the presence of
generals and senior leaders as the face of Walter Reed in press conferences.
Differences between the stereotypes used to characterize senior
leaders and the remainder of the AVF make media accounts of
misconduct more harmful for senior leaders than junior ranks. In the
former group, the messages reinforce negative stereotypes. In the latter,
they are at such odds with the prevailing perception as to be considered
the behavior of outliers. By persisting in the profession, senior leaders
outlast the crisis for which they were called upon as saviors and expose
self-serving impetuses. In contrast, soldiers become increasingly
unassailable in respect and admiration. Because public respect for
22      James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military,” Atlantic (January/February 2015).
23      Richard Halloran, “Washington Talk: Military Careers; Air Force and Marines Battle ‘Ticket
Punchers,’ ” New York Times, April 25, 1988; and Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, “How a Careerist Culture
Leads to Military Scandals,” American Conservative, February 18, 2014.
24      For examples of contemporary political cartoons prepared by such cartoonists Pat Oliphant,
Jim Borgman, R.J. Matson, and Lyle Lahey, see Callahan, Forty Days of Winter.
25      Schoomaker, interview.
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the military has grown while opinions of its caretaking agents have
remained stagnant, the perception gap has widened.

The Boundaries

If the public regards soldiers as a heroic elite, then the medical and
support establishment must do so as well. Without such alignment,
the perception gap will result in crises of the scale and type of Walter
Reed. The factors leading to the physical, climatic, and bureaucratic
conditions in Walter Reed were complex and multidimensional. Even
so, many would argue the root cause was the simple fact that hospital
leadership and staff did not perceive their patients with the same
reverence as the public.
While the boundaries between the AVF and the establishment are
clear to the public, they are more difficult to discern from the inside.
Within Walter Reed’s walls, patients, staff, and leaders worked together
in constantly changing teams in ways that obscured the boundaries
between the establishment and the AVF.26 As a result, staff and leadership
did not understand that public adulation for the mythical soldier had
elevated patients to a status higher than the one they perceived and had
come to expect for themselves.
Factors other than physical mixing contributed to this ignorance:
Walter Reed’s staff included hundreds of soldiers such as Weightman,
who was a combat veteran that had spent his career serving with
soldiers. Many Walter Reed staffers were Operation Iraqi Freedom
veterans, and the hospital routinely and cyclically deployed its staff
to the war. The uniformed members of the staff, and many civilians,
received their care at Walter Reed, which routinely associated them with
the wounded. Members of the Walter Reed treatment team were revered
alongside the wounded in previous news features about the campus.
The unit won an Army Superior Unit award for its early work in the war.
The wounded wanted to remain in close proximity to Walter Reed even
though it was an acute, tertiary care hospital and not a rehabilitation
center.27 Proud of its medical services, the hospital respected these
wishes. Finally, Walter Reed workers developed traditional providerpatient alliances with the wounded. A division between patients and
providers in terms of goals, approach, and motivation was anathema
to their bonds. Although the system was inefficient, leaders, providers,
administrators, and patients navigated it, as best they could, together.
The Washington Post articles revealed the error in the collective
attitude at Walter Reed. Colonel Charles “Chuck” Callahan, the hospital’s
senior physician in 2007, described the impact of the articles on the
staff’s vision of reality: “The hospital staff failed [the patients]. Among
staff members [at Walter Reed], the Post’s articles evoked an incredulity
26      The author observed this dynamic as a physician at Walter Reed from September 2003–
June 2006.
27       Charles “Chuck” Callahan, “The Perfect Strom: Walter Reed, the Wounded and the
Washington Post 2007” (strategy research project, US Army War College, 2008), 1.
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shared with the American public, and when we were honest with
ourselves, we asked along with the public, ‘How did an organization that
was the most successful in history . . . break down?’ ” 28 The hospital’s
leadership recognized the shift of its public perception from highly
regarded to negligent was justified. Leaders at all levels had “failed as
systems thinkers.” 29 By choosing to accept, on a day-to-day basis, the
constraints of the system, they represented a traditional bureaucracy—
impersonal, inflexible, and accepting little accountability to change the
rigid processes.
The hospital staff mixing among, familiarizing with, and commonly
bonding with the AVF offers the beginning of an answer as to why more
efficient administrative processes were not offered to patients. A fixture
of Army life is a requirement to thrive in austere conditions. Luxury,
in the Army, was once considered “three hots (warm meals) and a cot.”
At the organizational level, leaders have waited months for pay and
administrative issues to be resolved, essential equipment to be repaired,
and key positions to be filled. Acquiring modern equipment routinely
takes decades, exceeds budgets, and falls short of promises. These flaws
create the climate of the military lifestyle. Survival in this atmosphere
requires resilience and stoicism. To be successful, leaders adopt can-do
attitudes that enable them to contend with the conditions of austerity
and scarcity experienced in combat and peace. Soldiers are conditioned
never to ask for luxury and to complain only in the guise of humor.
Schoomaker identified this tendency during the investigation
at Walter Reed: The hospital commander “had visibility of what the
problems were—but was unable to solve them . . . [for] compelling
reasons . . . I had to reprimand him not for failing to recognize what
was happening but because he did not notify higher command . . . He
was such a terrific soldier that he was unwilling to call attention to the
issues.” 30 Instead, the commander endured the resourcing deficiencies
and strove to complete the mission with what he had. Representative
Christopher H. Shays also insightfully identified this predisposition as a
cause for the conditions at Walter Reed.31
The events of Walter Reed demonstrate the public expects leaders
to overcome resourcing constraints to ensure the care, boarding,
protection, and equipping of modern warriors matches their heroic
station. According to Schoomaker, if there is a lesson to be learned from
Walter Reed, it is that leaders must fight the tendency to “drive on”
in resource-constrained environments. Instead, they must elevate the
existence of subpar physical and administrative conditions to the level
needed to assure correction.32
28      Chuck Callahan “To Stay a Soldier,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009).
29      Schoomaker, interview.
30      Schoomaker, interview.
31      CQ Transcripts Wire, “Congressional Hearing on Walter Reed Army Medical Center, House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,” Washington Post, March 5, 2007.
32      Schoomaker, interview.

TOC

22

Parameters 48(3) Autumn 2018

The establishment’s physical proximity to the AVF has implications
beyond knowledge and stoic acceptance of routine working conditions.
It has insider knowledge regarding the motivations for volunteering for
military service. Unlike the public, neither the AVF nor the establishment
can reflexively accept altruism as a unifying motivation for military
service. Except in the most existential crises, patriotism alone cannot
be used as the sole incentive to raise an army of volunteers. Instead,
recruitment policies must appeal to personal interests. Such reasoning
helped create the AVF of 2007 and 2008.
As the military changed its methodology from conscription to
volunteerism in the 1970s, monetary rewards were incorporated into the
new force. In fact, the famed Noble Prize-winning, free market-capitalist,
Milton Friedman, was a key voice in the Gates Commission, which
charted the Army’s conversion from a conscripted to a volunteer force.33
As a result, military pay was made more competitive with civilian
wages, and financial incentives such as combat and hazardous duty pay
were put in place for high-risk missions or specialized skills. Additional
bonuses are offered at key decision points to retain soldiers on active
duty. Finally, the military still offers a traditional lifetime pension
plan after 20 years of service, one that has not been retained in other
professions. Unlike the public, those immersed in the AVF cannot
clearly identify where altruism ends and private interests begin. Financial
incentives destroy a member’s ability to rely upon simple heuristics to
categorize other volunteers into dichotomous groups of patriots and
careerists, heroes and villains. Senior ranks at Walter Reed did not buy
into the soldier-as-exceptional myth as completely as the public because
they lived in a more complicated reality.

The Expectations

The public’s simplified perception of the all-volunteer force did not
develop in a vacuum. To counteract potential impressions of a mercenary
force, the military has, as a matter of policy, encouraged the public to
assign paternalistic and altruistic motivations to it.34 To this day, the
military crafts its image to resemble the superheroes of mainstream
American culture. Recruiting advertisements portray servicemembers
as possessing dual identities. In combat, they are fierce warriors masked
by protective equipment and in control of marvelous futuristic machines
capable of extraordinary destruction. In peace, they are good-looking,
selfless, and patriotic in their dress uniforms.
Led by Army Chief of Staff General William Westmoreland, the
founders of the AVF recognized this desired image of the emerging force
required different support than that of the conscripted force. To maintain
recruitment and to shape the AVF’s public image, benefits expanded to
33      Thomas S. Gates et. al., The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force
(Washington, DC: President’s Commission, 1970).
34      Jennifer Mittelstadt, The Rise of the Military Welfare State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2015), 45.
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include health, education, and insurance programs; personal quarters;
and administrative infrastructure. These features invited the public to
imagine the AVF as a family, cared for and united by common values.
To maintain this image, the military has improved benefits over
the past 45 years to match social expectations. Even during combat in
Iraq, the establishment provided soldiers with catered meals, private
air-conditioned living quarters, and indulgences such as internet cafes.
Without any signal to suggest otherwise, the military will continue its
journey upward not only in public perception but also in ensuring its
existence meets all the conditions suitable to its elevated station. Even
so, such a transformation will require eliminating what was once the
status quo. Such change is not always predictable, smooth, or easy.
Walter Reed demonstrates at least one case in which the evolutionary
pace of providing combat matériel and services eclipsed the progress of
administrative processes on the home front.
This line of thought opens a new aperture through which to
evaluate whether the events at Walter Reed were the simple failures
of a few poor leaders or an inevitable step in the public’s effort to
ensure its force was treated appropriately. By illustrating an antiquated
and insensitive bureaucracy, Walter Reed provided the energy and
urgency needed to usher in several new programs that rapidly benefited
the nation’s wounded. The Army created warrior transition units to
manage medical transitions properly and introduced soldier and family
assistance centers to provide nonmedical support. The disability system
was reformed to reduce substantially the timelines required to process
benefits. The consequences of the disruptive changes on the existing
establishment were necessary for equalizing the public’s expectations
with the care provided to wounded servicemembers of the AVF. Walter
Reed demonstrates the success of the 1970s image for the all-volunteer
force. The modern public will support its heroic military whatever the
cost, which is an important lesson of Walter Reed and a cautionary tale
for the Defense Health Agency.

The Protection

The Somalia intervention (1992–94), the Khobar Towers bombing
(1996), and the Kosovo conflict (1998–99) provide examples of the
American public’s “excessive aversion to casualties” altering military
responses.35 With the events at Walter Reed demonstrating such feelings
have grown to an “aversion to austerity” for its military class, the
possibility that the United States will experience greater constraints
on military employment should be considered. Conversely, some claim
that the very qualities that make the AVF cherished by the public—a
willingness to fight and to sacrifice—make it more liberally employable
by the government, possibly even encouraging national adventurism.

35      Edward Dorn and Howard D. Graves, American Military Culture in the Twenty-first Century
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), 21.
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Contemporary military critic John A. Nagl states, “The American
public is completely willing to let this professional class of volunteers
serve where they should, for wise purpose. This gives the president much
greater freedom of action.” 36 Others—such as historian and international
relations professor Andrew J. Bacevich—testify the situation is more
menacing: “By rescinding their prior acceptance of conscription, the
American people effectively opted out of war.” 37 Since “they have no
skin in the game, they will permit the state to do whatever it wishes
to do.” 38 Finally, if nothing changes, “Americans can look forward to
more needless wars or shadow conflicts . . . more wars that exact huge
penalties without yielding promised outcomes.” 39
While history indicates a trend of increased American military
expeditionary intervention, no evidence supports the contention that
the public has or will become indifferent to the well-being of the AVF
in times of hardship. Such analysis is at odds with the adulation of
the military discussed previously. Indeed, the public’s reaction to the
conditions at Walter Reed disproves the hypothesis. To suggest the
government and its military could be divorced from the people would
mean Clausewitz’s elements of reason and chance could be isolated
from passion. The bonds between the military and the people are not
weakening but strengthening. Contrary to Bacevich’s claims, it is the
bonds between the military and the government that are fraying.
Underestimating the public’s power and desire to affect war is a pit
into which senior military leaders have repeatedly fallen. Public support
for military intervention varies according to the nature of the threat,
the merit and progress of the endeavor, and ultimately, its cost. This
last variable, cost—particularly human cost—is what has changed in
the era of the AVF, the age of instant information, and the period of
military heroism.
Only when the US military encounters success at little human
cost will the public remain silent. But the human costs are increasingly
visible. Furthermore, even relatively rare losses or inequities may
produce soul-touching impact in the realm of public opinion—as they
did at Walter Reed. When the internet and mainstream media deliver
stories of human injustice or tragedy, no matter how tactically or
statistically insignificant, public emotion of strategic scale may emerge.
Because superheroes are held in such high esteem, harm to them is
abhorrent. As they are killed, disfigured, or mistreated, their anonymity
is lifted, and without armor, they appear smaller, younger, ordinary,
and vulnerable. In the moment their sacrifice is realized, they instantly

36      James Fallows, “Tragedy of the American Military.”
37      Andrew J. Bacevich, “Ending Endless War: A Pragmatic Military Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95,
no. 5 (September/October 2016): 40.
38     Andrew J. Bacevich, “The New American Way of War,” London Review of Books (blog),
February 13, 2012.
39      Andrew J. Bacevich, Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country (New
York, NY: Metropolitan, 2013), 190.
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resemble our children, and it matters not whether the force volunteered
or was conscripted.
A public united to oppose the harm or discomfort affecting its
heroes will retain the power to affect the course of warfare through its
representatives in Congress. After reflexively criticizing the self-serving
character and marginal competence of military and civilian leaders, the
public will intervene to hobble the establishment’s power and limit its
autonomy with the AVF. Specifically, excessive demands may be made to
draft defensive rules of engagement, to make major changes in strategy,
to withdrawal from combat, or to fast-track protective equipment at the
cost of other acquisition programs.
In a salient example of the latter, Congress, reacting to public
outcry over the death and injury of soldiers in Iraq due to primitive
roadside explosive devices, demanded the immediate acquisition of safer
vehicles for troops. The acquisition of mine-resistant, ambush protected
vehicles occurred at a cost. Specifically, many of the military’s major
modernization efforts were abandoned, which contributed to persisting
strategic vulnerabilities. Hence, the US national security apparatus will
increasingly need to consider the public’s feelings about the AVF as too
precious to lose and too honored to harm. Otherwise, with time, the
force may only be available for threats of the most existential kind.

The Solutions

More resources need to be applied to understanding the strategic
implications of an AVF for America. Specifically, leaders should strive
to understand how to maintain and to deploy a small, anonymous, and
elite force, a force to whom the public will accord proud confidence and
protection. Ironically, the bonds between a society and its guardians
have been explored more in blockbuster movies than in serious
academic triangles.
The problem defined in this article provides a place to begin
understanding what it will mean to live in a modern America in which
a group of elites provides collective security. Because this reality will
not be easily disentangled from its DNA, its decades-old historical
foundations, and the mass impact of myth, understanding it will be
every bit as challenging as understanding future battle.
Work at the tactical and operational levels offers a logical parallel. In
the multidomain battlefield of the future, the ability to collect information
and act upon it rapidly will be decisive. As a result, battlefield sensors
are being developed on scales from microscopic to aircraft-sized. At the
strategic level, the inability to sense public opinion may lead to a loss
of situational awareness, the widening of perception gaps, and finally,
frequent self-imposed strategic surprises.
To avoid such events, it would be wise to design polls, surveys, focus
groups, and red-team equivalents to map the ever-changing relationship
between government, people, and military. Had such mechanisms existed
between 2003 and 2007, the establishment may have been able to react to
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early signals of the gap between the public’s expectations for wounded
soldiers and the care that was provided. Eventually, technology might
be leveraged to include new techniques such as predictive analytics, big
data mining, simulation, and modeling.
As mentioned, the Army already implemented a solution for Walter
Reed. As the Defense Health Agency matures, the organization should
ensure it does not rebuild the system it was designed to replace. Costs
and readiness must be balanced with patient experiences and satisfaction
or history will repeat itself.
The events examined in this study depended on the creation
of the AVF. Specifically, abandoning the draft, over time, created a
largely anonymous force of tremendous agency and perceived altruistic
motivations. Forty-five years later, with the help of lessons drawn from
Walter Reed, we are beginning to understand the repercussions of an
AVF in American society. Specifically, the relationship between the
government, the public, and the AVF is such that the public elevates the
AVF by attributing superhero characteristics and status to it.
Such a status widens the gap between the all-volunteer force and
the establishment that governs it—framing civilian and military leaders
as self-serving and therefore below the force in character. The public
increasingly supports the highest care, protection, and treatment of
the AVF. The establishment’s proximity and insider knowledge limits
it from completely aligning its perceptions with the public—creating
blind spots and turbulent transitions.
Finally, the perception gap between the AVF and the agents of its
management will increasingly lead the public to intervene in the conduct
of war as standards for the treatment of servicemembers heighten.
Without indicators to forecast these phenomena, new constraints may
develop regarding the nation’s ability to employ its military.
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ABSTRACT: This article commemorates the centennial of the
First World War by highlighting some lessons for effective coalition
warfare. By building relationships, planning cooperative institutions,
learning from each other, and furthering influence, US leaders
and policymakers can more effectively collaborate with America’s
international partners.

N

ovember marked the centennial of the Allied victory in the
First World War. A war of many firsts—tanks, submarines,
armed aircraft, and wireless telegraphy—it was also the first
truly modern coalition war. For the Allies on the Western Front, the
challenge was how to join armies with different, if not conflicting,
national interests, languages, equipment, cultures, and traditions. France
and Great Britain, along with some twenty other nations, and later
the United States, learned through trial and error to conduct effective
combined operations.
The Allies absorbed at least four critical lessons in coalition warfare
to defeat Germany. First, professional contacts and personal relationships
forged in peacetime are critical in managing wartime relations as well
as unifying purposes and actions. Second, a coalition’s battlefield
effectiveness critically depends on institutional machinery for politicalmilitary planning to manage intra-alliance uncertainties and fears, and in
turn, generate well-integrated and cohesive combined operations. Third,
coalition warfare, with allies serving as important conduits of wartime
learning, promotes and facilitates military adaptation and innovation.
Finally, unity of command is essential to the coalition, but the effective
exercise of that command rests mainly on consultative leadership rather
than formal authority.
These hard-won lessons are no less relevant today. The United
States has waged all its major wars and military interventions alongside
allies on the battlefield.1 American security strategy still falls squarely
within this foreign policy tradition.2 Indeed, US defense strategy aims to
“strengthen and evolve our alliances and partnerships into an extended
network capable of deterring or decisively acting to meet the shared
The author would like to acknowledge Drs. M Taylor Fravel, Kevin C. Holzimmer, John T.
LaSaine Jr., Barry R. Posen, Daryl G. Press, Dan Reiter, and Caitlin Talmadge; Wg Cdr Richard M.
Milburn; and the anonymous reviewers at Parameters.
1      Scholars generally regard the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War (1846–48), and the
Spanish-American War (1898) as notable exceptions to this tradition of coalition warmaking. See
Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusade State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 39–56.
2      Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017).
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challenges of our time.” 3 With such an emphasis on partnering, the
lessons of the past cannot be ignored; they hold some of the answers to
today’s challenges.

Peacetime Relationships Pay Dividends

In the absence of institutional machinery to coordinate the Allied
war effort, professional contacts and personal relationships were critical
to managing international relations and unifying purposes and actions.
Although few in number, professional and personal relationships forged
among the Allies prior to 1914 contributed to greater coalition military
effectiveness, and hence wartime success.4 Between 1906 and 1910, then
Brigadier-General Henry Hughes Wilson, served as commandant of the
Staff College at Camberley, Surrey. In 1909, Wilson arranged to visit his
French counterpart at the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris, then
Brigadier-General Ferdinand Foch, to establish “intimate relations with
a French soldier who, already in those days, enjoyed a certain European
reputation as a military writer and thinker on the art of war.” 5
Although Foch was at first unimpressed, he was soon won over by
Wilson’s enthusiasm and openness, as well as his command of the French
language. Wilson returned in January and October 1910, in February
1911, three times in 1912, on four occasions in 1913, and once in 1914.6
Foch paid return visits to Britain in June 1910 and December 1912.
On these occasions, Wilson showed him not only the Staff College but
also introduced him to senior government officials and most of Britain’s
senior commanders.7 A close professional and personal relationship
emerged from these contacts.
When conflict arose on the Western Front, these intimate ties played
an important role in binding the French and British armies together.
During the Race to the Sea following the Battle of Marne, Allied
military relations deteriorated over differences of military strategy. The
British Expeditionary Force moved further north, positioning itself on
the far left of the French line, with a view towards taking independent
action. Meanwhile, the relief expedition for the Siege of Antwerp ended
in failure, which the British were quick to blame on a lack of French
support.8 Amid worsening relations, Foch was appointed to coordinate

3      James “Jim” Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (NDS) (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, 2018), 8.
4      On the role of preexisting personal relationships and transnational collaboration from civilian
scientists to military officers, see Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the
British Army, 1914–18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 137–63.
5      Sir Charles E. Callwell, ed., Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries, vol. 1 (New
York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1927), 77.
6      Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War General (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 10.
7      Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854–1914 (London: Routledge, 2015),
261; Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 74; and Michael S Neiberg, Foch: Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War (Dulles, VA:
Potomac Books, 2003), 13.
8      Roy A. Prete, Strategy and Command: The Anglo-French Coalition on the Western Front, 1914
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 128–40.
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the operations of the French, British, and Belgian armies in Flanders.9
In this role, Foch found himself again working closely with Wilson to
manage the prickly British commander in chief, Sir John French, also
his superior in rank.10
With Wilson as subchief of staff at the British headquarters, a close
liaison developed between the two armies, and Foch was able to gain
Sir John’s confidence and persuade him to hold fast.11 Wilson wrote to
his wife:
I am spending a good deal of time these days with Foch on the curious hill
on the way between Ypres and St. Omer [that is, Foch’s headquarters at
Cassel]. We have got our troops so much mixed up with his that no order can
be issued without the other’s approval, etc. I think we are going to beat this
attack with the aid the French have given us. It has been a stiff business.12

Importantly, the two generals were able to communicate honestly
with each other, including Wilson conveying Sir John’s changing state
of mind. Thus, Foch was helped to find the right words with Sir John—
always tactful, reassuring, and deferential—to bring the British around
to his side.13 In the end, the Allied line was pushed back but never
broke. The situation had been saved due in large measure to the decisive
influence of the Foch-Wilson relationship.

Planning Institutions Enable Success

Institutional machinery for common political-military planning
made a critical difference in coalition battlefield effectiveness. Before
1916, the Allies lacked such machinery, and as a result, fought together
ineffectively. To the extent combined planning occurred at all, it was
limited to an exchange of views among the Entente Powers. Staff talks
were held between France and Britain in 1905 and intermittently after
1911 to establish logistical arrangements for the dispatch of the British
to France.14 These talks never worked out what would happen once the

9      The German objective was twofold: to threaten the British through seize of the Channel ports
with operations by submarine, aircraft, and airships and to secure German lines of communications
through Belgium. Otto Schwink, Ypres 1914: An Official Account Published by Order of the German
General Staff (London: Constable and Company, 1919), 1–12; and Ian F. W. Beckett, Ypres: The First
Battle, 1914 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 15–17. On Foch’s appointment and coordination of the
Allied armies in Flanders, see William J. Philpott, Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western
Front, 1914–1918 (Bassingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 31–50; Neiberg, Foch, 31–44; Greenhalgh, Foch in
Command, 43–73; and Prete, Strategy and Command, 119–83.
10     The British, for their part, were anxious to disengage and retreat the relative safety of Calais
and Boulogne. If the British were to fall back, and thus away, from French and Belgian forces, the
Allies would have been liable to defeat in detail. See George H Cassar, The Tragedy of Sir John French
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1985), 254.
11    In Flanders, Foch had little choice but to inspire confidence, as he had no formal authority
over the Belgian and British armies. See Prete, Strategy and Command, 173.
12      Wilson quoted in Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, 68.
13    Cassar, Tragedy, 156; Elizabeth Greenhalgh, “Liaisons Not So Dangerous: First World War
Liaison Officers and Marshal Ferdinand Foch,” in Finding Common Ground: New Directions in First
World War Studies, ed. Jennifer D. Keene and Michael S. Neiberg (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 187–208,
especially 192; and Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition: Britain and France During the First
World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 75–102.
14    For the seminal study of Franco-British prewar staff talks, see Samuel R Williamson, The
Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1969).
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armies took the field of battle—specifically whether the British would
join the French line or conduct independent operations in Belgium.15
With the outbreak of war, coalition political-military planning was
little better. The Allies still relied on normal diplomatic channels, in
addition to a few ad hoc and hasty meetings arranged between Allied
commanders.16 But wartime decisions had to be taken quickly and
required “direct and frequent consultations between the principal
ministers concerned,” politicians and soldiers alike.17 Thus, each Allied
headquarters devised its own operations, leaving liaison officers with
the herculean task of combining them into a single plan. But the liaison
mechanism alone was insufficient to the task.18
The liaison missions attached to each headquarters “might arrange
details,” British liaison officer Edward Spears observed, “but they
could not break down the water-tight compartment in which each
staff worked, nor had they the authority to determine whether any
fundamental divergence of conception, any charge of heart or mind,
had occurred in the commanders.” 19 Instead, the best the Allies could
manage in the words of British Prime Minister David Lloyd George was
a poor “tailoring operation,” in which “different plans were stitched
together” to obscure rather than resolve differences.20
The resulting military performance was accordingly abysmal. In
August 1914, the Allies often fought at cross-purposes, routinely left
each other in the lurch, and only slowly responded to German advances.
During the Battle of Charleroi-Mons, for example, the operational
objectives of the French and British armies were at odds—the British
Expeditionary Force marched forward to take to the offensive, the
adjacent French army halted its advance and shifted to the defensive,
and the British were left marching forward in an exposed position.21
Instead of meeting the enemy together, the French and British fought
a series of uncoordinated actions and beat a hasty retreat. Indeed, the
French retired without so much as a word of warning to their British
ally, forcing the British to leave in haste, which opened a nine-mile gap
between the two armies.22
To his credit, the French commander in chief, General JosephJacques-Césaire Joffre, devised a new scheme to counterattack.
Unfortunately, much valuable time and territory was lost in trying to
15      Beyond the concentration zone, the French had no fixed plans for the action of the British
Expeditionary Force in the field. More generally, historian Robert Doughty argues that Plan XVII,
which included a secret annex that anticipated any British intervention to take position left of
the battle line, was little more than “a concentration plan with operational alternatives.” Robert
A Doughty, “French Strategy in 1914: Joffre’s Own,” Journal of Military History 67, no. 2 (April
2003): 427–54; and Robert A Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 17–57.
16      Jehuda Lothar Wallach, Uneasy Coalition: The Entente Experience in World War I (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 76; Philpott, Anglo-French Relations, 23–24, 93–95; Greenhalgh, Victory
through Coalition, 36–40; and Prete, Strategy and Command, 52, 70–71.
17      Sir Maurice Hankey, “Diplomacy by Conference,” Round Table XI (1920–21), 287–311.
18      See Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, 75.
19 Sir Edward Spears, Liaison, 1914: A Narrative of the Great Retreat (London: W.
Heinemann, 1930), 119–20.
20     David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (London: Nicholson &
Watson, 1934), 2407.
21      John Terraine, Mons, The Retreat to Victory (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2002), 49–51.
22      Adrian Gilbert, Challenge of Battle: The British Army’s Baptism of Fire in the First World War
(Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2014), 157.

TOC

On Alliances and Coalitions

Grieco

31

gain his ally’s cooperation.23 As Spears observed, “General Joffre must
have felt himself helpless, unable to adjust to differences he could only
guess at, fettered by not being able to issue orders to the British soldier.” 24
Instead, the decision-making process came to a standstill, and the Allies
were unable to respond quickly and effectively to the German invasion.
The result was the loss of the richest industrial region of France for the
next four years.25
The coalition managed to avoid complete disaster at the Marne, but
even then, the Allies fought poorly together. On the eve of battle, the
British retired to the south as the French prepared to move forward.
These disjointed movements placed the British Expeditionary Force
some fifteen miles from its intended starting line and too far behind the
French to play its assigned role in the campaign—the spearhead of the
attack.26 Instead of a single plan of operations, two plans had emerged
for a counterattack against the German right flank, each of which asked
the British to occupy a different position.27 And no institutional
mechanism existed to forge the opposing schemes into a single plan.
Instead, the British exploited the confusion, turning their role in the
counteroffensive into a supporting one.28 Though Joffre was in a position
to encircle and destroy the entire German First Army, he could do little
to bring the requisite coalition battlefield cooperation about in time.29
The tragedy of the Marne was that it fell short of the victory it might
have been, owing to the absence of allied institutions.
In the face of mounting casualties, however, Allied leaders finally
began building the institutional machinery for common politicalmilitary planning. The first such effort was a hastily organized summit
of senior political and military leaders convened at Calais and Chantilly
in July and December 1915. These summits marked the first concerted
effort to forge a common strategy—a combined Franco-British offensive
at the Somme.30 The planning process entailed numerous written
exchanges, telephone contacts, and frequent visits between the French
and British commands.31 Whereas the Allies previously drew up separate
plans before attempting to coordinate them through slow diplomatic
channels, they initiated this plan together and continued their close
collaboration until the eve of battle.32
23      Joseph Joffre, Mémoires du maréchal Joffre, 1910–1917 (Paris: Plon, 1932), 300.
24      Spears, Liaison, 230.
25      The occupied northern regions of France included three quarters of the French coast and
four-fifths of French iron and steel. See Robert O. Paxton and Julie Hessler, Europe in the Twentieth
Century (Cengage Learning, 2011), 87, 230.
26      Holger H Herwig, The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle that Changed the
World (New York: Random House, 2009), 254.
27      Sewell Tappan Tyng, The Campaign of the Marne, 1914 (New York: Longmans, 1935), 211–22.
28      Prete, Strategy and Command, 115–22.
29      Herwig, Marne, 254, 291.
30      At the same time, a series of proposals made the rounds for the creation of sort of
permanent allied council to coordinate political and military strategy. For the time being, however,
such proposals came to naught. See Wallach, Uneasy Coalition, 75–81.
31      Peter Simkins, “For Better or for Worse: Sir Henry Rawlinson and His Allies in 1916 and
1918,” in Leadership in Conflict, 1914–1918, ed. Matthew Hughes and Matthew Seligmann (Barnsley:
Leo Cooper, 2000), 15.
32      For the effect of Verdun on the planning process, see Elizabeth Greenhalgh, “Why the
British Were on the Somme in 1916,” War in History 6, no. 2 (April 1999): 147–73; William Philpott,
“Why the British Were Really on the Somme: A Reply to Elizabeth Greenhalgh,” War in History 9,
no. 4 (October 2002): 446–71; and Elizabeth Greenhalgh, “Flames over the Somme: A Retort to
William Philpott,” War in History 10, no. 3 (July 2003): 335–42.
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Critically, the establishment of coalition institutions for military
planning led to observable improvements in battlefield effectiveness.
Lost in the drama of the Somme is the emerging Allied capacity to
fight as a cohesive combined force. On the basic idea of the operation,
a combined Franco-British attack along a broad front, there was a
fundamental convergence between the two Allies that resulted directly
from their frequent contact and staff meetings.33 Importantly, the
movements of the two armies were closely coordinated: French artillery
kept up a steady barrage south of the river to prevent the Germans
from enfilading British units to the north.34 Franco-British battlefield
performance had improved, and for reasons directly attributable to
adopting coalition planning machinery.

Coalitions Facilitate Learning, Innovation, and Adaptation

As the combatants adapted to the challenges of modern warfare,
they learned from each other. In 1914, the British officer corps did
not believe it had much to learn from the French, but this sentiment
dissipated in 1916 with the heavy losses suffered during the First Battle
of the Somme.35 Thereafter, the British made a sincere effort to study
French techniques. British officers visited French formations over the
winter of 1916–17 to observe and to report on French methods for
organizing defenses, coordinating artillery and infantry efforts, and
training troops.36 They gave particular attention to “new” French tactics
rooted in a more decentralized, elastic doctrine that allowed platoon
commanders greater latitude to attack in small, dispersed teams.37
Many of these French tactical developments were codified into two key
manuals—Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action and The
Normal Formation for the Attack—which guided British infantry training
and tactics until the end of the war.38
Collaborative learning occurred at all levels of and across all sectors
of the Allied front. Much of this learning was horizontal and localized,
often occurring at the junction of French and British formations.
By observing the operational and tactical methods of their allies,
commanders were forced to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses
of their own practices.39 A visit to the French Fifth Army by the chief
of staff of the British XV Corps in February 1917 identified many
33      Martin Gilbert, The Somme: Heroism and Horror in the First World War (New York: Henry
Holt, 2006), 49.
34      William Philpott, Three Armies on the Somme: The First Battle of the Twentieth Century (New York,
NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 171–72.
35      Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, 61–63.
36      Chris Kempshall, British, French and American Relations on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (Cham,
Switzerland: Springer, 2018), 8, 130.
37      The Canadian General Sir Arthur Currie served as a knowledge conduit, observing French
formations at Verdun and propogating such information between French, British, and Canadian
formations. See Mark Osborne Humphries, “ ‘Old Wine in New Bottles’: A Comparison of British
and Canadian Preparations for the Battle of Arras,” in Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment, ed.
Geoffrey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci, and Mike Bechthold (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University
Press, 2007), 65–86; and Fox, Learning to Fight, 148–50.
38      British Expeditionary Force (BEF), Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action,
Stationary Service Pamphlet (SS) 143 (London, General Headquarters, February 1917); and BEF,
The Normal Formation for the Attack, SS144 (London: General Headquarters, February 1917). See
also, Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914–1918: Defeat into Victory (London:
Routledge, 2005), 95.
39      Fox, Learning to Fight, 151–52.
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similarities between French and British methods. But it also revealed
the need for additional improvements to British fire and maneuver.40
Although some efforts were made after 1916 to translate and
distribute French tactical manuals, most of the lessons passed informally
between French and British soldiers, and spread to the newly arriving
American units through personal contacts or formal instruction. The
British and the French established missions in the United States to train
their new ally in trench warfare and continued their tutelage at training
camps in France. These interactions exposed American units to the
latest French and British army tactics—even if senior officers such as
General John J. Pershing resisted the new combat methods, limited the
effective transfer of knowledge, and thus contributed to thousands of
needless US casualties.41
In a war in which success ultimately depended on learning and
adapting doctrine faster than the enemy, fighting alongside allies
conferred significant advantages. American soldiers would most
certainly have fared better if their leaders had exploited this advantage
to its full potential. Fortunately, a number of division and lower-level
commanders were more open to these lessons from Allies and learned
to fight like the French and British.42 Intra-alliance learning was thus a
critical, albeit often overlooked factor in understanding how and why
the Allies eventually defeated Germany in the First World War.

Persuasive Leadership Builds Influence

Of all the lessons learned in the war, unity of command was the
most important. Independent command was tried for the first three
years of the war, to disastrous results. From the start, the British
remained an autonomous force, acting in collaboration with, but not
under the control of, the larger French army. The orders given to the
British commander in chief were unequivocal on this point: “I wish you
distinctly to understand that your command is an entirely independent
one, and that you will in no case come in any sense under the order of
any Allied General.” 43
These parallel command arrangements weakened coalition
effectiveness on the battlefield. Each ally pursued its own national
interests, and cooperation during battles depended entirely on
continuing goodwill, particularly the willingness of British and French

40      Fox, Learning to Fight, 152.
41      Kempshall, Relations on the Western Front, 8, 159–89. See also Kenneth E. Hamburger, Learning
Lessons in the American Expeditionary Forces, Publication 24-1 (Washington, DC: United States Army
Center for Military History, 1997); Jeffrey LaMonica, American Tactical Advancement in World War I:
The New Lessons of Combined Arms and Open Warfare (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2017), 59–76; and
Mark Ethan Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 39–58.
42      LaMonica, American Tactical Advancement, 61; and Grotelueschen, AEF Way, 200–310.
43      “Instructions to Sir John French from Lord Kitchener,” August 1914, in Military Operations,
France and Belgium, 1914: Mons, the Retreat to the Seine, the Marne and the Aisne, August–October 1914,
comp. James Edward Edmonds (London: Macmillan, 1933), 499. When Sir Douglas Haig assumed
command from Sir John at the end of 1915, he received almost identical orders to those of his
predecessor, reaffirming the independence of British command. “Instructions for General Sir D.
Haig, G.C.B., K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O. Commanding the Expeditionary Force in France,” December 28,
1916, in Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, comp. James E. Edmonds (London: Macmillian,
1932), Appendix 5.
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commanders to conform to the other’s plan.44 The limitations of these
command arrangements brought the Allies close to defeat in the spring
of 1918. When the first German spring offensive threatened to separate
the French and British armies and to roll up each in turn, both allies
placed national interests above all else. The French withdrew south to
cover Paris while the British moved north to guard the ports along the
English Channel.45 Lloyd George diagnosed the problem: “Each general
was interested mainly in his own front.” 46 Absent Allied mechanisms for
unity of command to order both the French and British to keep in touch,
coalition battlefield cohesion was lost.
At the moment of supreme crisis in March 1918, the Allies finally
adopted some semblance of a unified command, charging Foch with
“the coordination of the military operations of the Allied armies on
the western front.” 47 Eight days later, the Allies increased his power to
include “strategic direction of military operations” and conferred upon
him the “all powers necessary to secure [its] effective realization.” 48 In
this new role, Foch appreciated better than anyone else that his power
to command derived more from persuasion than any formal authority
to issue orders.49 He likened his command to that of the “leader of an
orchestra,” explaining, “Here are the English basses, here the American
baritones, and there the French tenors. When I raise my baton, every
man must play or else he must not come to my concert.”50
He exercised his command with a leadership style centered on
personal diplomacy, tact, and energetic exhortation. He exuded
command presence, consulting in person with commanders to shore
up resistance across the front. “He gives the impression of being frank,
loyal, and clear-sighted,” observed a captain on the French general
staff, “If I had to choose a motto for the general I think this would suit
him as well as another: ‘Clear vision.’ ” 51 In dealing with Allies, Foch
sought to influence, if not to command, and used his infectious energy
and determination to convince Allied commanders to carry through
his vision.
When the Germans launched a second spring offensive in Flanders,
Foch provided energy and strategic direction to the Allied defense.52
Acting through influence rather than coercion, he used his energy and
44      Prete, Strategy and Command, 94–97.
45      Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, 434–37; and David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and
Defeat in 1918 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 56.
46      Maurice Hankey, Diplomacy by Conference: Studies in Public Affairs, 1920–1946 (London:
Putnam, 1946), 21.
47      For a translation of the Doullens agreement signed March 26, 1918, see United States Army
in the World War, 1917–1919: Policy-Forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces, vol. 2
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), 254. On the American perspective on the
evolution to allied unity of command, see Tasker H. Bliss, “The Evolution of the Unified Command,”
Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (1922): 1–30. See also Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, 461; and Greenhalgh, Victory
through Coalition, 198.
48      For the minutes of the Beauvais Conference on April 3, 1918, see Policy-forming Documents, 277.
49      Raymond Recouly, Le mémorial de Foch: mes entretiens avec le maréchal (Paris: Les Editions de
France, 1929), 18–19.
50      Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. Colonel T. Bentley Mott (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1931), xvi.
51      Recouly, Le mémorial de Foch, 16.
52      See David T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 174–205; Peter Hart, 1918: A Very British Victory (London: Phoenix,
2008), 222–28; and Stevenson, With Our Backs, 68–78.
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confidence to fuse the allied armies together and hold the line. In his
words, he “pursued” the British in the north and French in the south,
to ensure both armies “held, sustained, [and] maintained.” 53 He was
open to persuasion, responding to Sir Douglas Haig’s calls for additional
reserves, yet never losing sight of his responsibility to consider the Allied
position on the Western Front as a whole.54 Weighing the dangers of
a possible third German offensive, he held back some reserves from
Flanders, sending to the north only what was absolutely necessary to
maintain the integrity of the line. The head of the British Mission with
the French Army was duly impressed, confessing, “Thank goodness
we have got a central authority to fight the battle as a whole.”55
When the time came to pass to the offensive, Foch gave new vigor
and direction to the combined attacks that continued until the Armistice
was in effect. Even the enemy recognized Foch’s contribution as critical
to Allied success in 1918: “The Entente has to thank General Foch
for successfully subordinating the divergent interests of the allies to a
higher, unified purpose.” 56 If leaders are those who are able to inspire
others to achieve a common goal, then Foch was the coalition military
leader par excellence.

Conclusion

One hundred years later, the First World War can help us prepare
more effectively for strategic competition and future wars. The 2018
National Defense Strateg y underscores the continued relevance of
America’s global alliances and partnerships and makes “strengthen[ing]
alliances and attract[ing] new partners” a core pillar of its strategic
approach. It declares “mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships
are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric advantage
that no competitor or rival can match.” 57 To render these security
relationships more capable, the strategy vows to “uphold a foundation
of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability,” “expand
regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning,” and
“deepen interoperability.” 58
If the First World War tells us anything, it is that coalitions with
preexisting networks of professional contacts, institutional mechanisms
for common planning, methods for intra-allied learning, and consultative
command cultures have the advantage in battle. Just as prewar
professional contacts between the French and British enhanced Allied
military effectiveness, today’s intra-allied professional relationships
contribute to more effective combined operations. Critically, these
working relationships foster cultural interoperability, or what the
British term “interoperability of the mind.” 59 Thus, while the current
national defense strategy is right to focus on deepening interoperability
53      Foch quoted in Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, 319.
54      Greenhalgh, Victory through Coalition, 206; and Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, 433–34.
55      Sir (George) Sidney Clive, diary entry, April 18, 1918, quoted in Greenhalgh, Victory through
Coalition, 212.
56      Quoted in David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, vol. 2 (London: Odhams
Press, 1938), 1836.
57      Mattis, NDS, 8.
58      Mattis, NDS, 9.
59      Steven Paget, “ ‘Interoperability of the Mind’ Professional Military Education and the
Development of Interoperability,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 4 (September 2016): 42–50.
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with US allies, the Pentagon must place greater emphasis on the human
dimension. If professional military education is a “strategic asset to
build trust and interoperability . . . with allied and partner forces,” so
too are combined multinational exercises, officer liaison and exchange
programs, and training programs that develop a common vocabulary, a
common way of thinking about combined operations.
As the Allied experience indicates, the United States will be more
likely to achieve its strategic objectives in the future by coordinating
action within formal, highly institutionalized alliances as opposed to
ad hoc coalitions of the willing. Some have questioned the value of
America’s longstanding treaty allies, and even labeled the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), with its complex, and sometimes ponderous,
decision-making processes “obsolete.” 60 But the extensive routines and
procedures of formal alliances make it easier to meld national military
capabilities and troop contributions into an effective combined military
force. NATO’s military structures, however imperfect, are still the
best way to enhance American military power when acting in concert
with others, particularly when facing a peer or near-peer competitor.
Indeed, the United States urgently needs to establish a more deeply
institutionalized alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific region, or expect
to put military effectiveness at risk.
Like the Allied militaries, today’s US military has as much to learn
as to teach. While the United States is right to demand its allies and
partners shoulder a larger share of the defense burden, it should not lose
sight of the many less tangible benefits of US alliances and coalitions,
specifically opportunities for intra-allied learning. There is also reason
for optimism on this score, as Secretary of Defense James Mattis has
promised, the Pentagon “will do more than just listen to other nations’
ideas. We will be willing to be persuaded by them.” 61 The United States
can and should benefit from the ideas of its strategic partners.
Finally, just as unity of command was the essential element of victory
in 1918, this guiding principle is still critical to success today. Yet it is so
difficult to achieve in practice. Ad hoc command arrangements hampered
US and allied efforts during operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
Libya.62 Difficulties with command are inherent to coalition wars;
governments abhor any perceived surrender of sovereignty. These
political dynamics complicate the task of a coalition commander. As
Foch learned, the exercise of coalition command depends on a set of
leadership skills that are more consultative than directive.63 The United
States is not going to fight the next war alone; ergo, it should learn from
the lessons of its past partnerships.

60      Molly O’Toole, “ ‘Is Nato Still Relevant? Trump’s Not the Only One Asking’,” Foreign Policy,
April 1, 2016.
61      “Remarks by Secretary James Mattis on the National Defense Strategy,” Paul H. Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, January 19, 2018.
62      Ian Hope, Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War, Student Papers (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008); and Florence Gaub, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector, Letort Papers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013).
63      Mark J. Thornhill, Coalition Warfare: The Leadership Challenges (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School
of Advanced Military Studies, 2011).
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ABSTRACT: The article discusses the status of the strategic
relationship between India and the United States. It emphasizes the
need for India to collaborate closely with the United States and its
allies in order to cope with issues resulting from China’s rise.

D

uring the Cold War, India and the United States seldom found
common areas for collaboration. New Delhi’s nonaligned and
anti-imperialistic rhetoric irritated America’s foreign policy
establishment. Since the end of the Cold War, the countries’ interests on
several issues have converged, and Indian prime ministers, crossing party
affiliations, have been inclined to strengthen strategic ties with the United
States. Convinced a strong partnership with the United States is in India’s
long-term strategic interests, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has renewed
efforts to expand Indian foreign policy.1
After taking office, Modi promptly resolved to replace the reactive
diplomacy that previously characterized India’s foreign policy with a
flexible negotiating strategy that values positive outcomes. Positioning
New Delhi to take the lead in bilateral engagements with the United
States, he invited US President Barack Obama to be the chief guest of
the Republic Day parade in 2015.2 Since no US official had ever been
afforded this honor, the gesture had huge symbolic significance. In an
address to a joint session of the US Congress in June 2016, Modi also
declared India-US ties had “overcome the hesitations of history.” 3
From almost negligible defense ties during the Cold War to a
contemporary defense partnership, India and the United States have
come a long way. After more than a decade of talks, India acceded to the
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement with the United States.
This accord was highly criticized in India for compromising the nation’s
strategic autonomy and nonaligned stance, but it allows for reciprocal use
of military resources. By signing this exchange agreement and refraining
from similar agreements with other nations, India moved toward closer
security cooperation with the United States. As a result, negotiations
1      Sumit Ganguly, “Has Modi Truly Changed India’s Foreign Policy?,” Washington Quarterly 40,
no. 2 (Summer 2017): 131–43.
2      C Raja Mohan, Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence (Noida, India: Harper Collins,
2015), 131; and John McCain, “The Pivot to India,” Foreign Policy, September 29, 2014; and Jim
Garamone, “Panetta Says U.S.-India Relations Must Deepen, Grow for Peace,” US Department of
Defense, June 6, 2012.
3      Press Trust of India (PTI), “ ‘Modi Doctrine’ Overcomes Hesitations of History: U.S.,” Hindu,
June 11, 2016.
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on two other important Indo-US initatives—the Communications
Compatibility and Security Agreement and the Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement for geospatial intelligence—commenced.4 As
a consequence, America became India’s second largest arms supplier.5
This new relationship departs from India’s basic foreign policy of
strategic autonomy. To the anxiety of China, the relationship continues
to grow under the administration of President Donald Trump, which has
given more attention to the “Indo-Pacific” region and accorded India
a greater strategic security role there. The United States also supports
India’s position on China’s ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative, that
is, “made in China, made for China.” 6
Identifying China as a major challenge to American economic
prosperity and global primacy, Trump’s national security strategy (NSS)
describes China as a “revisionist power” trying to “shift regional balances
of power in [its] favor.” Furthermore, the United States supports “India’s
emergence as a leading global power” by promoting a convergence of
regional interests and encouraging “quadrilateral cooperation with
Japan, Australia, and India.” 7 Renaming the US Pacific Command to
the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) further symbolizes the
growing importance of the Indian Ocean in US strategy.
This elevation of India’s status reflects Trump’s willingness to build
on Indo-US advances over the last two decades, and his vision of “a
larger role for [New] Delhi in stabilizing the Indo-Pacific.” 8 As Manoj
Joshi observes, “Like it or not, or hide it or not, the term [Indo-Pacific]
now seems to be a means of including India in the military calculations
of US strategy in the Pacific.” 9

India’s Challenge

Extensive and rapid economic advances over the last few decades
have enabled China to boost its military expenditures and capabilities
as well as to constrain the actions of other nations. Always seeking to
undermine India’s influence, Beijing looks at New Delhi’s growing links
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations with concern and its
ties with Washington and Tokyo with great suspicion.10 To contain its
4       “India & US Sign COMCASA, Pompeo Says No Decision on S400,” Economic Times (Mumbai),
September 6, 2018.
5      Ajai Shukla, “Key Defence Agreement with the US Finally within Reach,” Business Standard,
June 23, 2018; and “U.S. Officials Seek To Boost Arms Sales to India,” Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, September 6, 2018.
6      PTI, “US Terms BRI ‘Made in China, for China,’ Asks Beijing To Adopt ‘Inclusive’ Approach
to its Overseas Infrastructure Projects,” Firstpost, July 30, 2018.
    7      Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:
White House, December 2017), 25, 46.
8     C. Raja Mohan, “How India Can Negotiate Trump’s World,” Indian Express, December 25, 2017.
9      Manoj Joshi, “Why India Should Be Wary of the Quad,” Wire, November 13, 2017.
10      Jayanna Krupakar, “China’s Naval Base(s) in the Indian Ocean—Signs of a Maritime Grand
Strategy?,” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 3 (2017): 207–22; Shishir Upadhyaya, “Expansion of Chinese
Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean: Implications for India,” Defence Studies 17, no. 1 (2017): 63–83;
and Abhijit Singh, “Deciphering China’s Submarine Deployments in the Indian Ocean Region,”
IDSA, July 8, 2015.
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longtime regional rival, Beijing has not only modernized its army, navy,
air force, and nuclear forces but also equipped Pakistan with a missile
arsenal that includes plutonium-based tactical nuclear weapons.11 China
reportedly became the first country to sell Pakistan sensitive equipment
when it provided a powerful tracking system that could accelerate the
development of multiwarhead missiles.12
These capabilities undermine the current military balance along
the border.13 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—an
important node in the One Belt, One Road chain—passes through
Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), a territory claimed by India. According to Indian intelligence agencies, China has extended its military
footprint in PoK to around 25 percent while “undertaking strategic
infrastructure projects in Gilgit, Baltistan, and Satpara. . . . by deploying
technicians, engineers, and PLA troops.” 14 The PLA was also “digging
tunnels in Leepa Valley, located in PoK, with a goal to building an allweather road as an alternate route to reach Karakoram Highway.” 15
China continues to invest substantially in a number of ports such
as Kyaukpyu in Myanmar; Chittagong in Bangladesh; Hambantota in
Sri Lanka; and most important, Gwadar in Pakistan. Coupled with
ambitious One Belt, One Road infrastructure projects in many South
Asian countries, Beijing is developing unhindered access towards the
Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean. Under Xi’s
supervision, the Chinese military is becoming more agile and battle
ready. Having built its second aircraft carrier and making efforts to
advance other maritime systems, China will have a blue water navy in
coming years.16 This level of readiness contrasts with India’s lack of
preparedness to fight simultaneous land wars with Pakistan and China.
While testifying before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Defence, the Indian Army’s vice chief noted 65 percent of the army
arsenal is obsolete, adding, “the force lacks the artillery, missiles and
helicopters that will enable it to fight on two fronts.” 17

11       T. V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and Balance of Power Politics,”
Nonproliferation Review 10, no. 2 (2003): 21–29; and Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New
Geopolitics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015).
12      Stephen Chen “China Provides Tracking System for Pakistan’s Missile Programme,” South
China Morning Post, March 22, 2018.
13      Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia (Indian Army Retired), China’s Infrastructure in Tibet and POK-Implications
and Options for India (New Delhi: Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, 2016); and Khawar Ghumman,
“PML-N Unwilling to Share CPEC Control?,” Dawn, July 18, 2016; and Devika Bhattacharya,
“CPEC Funds Halted: China Wants Pakistan Army To Take Over Projects?,” Times of India,
December 9, 2017.
14      Rajnish Sharma, “China Extends Its Footprint to 25 Percent of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir,”
Deccan Chronicle, June 2, 2016.
15      PTI, “Chinese Army Troops Spotted along LoC in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir,” Hindustan
Times, March 13, 2016.
16      Minnie Chan, “China Has Started Building Its Third Aircraft Carrier, Military Sources Say,”
South China Morning Post, January 5, 2018; and Guo Yuandan and Bai Tiantian, “China Eyes NuclearPowered Carriers: Defense Firm,” Global Times, February 28, 2018.
17      Sandeep Unnithan, “Budget Squeeze Threatens Indian Army’s Preparedness for Possible
Two-Front War,” India Today, May 3, 2018.
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With an intractable border dispute, the contentious issue of Tibet,
bitter memories of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Beijing’s growing
influence among Indian neighborhoods, China’s rising assertiveness
in the Indian Ocean, and Chinese attempts to build an alternative
international system to oppose the United States, a “reset” between India
and China seems difficult to imagine.18 Persistent Chinese opposition
to India’s aspirations to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and
efforts to become a permanent member on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) combined with protecting Pakistan from charges of
sponsoring terrorism and of CPEC expansion in Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir makes the Sino-Indian relationship much more complex and
difficult to manage.
In July 2017, China violated a border agreement with Bhutan on the
Doklam plateau between India, China, and Bhutan. Although China
withdrew, the incursion raised uncomfortable questions about India’s
security vulnerabilities. It also caused India to reconsider its China
policy, and the Modi government made some positive gestures towards
China. Notably, India reverted to its traditional position on the status of
the Dalai Lama, denying any official connection with him or the exiled
Tibetan government in India.19 It also did not invite the Royal Australian
Navy to join the Malabar naval exercise.
Modi and Xi subsequently held their first ever informal summit
in Wuhan, China, on April 27 and 28, 2018. The joint commitment
to maintain peace and tranquility over the border and the direction
for their respective militaries to observe restraint and to strengthen
communications were noteworthy. The Wuhan consensus may be a
welcome development, giving India “a brief breathing space” in the
short term.20 But the only effective instrument for managing India’s
relations with China is developing significant and sustained economic
and security capabilities in close cooperation with the United States.

America’s Views

In the context of China’s unprecedented rise and its challenge to
America’s preeminence in Asia, the United States adopted the Free and
Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. If the “concept of the Indo-Pacific just
reconfirms the reality that the United States may no longer be able to
maintain the strategic status quo in the Pacific and Indian Oceans,” it
also indicates “more like-minded countries are willing to exert collective
efforts to supplement the US missions in this” vital region.21
The United States views India as an effective regional counterweight
to China’s economic and military might. The Atlantic Council sees
18      “India’s Grand Illusion of a ‘Reset’ with China,” Livemint, April 17, 2018; and Ivan Lidarev,
“Is a China-India ‘Reset’ in the Cards?,” Diplomat, June 8, 2018.
19      Abantika Ghosh, “Govt Sends Out Note: Very Sensitive Time for Ties with China, So Skip
Dalai Lama Events,” Indian Express, March 2, 2018.
20      Shyam Saran, “The Modi-Xi Wuhan Summit Fixed the Growing Power Imbalance between
India and China—Somewhat,” Scroll, May 16, 2018.
21      Kuni Miyake, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Is Nothing New,” Japan Times, June 4, 2018.
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India as a “key piece in the jigsaw,” asking the Trump administration to
make sure “it is not merely a regional prop to balance Beijing’s power in
the region, but a top priority for US foreign policy.” 22 This Indo-Pacific
vision builds on the Bush administration’s efforts to establish stronger
India-US ties while connecting India to the Pacific Ocean through closer
relations with Japan.23 Later, President Obama’s Rebalance strategy
pivoted towards the Asia-Pacific.
The United States increasingly fears a future of diminished
international influence; hence, Washington is willing to take risks. The
Trump administration has elevated the single strategic space formed
by the Indian and Pacific Oceans to a top-level regional priority. While
the National Security Strateg y calls American allies and partners to
collaborate, including boosting “quadrilateral cooperation with Japan,
Australia, and India,” the strategy also welcomes India’s rise as a global
power and emphasizes expanding defense ties with New Delhi.24
Due to the current administration’s emphasis on the return of greatpower competition between the United States, Russia, and China, Beijing
essentially views the Indo-Pacific strategy as a means of perpetuating
US dominance in the region while confining China to the sidelines of
a newly reinforced American sphere of influence. Despite the rhetoric,
there have been few details to explain how the new strategy is going
to be operationalized beyond the reemergence of the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (Quad). Similarly, US officials frequently acknowledge
the value of investing in connectivity and infrastructure to build an
Indo-Pacific community. But Washington’s efforts are hindered by the
president’s economic policies.

India’s Vision

Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June
1, 2018, signaled India’s willingness to embrace greater responsibility
in anchoring a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region. Stressing
that India’s partnerships are not alliances of containment, Modi said
“engagement in the Indo-Pacific region—from the shores of Africa to
that of the Americas—will be inclusive.” Simultaneously, in an indirect
reference to the One Belt, One Road model of “debt-trap” diplomacy,
Modi called for connectivity initiatives in the region that “empower
nations, not place them under an impossible debt burden. They must
promote trade, not strategic competition.” The region can only prosper,
he said, “if we do not return to the age of great-power rivalries.”
Although he did not mention the Quad, Modi expressed a willingness
to work with partners “in formats of three or more.” 25
22      Manish Tewari and Bharath Gopalaswamy, Transforming India from a Balancing to Leading Power
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council South Asia Center, 2017).
23      Brad Glosserman, The Indo-Pacific: A U.S. Perspective (Milan, IT: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica
Internazionale [ISPI], June 2018).
24      Trump, National Security Strategy.
25       Shri Narendra Modi, “Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue” (speech, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 1, 2018).
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Modi’s Shangri-La speech was important. It outlined India’s
Indo-Pacific vision, which extends from the eastern shores of Africa
to the western shore of the Americas. It conveyed India’s message that
the Indo-Pacific approach is broad-based and inclusive to the ASEAN
countries. It stressed India’s adherence to a rules-based order in the
region that is positioned around territorial integrity, indirectly opposing
China’s confrontational attitude towards territories in the South China
Sea. And it highlighted India’s long-standing strategic autonomy.
India recognizes military power as merely one aspect of its national
strategy or global influence. New Delhi understands security involves
much more than the ability to mount an effective military defense.
Nor does India believe a national security vision requires exporting its
value system or political culture to other countries. Preserving national
independence, civilizational heritage, and cultural pride entails sound
statecraft that can enlist friends, frustrate enemies, and deflect domestic
and foreign challenges to territory, traits, and structures that define the
Indian nation. India’s strategic vision is unique in the sense that it does
not wish the region be divided between rival hegemonies.
With this view, India offers to include all states in securing a free
and open Indo-Pacific regardless of political backgrounds and economic
strengths.26 At the same time, it also rejects the Chinese proposition to
create dependencies through economic statecraft and military coercion
reminiscent of the Cold War.
India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is neither one of alignment nor
strategic autonomy. It lies in the grey zone between them. It is in the
US interest to push India out of this zone by helping it overcome major
obstacles: India’s commitment to strategic autonomy doubts America’s
reliability as a strategic partner, emphasizes the need to sustain
engagement with Russia, and seeks to avoid the adverse consequences
of provoking China. The Modi government has assured Russia that
the Indo-Pacific strategy would not compromise the ties between the
two countries.27 The reasons are simple: India needs Russia for military
equipment such as spare parts and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia
wields veto power at the UN Security Council. And India recognizes
Russia’s growing tilt towards China and Pakistan. Therefore, even at the
risk of antagonizing Washington, New Delhi will purchase the S-400
antiaircraft missile system from Russia.28

Benefits of Balancing

Modi has been cautious with his Indo-Pacific strategy. But he
will not be able to convince Beijing that India has given up its efforts
to balance or contain China. Whenever the Indo-Pacific concept is
discussed, China is not mentioned. Yet the formulation of a free and
26      Samir Saran, “China and SAARC Will Be the Pivots of India’s Rise as Global Superpower,”
Print, July 24, 2018.
27      “Sochi Informal Summit: India, Russia in One Mind about Global Uncertainty,” Hindustan
Times, May 23, 2018.
28      Shubhajit Roy, “Simply Put: A Russian Deal, a US Nod,” Indian Express, July 26, 2018.

TOC

On Alliances and Coalitions

Kaura

43

open Indo-Pacific suggests an anti-Chinese connotation. The declared
objectives of seeking greater freedom and openness—in terms of
governance, fundamental rights, and economic transparency—run
counter to the Chinese political model.
Beijing is unlikely to back down from its claims to the Indian
territory along the border. And there is no indication China will reduce
its attempts to contain India.29 Rajesh Rajagopalan, a leading Indian
strategist, argued India’s hedging approach “will satisfy neither China
nor the partners that India hopes to balance China with” and is likely
to “be seen in Beijing as conference hall sophistry” that will be ignored
against the background of India’s balancing efforts. Explaining the
downside of this hedging strategy, he believes “India will neither reduce
the threat it faces from China nor have the partners it needs to counter
this threat.” 30 If this pattern of strategic ambiguity continues, it could
spell the end to any chance of the revival of the Quad. India’s strategic
reorientation could also mean that the Quad will never materialize in the
way it is being conceptualized.
Divergent ideas among the four countries regarding China
constitute another big hurdle to the Quad. But even if there is not much
formal progress, the parties must work towards better coordination and
cooperation on common concerns. Merely opposing China’s economic
hegemony through multiple plans and initiatives will be futile because
of the urgent need to develop infrastructure in many parts of the world.
The challenges emerging from China’s growing economic and military
footprint in the Indo-Pacific can, however, be tackled if India, the
United States, Japan, and Australia “combine forces.” 31
The Quad provides an insurance policy against China’s strong-arm
tactics; it also provides states in the region with confidence that pressure
from China can be resisted. As Asia struggles under the burden of a
permanent Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean and the
South China Sea, New Delhi has no option but to balance power with
Beijing, using the “quad with teeth” as the trump card.32 Adhering to
strategic autonomy made sense when India did not have global power
ambitions. But in aspiring to emerge as a world power, India cannot
rely entirely on internal balancing. With global interests and global
responsibilities, strategic orientation cannot remain prisoner to a bygone
era. Persistent concerns need persistent partnerships to demonstrate the
readiness for joint action. New Delhi needs to conceptualize an alliance
with Washington—beyond friendship—to address long-term concerns.

29       IANS, “Navy Conclave Assesses Combat Readiness amid Chinese Presence in Indian
Ocean,” Navhind Times, May 8, 2018.
30       Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Hedging Strategy Is Bound To Fail,” Observer Research
Foundation, June 21, 2018.
31      Harsh V. Pant, “Cornered by the Quad?,” Hindu, February 28, 2018.
32      Abhijnan Rej, Reclaiming the Indo-Pacific: A Political-Military Strategy for Quad 2.0, ORF Occasional
Paper 147 (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2018).
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Recommendations

The dialogue between the defense and foreign ministers of India and
the United States on September 6, 2018, provided a significant milestone
for the countries’ strategic and security ties. It sought to converge defense
cooperation, Quad formation, Afghan reconciliation, counterterrorism
strategy, and maritime security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. But its
abrupt postponement—when former Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson
stepped down in March 2018 and due to the Trump-Putin summit in
July 2018—sent a negative signal to India regarding America’s strategic
priorities. One delay may not have constituted a setback. But postponing twice suggests India’s issues are not receiving their due priority.33
Even though India’s relatively weak economic and military resources
prohibit the country from confronting Chinese revisionism alone, the
Trump administration should not take lightly India’s deeply entrenched
lobby for strategic-autonomy. Regular discussions to develop a common
vision for the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific should be
organized with US allies and partners. Otherwise divergent visions will
continue to make joint policies and strategies difficult. In addition to
Japan and Australia, the effort to develop common understanding of
threats and security should involve Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam,
who are equally wary of China’s economic and military rise.
India’s position in America’s Indo-Pacific vision is very important
for ensuring greater interoperability between the Indian and American
militaries. Geographically, India sits between INDOPACOM and
US Central Command (USCENTCOM). Operationally, India lies in
INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility. But Pakistan, India’s troublesome
nuclear-armed neighbor allied with radical Islamist ideology, is in
CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. This framework diminishes the
defense institution’s awareness of India’s significant interests, which
needs to be rectified.34
Despite the Trump administration’s tough public stance against
Pakistan’s duplicity on terrorism, CENTCOM depends on Islamabad’s
support to achieve objectives in Afghanistan, which hinders effective
coordination with New Delhi to counter terrorism. Thus, the United
States needs to include all of the western Indian Ocean in its definition
of the Indo-Pacific. America also needs to address the challenge of
terrorism to a sovereign, rules-based region. India recently assigned a
military attaché to the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT)
in Bahrain. This ability to coordinate joint activities in the Red Sea, the

33      Yashwant Raj, “Why Friction between India, US Is Rising When the Two Nations Are
Trying To Improve Ties,” Hindustan Times, June 29, 2018; Alyssa Ayres, “All Is Not Well between
Washington and New Delhi,” Hindustan Times, July 2, 2018; and Joanna Slater, “Mike Pompeo Was
Supposed To Meet with His Indian Counterpart. He Went to North Korea Instead,” Washington Post,
July 6, 2018.
34      Harsh V. Pant and Abhijnan Rej, “Is India Ready for the Indo-Pacific?,” Washington Quarterly
41 no. 2 (Summer 2018): 47–61.
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Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea provides a logical
first step in increasing India’s involvement in CENTCOM.35
Iran exacerbates the incongruity between the Indian and US visions
of the Indo-Pacific. With Washington’s unilateralism irritating the
bilateral relationship, New Delhi is closely watching US accommodations
of India’s strategic interests vis-à-vis Iran. Energy security apart, India
needs a cooperative relationship with Iran to develop the strategically
vital Chabahar port—a venture involving New Delhi, Tehran, and
Kabul—which is seen as India’s gateway to landlocked Afghanistan and
resource-rich Central Asia without having to cross Pakistan, as well as
an effective alternative to the China-led One Belt, One Road initiative.
Geopolitically, weakening ties between Iran and India may have
the unintended consequence of pushing Beijing and Tehran closer
together, giving China room to embed itself in the Middle East.36 If
Indian companies are sanctioned for associating with Iran, India-US
coordination toward a common Indo-Pacific strategy to contain an
increasingly assertive China will be adversely affected.
India cannot live up to its full potential as an Indo-Pacific power
if its strategic vulnerabilities are not addressed. The Pentagon needs
to convince India that America’s current transactional approach will
not preclude the defense of India’s border interests. America’s vocal
opposition to Chinese bullying would go a long way toward ensuring
peace and stability in the South Asian theatre. Moreover, collaborating
with India secures the US ground offensive option through Tibet and
Xinjiang—China’s military underbelly—if Beijing does not tone down
its territorial aggressiveness.37
The Pentagon has agreed to have an Indian military representative
at the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), which funds private companies
working on innovating defense technologies. This step is likely to help
India identify its own military technology requirements. Simultaneously,
these defense companies should be encouraged to collaborate on
modernizing India’s military.
Joint operational training and military exchanges could also
provide shared experiences India and the United States could use to
build greater cooperation across a variety of other security issues such
as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. These improvements will
be especially beneficial when applied in conjunction with joint efforts
to share information, dismantle terrorist camps, and limit financing of
terrorist activities. A bottom-up approach where Indian and American
military personnel find it comfortable to work together will build greater

35      Shishir Gupta, “Soon, India Defence Attaché at US Navy Bahrain Command,” Hindustan
Times, March 21, 2018.
36       Vikram S. Mehta, “Trump’s Foreign Policy: An Unlovely Triangle,” Indian Express,
August 6, 2018.
37      Tata, “US Landpower,” 98.
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familiarity in terms of equipment and technology, strategic doctrines, and
operational planning to conduct joint campaigns whenever required.38
The United States designated India a Strategic Trade Authorization
(STA) Tier 1 country, which allows it to buy advanced and sensitive
technologies from the United States.39 With this status, India is equal to
America’s closest allies and partners, elevating the strategic partnership
by several notches. The designation should accelerate the bilateral
defense trade relationship and encourage the United States to share
sensitive technologies with India. Expediting the sale of priority military
hardware and technologies and identifying areas for joint production
will further strengthen India’s defense capabilities. This initiative will
also assuage India’s doubts about America’s commitment to supporting
India as a leading Indo-Pacific power.

Conclusion

India’s multidimensional relationship with the United States is the
most comprehensive of all its major power relationships. Few other
powers have been as positive as the United States in addressing India’s
concerns on regional terrorism. President Trump’s opposition to China’s
assertiveness has expanded India’s role in the Indo-Pacific region. New
Delhi’s unwillingness to see a Cold War-type division of competing
spheres of influence in the Indo-Pacific should not be interpreted
as disinterest in countering Chinese assertiveness; India seeks to
consolidate its borders while reducing the danger of armed conflict with
China. Support from Washington and its Asian allies provides India an
important component for balancing China’s power.
The strategic alignment between India, the United States, Japan, and
Australia offers a basis for reinforcing a rules-based order in the region.
A diplomatic consensus on China, strong bilateral ties, and converging
security interests favor further cooperation with the United States.
At the same time, the United States must show publicly that it
remains committed to India’s rise to global prominence. A long tradition
of strategic autonomy may ultimately prevent India from forging a formal
alliance with America. But it makes sense for New Delhi to establish a
unique, multifaceted, and future-oriented partnership with Washington.
Such a partnership can deliver a beneficial balance of power without the
limits of a formal architecture.

38      Harsh V. Pant, telephone conversation with author, August 9, 2018.
39      PTI, “India Third Asian Nation To Get STA-1 Status from U.S.,” Hindu, August 4, 2018.
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Toward a Whole-of-Government Approach:
Revamping Peru’s Strategy Process
Paul E. Vera Delzo
©2018 Paul E. Vera Delzo

ABSTRACT: This article explains Peru’s efforts to develop
effective strategies. It discusses the problems created by overlapping
authorities. It suggests a more integrated approach to developing
national strategy would help resolve the complications associated
with high levels of drug trafficking, poverty, and terrorism.

A

severe Peruvian security challenge in the valley of the Apurimac,
Ene, and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM) has been brought about by
a combination of three maladies: drug trafficking, poverty, and
terrorism. At the end of 2016, the largest area of coca cultivation (46
percent or 20,304 hectares) and production (70 percent or an estimated
256 metric tons of cocaine) centered in the VRAEM.1 Poverty, which
afflicts 49 percent of the region’s population (approximately 650,000
inhabitants), complicates Peru’s efforts to counter drug trafficking.
Furthermore, low levels of education and limited economic opportunities
led most of the population to depend on coca cultivation for its survival.
Thus, many people in the valley defend this illicit activity.2 Since the
region is isolated from the major population centers, local governments
have little incentive to dedicate resources to the region. Hence, interest
in stopping drug trafficking shifts to the national level.
Over the past decade, Peru’s national strategy has fallen short of
its stated objective of defeating the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path,
a terrorist organization that controls the principal transportation
routes into the valley, provides security to the region’s drug cartels, and
directly funds its operations through drug trafficking. Two temporary
organizations created by the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed
Forces—the VRAEM Special Command and the Intelligence and Joint
Special Operations Command—experienced some operational success
toward this mission. However, the Peruvian Armed Forces and National
Police suffered 384 casualties, including 137 deaths, in armed actions
with the terrorists from 2005 to 2014.3
Strategic uncertainty in the region results from the absence of a
clear national security policy, consistent political objectives, and a stable
military objective that spanned several presidential administrations.
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1      Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito (UNODC), Peru: Monitoreo de been a professor at the
Cultivos de Coca 2016 (Lima: UNODC, 2016), 29.
Argentine Army War
2      Waldo Mendoza and Janneth Leyva, The Economía del VRAEM: Diagnóstico y Opciones de College and a military
Política (Lima, Peru: Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional [USAID] and observer at the United
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3      “Las Cifras Ocultas de la Guerra,” Convoca, accessed December 12, 2017.
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This uncertainty further impedes the formulation of a national military
strategy by preventing the Peruvian Armed Forces from supporting other
efforts to counter drug trafficking. Furthermore, a lack of prioritization
limits the effective allocation of government resources to ministries
and departmental agencies that could develop an optimal strategy for
achieving the nation’s broader strategic objectives.
This article examines the processes and actors involved in developing
such strategic plans as well as the impact of these participants on
government efforts in the VRAEM. Recommendations for structuring
and coordinating state and regional efforts with a whole-of-government
approach to address the region’s challenges successfully are included.

A Whole-of-Government Approach

The Peruvian national defense system lacks the agility and the
flexibility required to achieve the government’s objectives in the
VRAEM. An inability to recognize threats and vulnerabilities clearly
results in slow responses. Furthermore, ministries and government
agencies focus on their own immediate tasks, instead of effectively
coordinating and cooperating toward shared objectives and a focused
vision.4 Because of the interrelated military and socioeconomic
dimensions affecting the region, close interagency collaboration is
necessary to achieve an adequate level of security that will foster
economic development, reduce poverty, and further reinforce security.
In other words, to address the challenges of the VRAEM adequately, the
Peruvian security structure must operate as an effective system instead
of a collection of separate components.
Through integrated efforts, the Peruvian government can provide
economic development that permits the inhabitants of the VRAEM to
remain in the region rather than migrating to other parts of the country,
such as the greater Lima area. Such migration would further degrade
the nation’s security by intensifying other challenges. But a whole-ofgovernment strategy for the VRAEM would address some of these
challenges by attracting people who are more likely to participate in legal
economic activities and who are less likely to support terrorist activities.

Leadership Authorities

Although responsibilities for the national security policy and the
national security strategy are clearly defined by law, responsibilities for
the national military strategy, as it impacts the VRAEM, are not. This
ambiguity impedes the formulation of a single, coherent document that
would establish strategies for achieving military objectives in the region.
In this regard, and because of the political nature of the position, the
minister of defense usually lacks the military knowledge to formulate
the national military strategy optimally. Conversely, the chief of the
Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces can expertly formulate
4      Jason L. Percy and Terry A. Fellows Jr., “A Whole of Government Approach for National
Strategy” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 3.
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the national military strategy. But the resulting document has less
authority since the chief has no mandate to do so under Peruvian law.
Thus, the national military strategy is formulated in isolation, creating
confusion and undermining its importance. This situation has led to
competing priorities and approaches that have been counterproductive
in the VRAEM over the last decade.
Further complicating the situation, constitutional and legal
responsibilities for the minister of defense do not indicate the manner
for providing strategic guidance nor the type of strategy that must
be formulated. Consequently, the chief of the Joint Command lacks
clear strategic guidance to help ensure military actions support the
government’s objectives in the region. For example, the ministry
of defense must direct, coordinate, execute, supervise, and evaluate
national security policy, in accordance with presidential decisions.5 By
contrast, the US secretary of defense provides a national defense strategy
based on the national security strategy to ensure military actions support
national objectives. The US national defense strategy then prioritizes
Department of Defense missions, counter strategies, and a framework
to guide prioritizing threats, the force structure, modernization plans,
and the military’s roles and missions.6
By establishing a similar hierarchy for Peruvian strategy, the
minister of defense can provide a foundation for other strategic
guidance, specifically for military planning, force development,
and intelligence.7 This clarity would also allow the chief of the Joint
Command to compose a military strategy that could be integrated with
other government efforts to address the interrelated security, societal,
and developmental challenges in the VRAEM as opposed to limiting
the focus to the Shining Path. One opportunity for integration exists
in relation to a declared state of emergency. In this case, the VRAEM
Special Command is tasked with operations against terrorism without
any doctrinal responsibility to address the challenges, such as poverty
and drug trafficking, that contribute to terrorism.8
Even if empowered by the national military strategy to conduct
operations against drug trafficking, the Peruvian government does not
have an adequate legal framework for the military and police to work
together to meet the evolving threat effectively. Thus, the fight against
this scourge is legally the principal mission of the National Police,
even though the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces and
the VRAEM Special Command have the resources. To overcome this
constraint, the VRAEM Special Command has a component of the
National Police assigned to it. But the other military components must
5      Ollanta Humala Tasso, Juan F. Jiménez, and Pedro Cateriano Bellido, Decreto Legislativo
que Aprueba la Ley de Organización y Funciones del Ministerio de Defensa, Decreto
Legislativo 1134 (2012).
6      Secretary of Defense, 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2018).
7      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2017), II-4.
8      “¿Por qué existe el VREAM?,” Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas (CCFFAA),
accessed December 13, 2017.
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focus only on defeating the Shining Path. Accordingly, an appropriate
ratio of police and military resources cannot be used effectively to
counter the interdependent threats of terrorism and drug trafficking.
Beyond the issues raised in the previous paragraphs, the brief duration
in which the chief of the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces
is assigned to the position further impedes the development of a holistic
approach to provide security in the VRAEM. According to law, the chief
holds the position for a period of no more than two years, renewable by
exception, only for one additional year.9 This situation contrasts with
that of the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, which begins with a
similar period of two years that may be renewed by the president for two
additional terms.10 Thus, General Joseph Dunford has held the position
since 2015, while his predecessor, General Martin E. Dempsey, held
the position for four years (2011–15).11 This longer period allows the
chairman to develop a deeper understanding of the strategic objectives
and formulate a more effective military strategy.
Furthermore, a new chief of the Joint Command must spend a
large percentage of his or her term learning about the national military
strategy that guides the combatant commands and the key actors in each
region, as well as the internal and external factors that affect missions.
Unfortunately, commanders often rotate from the position before
they acquire enough experience and knowledge needed to address the
problems holistically.
Likewise, changes among senior staff officers compound the effects
of the short term of the Peruvian joint commander. Because of the lack
of a joint culture within the Peruvian Armed Forces, the chief generally
assigns members of the same service to the main positions of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In 2017, the chief of the Joint Command, for example,
was a Navy officer. And not entirely by coincidence, four of the nine
division chiefs were also Navy officers.12 Of the seven autonomous offices
of the Joint Command, five were headed by Navy officers.13 Of the two
combatant commands executing military operations in the VRAEM,
a land operations theater, one was commanded by a Navy officer.14
Despite its experience in countering terrorism and drug trafficking, the
National Police is not represented within the Joint Command. This
situation generates bias that favors the chief’s service affiliation.
The necessity of the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces
to attend to its main mission of planning, preparing, coordinating, and
conducting military operations, such as those conducted by the VRAEM
Special Command and the Intelligence and Joint Special Operations
9      Ollanta Humala Tasso, Juan F. Jiménez Mayor, and Pedro Cateriano Bellido, Decreto
Legislativo del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, Decreto Legislativo 1136 (2012).
10      Chairman: Appointment; Grade and Rank, 10 U.S.C. § 152 (2018).
11      “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” JCS, accessed December 17, 2017.
12      “Divisiones Estado Mayor,” CCFFAA, accessed December 17, 2017.
13      “Oficinas Autónomas,” CCFFAA, accessed December 17, 2017.
14       “Se Reconoció al Comandante del Comando Especial de Inteligencia y Operaciones
Especiales Conjuntas (CIOEC),” CCFFAA, October 11, 2016.
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Command in the VRAEM, also impedes its ability to conceptualize,
design, and assess risks relevant to formulating a national military
strategy.15 The United States manages this complexity by assigning the
Joint Chiefs of Staff the role of providing military advice without the
competing demand to manage operational campaigns.16

Strategy Implementation

The insufficient results of the VRAEM Special Command during
its first three years led the Joint Command to create the Intelligence and
Joint Special Operations Command. This combatant command includes
intelligence personnel and special forces from the three military services
who execute operations in the region against high-value targets, such
as the leaders of the Shining Path.17 The parallel efforts of these two
combatant commands in the same area of responsibility generated
friction and competitiveness.
In addition to these overlapping responsibilities, 69 districts of five
political regions in the VRAEM formed a more intricate problem when
implementing the national military strategy.18 This vast area of direct
intervention and influence hinders the VRAEM Special Command’s
efforts because actions must be coordinated with the disparate political
authorities who have different priorities and resources for each region.
Luis Rojas, a former technical secretary of the multisectoral Commission

Map of the Valley of the Rivers Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro by Pete McPhail
15      “Misión,” CCFFAA, accessed December 17, 2017.
16      10 U.S.C. § 152.
17      “Se Reconoció al Comandante,” CCFFAA.
18      “Reordenan Ámbitos de Intervención Directa y de Influencia del VRAEM,” Andina (Lima),
June 10, 2016.
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for Pacification and Economic and Social Development in the Valley
of the Rivers Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro, recognized the need for
the VRAEM to become an autonomous region backed by adequate
resources that could formulate a coherent plan for its development.19
The current legal framework, however, is inadequate for the
Peruvian Armed Forces to conduct operations in the region beyond the
campaign against the Shining Path. In November 2017, the Peruvian
Congress approved a bill authorizing military participation in drug
trafficking interdiction within zones declared in a state of emergency,
which includes jurisdictions of the VRAEM.20 While the approval of
this bill will provide a legal framework for a national military strategy to
include the fight against drug trafficking, it generates additional risks for
the VRAEM Special Command. These risks are magnified due to the
lack of training and experience of the Peruvian Armed Forces in carrying
out operations against drug trafficking, which is in stark contrast to that
of the National Police who currently execute this mission.

Recommendations

To address the challenges identified above, Peru must change its
process for formulating and implementing its national military strategy.
Peru must develop a whole-of-government approach that unifies the
efforts of ministries and agencies to maximize the effectiveness of
available resources. Therefore, the national military strategy and the
VRAEM Special Command mission should be broadened to orient
military forces toward working with other government organizations to
solve drug trafficking, poverty, and terrorism in the VRAEM.
In this manner, the national military strategy could focus not only on
defeating the Shining Path but also on collaborating with the National
Police to fight drug trafficking. The military engineer battalions could
also support regional development by constructing roads and schools.
These kinds of actions will help the government obtain the support
and trust of the population. Such measures will also provide access to
information about members of the Shining Path and the drug cartels.
To develop and implement a more coherent and effective military
strategy in the VRAEM, the Peruvian congress should establish clearer
legal responsibilities regarding who formulates the national defense
strategy and the national military strategy. Ideally, the changes should
clarify the minister of defense is responsible for the national defense
strategy and the chief of the Joint Command for the national military
strategy. Regardless, those formulating the national military strategy
should address the major problems in the VRAEM and efficiently
integrate the area’s military and police resources. Similarly, the congress
should consider creating a unified political region for the VRAEM based
19      “¿El VRAEM como una Región para Buscar su Desarrollo?,” El Comercio (Lima),
April 22, 2015.
20      “Congreso Aprobó que Fuerzas Armadas Participen en la Interdicción Contra el Tráfico de
Drogas en el VRAEM,” Correo (Lima), November 3, 2017.
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on the local districts and provinces. Doing so would enable the political
authorities and the VRAEM Special Command to coordinate efforts,
such as public projects to stimulate development, more effectively.
Beyond such legal changes, attention should be given to military
commands. The Peruvian government should lengthen the tenure for
the chief of the Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces by at least
two years. This extended period would allow the chief to understand the
complex issues in the region more deeply, design the military strategy,
and make the corresponding adjustments.
Joint commanders should work to ensure equitable distribution of
senior assignments among the military services, including the National
Police. This diversity would provide an integral joint approach to inform
a more comprehensive national military strategy.
The government should also redefine the roles and responsibilities
of the Joint Command to eliminate the responsibility of conducting
operations, which should be delegated to the combatant commands.
This modification would allow the Joint Command to focus on strategic
guidance for integrating the police and other elements of national
power to achieve the state’s objectives. This change would also reduce
overlapping authorities such as those between the VRAEM Special
Command and the Intelligence and Joint Special Operations Command.
To conduct more effective operations in the VRAEM, the Peruvian
Armed Forces should correspondingly increase the training of military
personnel assigned to the region. Participants in counterterrorism and
counternarcotics operations should be knowledgeable of the policy
guidance and legal authorities established by the aforementioned
frameworks. Furthermore, joint commanders should leverage the
experience of other organizations that have appropriate experience in
the operational environment, such as the National Police, to help orient
personnel to the complexities of specific missions.

Conclusion

The national military strategy implemented in the VRAEM during
the last decade has proven ineffective. The approach has lacked coherence
and failed to integrate the efforts of various ministries and agencies. As
this article has shown, formulating and implementing an effective policy
in the VRAEM requires a series of fundamental changes ranging from
specific actions to state and military organization. As noted, security
comes from the strength and the application of all the instruments of
national power. To this end, the Peruvian government must prioritize
the urgent issues in the VRAEM and ensure an effective interaction
among all the ministries and agencies.
Correspondingly, the Joint Command must assume an advisory role
and integrate the capacities of the National Police to unify action in the
region. With these changes, the national strategy can address the critical
security issues within the VRAEM through strong commitment and
common effort from all the actors involved.
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Reclaiming Clausewitz’s Theory of Victory
Richard M. Milburn

ABSTRACT: This article challenges a recent interpretation of
Carl von Clausewitz’s work On War that includes concepts such as
Natur, the trinity, and the primary elements of war. After discussing
the approaches of universalists and new wars scholars, the article
considers trinitarian relationships in the context of modern conflict.

I

n a recent article for Parameters, Emile Simpson challenged
conventional interpretations of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. In
particular, Simpson called into question the universal applicability
of Clausewitz’s theory of war and his theory of victory. Simpson also
challenged traditional views of the differences between the nature and the
character of war. The former is normally associated with the permanent
aspects of war, the latter its impermanent features. In his seminal work,
Clausewitz described what is generally considered to be the nature of
war: “A paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred,
and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play
of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam;
and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which
makes it subject to reason alone.” 1
The trinity has been a topic of debate for two broad schools of
thought: the universalists (or traditionalists) and the new wars scholars.
For the universalists, Clausewitz’s theory of war is timeless and
comprehensive: the Clausewitzian trinity and the nature of war are
synonymous.2 In contrast, the new wars scholars purport Clausewitz’s
theory of war is either temporal, situational, or both.3
Simpson provides the latest challenge to the universalists’ view. His
method of critique removes the trinity from the core of Clausewitz’s
theory of war and replaces it with the concept of the “duel.” In doing
so, Simpson relegates the most strategic Clausewitzian concept to minor
I am extremely grateful for the thoughtful comments and suggestions of Kevin C. Holzimmer,
Kelly A. Grieco, J. Wesley Hutto, and Ann M. Mezzell of the US Air Command and Staff College
as well as David C. Benson and James Kiras of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.
1      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
2      Colin S. Gray, “How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War,” Parameters 35, no.
1 (Spring 2005): 14–26; Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. Clausewitz in the TwentyFirst Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and
Contemporary War (New York: Oxford University Press), 2007.
3      Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991); Mary Kaldor, New
and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); and John Keegan, A
History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).
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importance and promotes a narrow interpretation of the more tactical
duel in its place. This conceptualization presents a straw-man theory of
victory. This article uses the trinity to construct a more complete, and
fundamentally Clausewitzian, theory of victory.

Simpson’s Argument

Simpson’s major point, in keeping with the new wars scholars, is
that Clausewitz’s theory of war is not universal:
To understand what Clausewitz means by the nature of war, it is necessary
to recognize that there are two ideas of war at play in On War. One is the
abstract version found in the realm of logic, which Clausewitz identifies
as the nature of war. As Clausewitz stresses, “it must be observed that the
phrase the natural tendency of war, is used in its philosophical, strictly logical
sense alone and does not refer to the tendencies of the forces that are
actually engaged in the fighting—including—for instance, the morale and
emotions of the combatants.” 4

This is an admittedly troubling passage for universalists who
conflate the nature of war with the Clausewitzian trinity. If the natural
tendency of war does not include the emotions of the combatants, then
the nature of war, at least in the abstract form, does not contain one of
the elements of the trinity.
Simpson continues:
The other idea of war is the phenomenon produced when the abstract
concept of war is modified by reality, to give us real war. This is the idea
of war that we reach at the end of book 1, chapter 1, in which Clausewitz
presents his well-known image of the “total phenomenon” of war as it
appears in reality as a “trinity” comprised of three “dominant tendencies.”
These three tendencies effectively provide categorical buckets within which
to place the various reasons listed above for why war in reality moderates
the abstract concept.5

In this view, the trinity does not account for other causes of war,
such as religion or ideology. Moreover, Clausewitz’s theory cannot
be universal because it reflects a hierarchical relationship that is not
universal according to Simpson:
A hierarchical enemy is presupposed in any strategic theory based on
Clausewitz, given how he assumed the enemy to be a unified enemy. This
assumption provided the basis for his most important strategic concept, the
center of gravity, which necessarily presupposed the enemy had a “will,”
in the sense that it was a unified enemy. Thus, Clausewitz envisaged the
military strategist striking at the enemy’s center of gravity to translate a
military result into a political result because it was a physical representation
of the enemy’s will.6

Simpson considers such a theory of victory has little utility against
networked enemies, who have no fielded forces, nor a capital city, nor
4    Emile Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict,”
Parameters 47, no. 4 (Winter 2017–18): 9.
5      Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory,” 9.
6      Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory,” 16.
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necessarily alliances to attack. Since there would be no Clausewitzian
center of gravity to attack against a networked enemy, the theory of
victory must be limited, as would the theory of war.
At first glance, this argument makes sense. But when we consider
Clausewitz’s discussion of wars for limited aims, it does not. There are
wars where striking the enemy’s center of gravity would be unnecessary
to achieve the political aims of the war, which must guide the scale of
military effort to be made.7 In fact, decisively attacking centers of gravity
is not, and cannot be, Clausewitz’s theory of victory because it would
ignore great swathes of military history. While Simpson’s complex
explanation of On War is stimulating, such complexity is a blessing and
a curse.

Interpretation and Translation

The primary problems with Simpson’s article rest with his
discussion of the German word Natur and his interpretation of the duel.
His reasoning is based largely upon the English translation of the word
Natur, which has caused understandable confusion for Clausewitzian
scholars. Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s translation of On War, for
example, states, “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts
its characteristics to the given case.” 8 In contrast, Christopher Bassford’s
translation (which Simpson follows) asserts, “War is thus more than a
mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some extent in each
concrete case.” 9
In Simpson’s view, the later translation alters the distinction between
the nature and the character of war. There are two principal problems
with this belief. First, Natur can mean either nature or character, and
we have a difficult time separating these concepts philosophically.
Second, Bassford does not use “nature” in the same way as Simpson.
Bassford declares, “We should accept it as standing here for something
intermediate—much more consequential than the chameleon’s
superficial color, but less than truly fundamental or definitive.” 10 With
this intermediate understanding of Clausewitz’s intent, Natur could
mean, the magnitude of each element of the nature of war and the relationships between
the elements. Clausewitz is still referring exclusively to the elements of his
trinity and describing their variances and fluid interactions not only in
different wars but even in different theaters during the same war.11 This
interpretation is consistent with Clausewitz’s further discussion about
never fixing an arbitrary relationship between the elements of the trinity.
Simpson accepts an open-ended range of the types of war. But he
is mistaken to think the trinity does not account for them. A traditional
7     Clausewitz, On War, 585–94.
8     Clausewitz, On War, 89.
9    Christopher Bassford, “The Primacy of Policy and the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s Mature
Thought,” in Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz, 77.
10     Bassford, “Primacy of Policy,” 78.
11     This idea links to later discussion of Clausewitz’s use of the chameleon as a metaphor for
war. Changeability is inherent in the nature of both.
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view of the nature of war allows relationships within the trinity to be
endlessly changeable, yet requires each be present to some degree. This
understanding accounts for guerilla warfare and low intensity conflict,
countering the new wars scholars’ claims that the Clausewitzian trinity
is irrelevant in the modern age. War’s permanent elements cannot and
do not change. As M. L. R. Smith points out, “in the end, there is really
only one meaningful category of war, and that is war itself.” 12
Simpson goes on to suggest Clausewitz defined war as “nothing but
a duel on a larger scale.” 13 He claims Clausewitz’s use of the duel is insufficient as an abstract, comprehensive definition because it implies war
is a two-way, combat-centric struggle against a unitary enemy. Simpson
interprets the duel so narrowly as to remove any possible connection to
strategy.14
Clausewitz, however, was an avid student of history, cognizant
of the multifaceted character of war in the history of Europe, which
abounded with complex and changing alliances. Having fought for both
the Prussian and Russian armies in the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz was
fully aware of opposing national interests, shifting alliances, and the
absence of a simple two-way struggle. Furthermore, in the Clausewitzian
construction of war as simply the continuation of politics by other
means, the multifaceted character of politics must be common to both
politics and war.
Simpson further argues the duel metaphor implies war is combatcentric. While there must be an element of combat to meet a Clausewitzian
definition of war, war need not be combat-centric. All wars, including
the Napoleonic Wars, have extended periods of inactivity. Moreover,
the character of some wars is simply not combat-centric. Clausewitz
describes the fighting value of condottiere wars as negligible: “Extremes
of energy or exertion were conspicuous by their absence and fighting
was generally a sham.” 15 The notion is further supported through
Clausewitz’s treatment of limited wars for limited aims that he uses as
one mechanism to modify his simple definition of war as a duel: “The
political object—the original motive for the war—will thus determine
both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it
requires.” 16 Sometimes, even the threat of force could be enough to
achieve the desired political objectives.
Viewing the enemy as a unitary actor is a common mistake.17 To
suggest Clausewitz conceptualized war as a contest between unitary
actors, however, dismisses his experience. In 1806, for example,
12     M. L. R. Smith, “Guerillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare,”
Review of International Studies 29, no. 1 (2003): 34; and Colin M. Fleming, Clausewitz’s Timeless Trinity: A
Framework for Modern War (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 171.
13      Clausewitz, On War, 75.
14      Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory,” 10–11.
15      Clausewitz, On War, 587.
16      Clausewitz, On War, 81.
17    Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2017), 327.
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Clausewitz expressed his frustrations with the political wrangling in the
military by writing the Prussian army had “three commanders-in-chief
and two chiefs of staff.” 18 He was well acquainted with self-interested
parties and organizations affecting policy and viewed neither the enemy
nor the Prussian state as a unitary actor. In fact, Clausewitz’s entire
discussion about war being only a continuation of politics suggests a
symbiotic relationship representing a theory of victory rather than an
unsatisfactory reality of actual war. During war in the real world,
we must allow for natural inertia, for all the friction of its parts, for all the
inconsistency, imprecision, and timidity of man; and finally we must face
the fact that war and its forms result from ideas, emotions, and conditions
prevailing at the time—and to be quite honest we must admit that this was
the case even when war assumed its absolute state under Bonaparte.19

The friction of the political-military nexus is part of modern
warfare. The military commander may have to deal with the timidity of
political leadership, something Napoleon was spared. This was perhaps
a contributing factor in his spectacular run of victories.
Simpson’s view of Clausewitzian victory is that it is achieved by
locating and destroying the enemy’s center of gravity, which is where the
enemy’s will can be defeated.20 This perception implies the normal center
of gravity is the enemy army, though the capital city or key alliances
are other possibilities. Simpson’s claim that this theory of victory is
incomplete, as networked enemies lack such centers, is correct.
Nevertheless, he is incorrect in thinking this was Clausewitz’s
theory of victory. This concept represents a way to achieve victory only
in wars tending toward the absolute. Clausewitz’s broader theory of
victory centered on matching political ends with military means. In this
sense, war’s subordination to politics and to policy could be regarded as
an ideal state rather than a fact.
There is no universal theory of victory in On War. Starting with the
Clausewitzian trinity, however, a more complete conceptualization of
Clausewitz’s theory of victory is possible.

Strategic Interaction

Holistic consideration of the trinity is a fundamentally strategic
enterprise. War is a competition that can be characterized as the
protection of the friendly trinity while simultaneously attacking the
enemy’s trinity—a clash of trinities. During war, the magnitude of each of
the elements—passion, reason, and chance—is fluid and changes rapidly
due to precipitating events. “Our task,” said Clausewitz, “is to develop
a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies.” 21 At
18                 Carl von Clausewitz to Marie von Brühl, September 29, 1806, quoted in Peter Paret,
Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2007), 124.
19      Clausewitz, On War, 580.
20      Simpson, “Clausewitz’s Theory,” 16.
21      Clausewitz, On War, 89.

TOC

60

Parameters 48(3) Autumn 2018

the center of this balance is the state (or community) itself, composed
of the government, the people, and the military or its analogues.22
The relationships between these elements of the Clausewitzian social
trinity are constantly fluid and evolving, becoming stronger or weaker
depending on prevailing circumstances and as affected by myriad factors
including military action. The elements of the primary trinity, the most
powerful of which is passion, also influence relationships in the social
trinity.
Passion often acts as a binding force and may give the people
justification for war. Passion could be stoked by ideology, religion,
nationalism, injustice, racial hatred, or outrage to strengthen the resolve
to go to, or to stay at, war. In total war, passion can dominate rational
thought, which Captain Ramsey, Denzel Washington’s character in the
movie Crimson Tide, acknowledges, “The true nature of war is to serve
itself.” 23 As wars tend toward totality, passion takes on a logic of its own,
and increasingly, the military decision becomes the political end state.
Passion and reason may complement one another in wars of
necessity, but reason may equally counter passion. In limited wars,
directly linking political goals to the use of military force may be
difficult. This void is sometimes called the Clausewitzian gap.24 As
wars become more limited, and the justification of primordial violence
becomes more difficult, reason often comes to the fore, especially in
the information age where the horrors of war are continually dissected.
Constant network news coverage can alter public perception, especially
if friendly interests are unclear. In democracies where open debate is
encouraged, it can be especially hard to present a united political front,
which might be required to maintain public support for military action
and to protect one’s own trinity. This effort might call into question the
value of the military instrument of power in matters of limited national
interest. David Betz, among others, considers the diminishing utility of
war as a tool of policy.25
Chance is the embodiment of war’s uncertainty. At the extreme end,
the king of Persia lost an entire army to a sandstorm, and the Spanish
Armada was devastated by storms. Likewise, the death of Gustavus
Adolphus in 1632 during the Battle of Lützen quickly precipitated the
end of Sweden’s time as a great power. In the modern world of precision
weapons, luck is a more dangerous force precisely because the public
may be led to believe that accidents such as the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade in 1999 are deliberate acts. Chance is ever-present
on the battlefield, and though it can be reduced, there may be, as General
22      This has been another bone of contention for the new wars scholars, but Bassford, Jan
Willem Honig, and James Gow have all constructed more flexible analogues for these actors.
Thomas Waldman, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 169.
23      Captain Ramsey to Commander Hunter in Crimson Tide, directed by Tony Scott (Hollywood
Pictures, 1995).
24      Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, Jason J. Lepore, eds., Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring
Success and Failure (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015), 17–18.
25     Betz David, Carnage and Connectivity: Landmarks in the Decline of Conventional Military Power
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 4–5.
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Stanley McChrystal found, a corresponding reduction in military
effectiveness or an increased risk to friendly forces.26
Understanding both trinities requires understanding the kind of
war the enemy is embarking upon as well as your own. There is no
natural balance here: a limited war for one side is not necessarily so for
the other or indeed for coalition partners on either side. The disparities
in military capability between sides in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
were more than balanced by the other side’s abundant passion and will
to keep fighting.27 Considering war in this light naturally leads to grand
strategic considerations that drag military leaders out of their comfort
zones and into the policy arena, which is where the only meaningful
victories reside.

A Clausewitzian Theory of Victory

In the clash of trinities, there are two ways to win a war.28 The
enemy trinity must be destroyed by breaking either a relationship in, or
an element of, its trinity. Clausewitz said an enemy’s power of resistance
is comprised of the total means at his disposal and the strength of his
will.29 Most battle-centric strategies attack capability, primarily within
the enemy’s military, but others, including coercive strategies, attack the
will to fight through trinitarian relationships. There are many possible
strategies to win wars beyond what Clausewitz actually discussed in
On War that can also be discussed through this theoretical extension.
One such example is Robert Pape’s four types of strategic bombing:
punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial.30 The trinitarian model can
show where a particular strategy is supposed to affect the enemy trinity.
But it is still incumbent upon the strategist to assess the metrics of how
successful such a strategy is or even if there is a causal link between the
choice of strategy and the intended breakdown of the relationship being
attacked.
As Simpson noted in War from the Ground Up, there may be many strategic audiences to particular actions in war.31 Thus, our actions to
affect the enemy’s trinity also have secondary and tertiary effects on
relationships in our own trinity that must be considered during strategic
deliberations. Punishment of a civilian population provides an excellent
example. Even though the model identifies the target as the peopleto-government relationship, it cannot indicate a probability of success.
Such a strategy posited by Giulio Douhet was sporadically successful in

26      “Tactical Directive,” Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, July 6, 2009.
27      Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,”
World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200.
28      Waldman, War, 161.
29      Clausewitz, On War, 77.
30      Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996).
31      Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
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Rotterdam and Rome during World War II despite more public failures
during the Combined Bomber Offensive.32
The repeated defacement of the statue of Sir Arthur Travers
“Bomber” Harris, the man synonymous with this British use of
airpower, illustrates how strongly the public can react to military action.
Risk, posited as a weaker form of punishment and unlikely to work,
targets the same mechanism. Both decapitation and denial try to affect
the government-to-military relationship. Denial is the only one of the
four strategies that targets both capability and will and is unsurprisingly
the most historically successful.
Many strategies attack the relationship between the people and
the government such as terrorism, economic war, attrition, and simply
enduring until the enemy’s public support wanes.33 A trinitarian
approach to assessing war allows us to look at key vulnerabilities as well
as opportunities; we must have continuous assessment of both since the
trinities are constantly changing. Moreover, war considered in this way
is not just about military activity but also about diplomacy, economics,
and information. Only through using all of the instruments of power
can strategy be optimized to protect the friendly trinity and to exploit
perceived weaknesses in the enemy’s.
For democracies such as the United States and Britain, who fight
on distant shores with conventional superiority, this raises questions
about likely enemy strategies and the limitations of friendly plans.
Former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak
presciently observed “enemies will attack us asymmetrically. They will
take us where we’re weak, and they will negate our strengths, which
is our technology, and so the best way to do that is to get you into close
terrain—towns, cities, urban slums, forests, jungles.” 34
These attacks often occur in the information domain, where the
West must learn to fight more effectively. That will require congruence
between political thought and military action. The information domain
can be particularly problematic for democracies where attitudes to war
are openly discussed in their respective parliaments, inviting dissention.
As R. D. Hooker Jr. contends, war is “a contest of wills played out
by thinking and adaptive opponents.” 35 It is easy to attack the will of
Western democracies in wars of limited national interest, and it would
be foolish for most nations to try to attack a US-led coalition head-on.
Indirect strategies, therefore, come to the fore: “Asymmetry is inherent
in the nature of war.” 36

32     Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (London: Faber and Faber, 1943).
33      Some of these strategies are discussed in R. D. Hooker Jr., “Beyond Vom Kriege: The Character
and Conduct of Modern War,” Parameters 35, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 15.
34   General Charles Krulak (commandant, US Marine Corps), interview with Jim Lehrer,
NewsHour, PBS, June 25, 1999).
35     Hooker, “Beyond Vom Kriege,” 12.
36     Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Rediscovering US Military Strategy: A Role for Doctrine,” Journal
of Strategic Studies 39, no. 2 (January 2016): 233.
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Although indirect strategies may not have been the focus of On War,
a brief study of the trinity shows that these ideas are easily extrapolated
from it, which allows us to discuss war and strategy more generally than
Clausewitz himself did, to find a road to victory. During war, victory
comes about through the knowledge and protection of one’s own trinity
and the simultaneous knowledge and destruction of the enemy trinity.
This trinitarian strategic analysis mirrors Sun Tzu’s maxim: “Know
the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be
in peril.” 37 In this manner, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are perfectly aligned
regarding both the nature of war and the path to victory.

Conclusion

Simpson’s interpretation of Clausewitz removes much of the
explanatory power that the trinity possesses. His complex reading does
not enable predictive strategic consideration because it lacks clarity and
relegates discussion of On War to the tactical arena. While Simpson’s
argument is intellectually thought-provoking, its practical utility for
military and political professionals is questionable. Furthermore, this
interpretation unwisely clouds basic understandings of what war is. As
Antulio J. Echevarria II states, “Understanding the nature of war is
important for more than academic reasons; the nature of a thing tends
to define how it can and cannot be used, which, in the case of war, makes
it extremely important to both political and military leaders.” 38
By restoring Clausewitz’s trinity to its proper place we can advance a
more comprehensive theory of victory than even Clausewitz himself. The
link between military means and political ends forms a fundamental, but
insufficient, element of this theory because the singular dimension does
not account for the economic and informational instruments of power.
The expanded Clausewitzian theory of victory embraces the competitive
nature of war, showing the flexibility and utility of the Clausewitzian
trinity at the grand and military strategic levels of war. This simple
model can help military and political professionals bridge their different
conceptual approaches to strategy, leading to better considerations
of second- and third-order effects. This deeper understanding and
consideration of the inadvertent and adverse consequences of military
action is essential to the pursuit of successful grand strategy.

37      Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1971), 84.
38      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Globalization and the Nature of War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, 2003), v.
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ABSTRACT: This article encourages operational thinkers to apply
the philosophies of Carl von Clausewitz, Thucydides, and Mao
Zedong when integrating technology into future war strategy to
remember that humans not only begin wars but also end them.

T

he contemporary literature on future war remains too focused
on the tactical level. General John R. Allen and Amir Husain’s
recent article in Proceedings entitled “On Hyperwar” illustrates
this fixation. Similar to other writings, Allen and Hussain argue victory, in
future war, will be predicated upon integrating increasing levels of artificial
intelligence and bypassing human decision-makers.1 Such an operational
concept claims wars will become more efficient, synchronized, and quick
to solve the limitations of human endurance and the natural propensity
for indecision in the face of uncertainty.
Seeking game-changing capabilities to neutralize potential US
adversaries is clearly important; however, writers of this literature often
overlook operational applications of future capabilities. Thus, impacts are
viewed in isolation.2 Undeniably, senior leaders have a practical grasp of
the nature of war due to the breadth and depth of their experience.
Military and civilian leaders can, however, interpret tech-centric
solutions as indications that overcoming near-peer adversaries simply
requires technological superiority. Consequently, we run the risk of
embracing hardware that conflicts with the nature of war, and we avoid
a serious discussion of how a thinking enemy may respond and adjust.
The key failure of most discussions on future systems stems from
the claim that these capabilities can somehow override the factors of fog,
friction, and uncertainty—or even change human nature. Ultimately, this
assumption obscures the fact that war is the use of violence to impose
one’s will on the enemy. This article argues that separating the nature of
war from the character of warfare makes understanding the integration
of innovative technologies and their roles in future wars easier.

1      John R. Allen and Amir Husain, “On Hyperwar,” Proceedings 143, no. 7 (July 2017): 30–37;
and B.A. Friedman, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2017).
2   For more on the 4+1 framework, which includes Russia, China, North Korea, Iran
and transnational violent extremism, see Fred Dews, “Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on
the “4+1 Framework and Meeting Transnational Threats,” Brookings Now (blog), Brookings,
February 24, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/02/24/joint-chiefs
-chairman-dunford-transnational-threats/.
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Nature of War versus Character of Warfare

Does distinguishing between the nature of war and character
of warfare matter? Yes, and the difference is more than nuance and
actually determines how we think about war. Antulio J. Echevarria
II argues “our understanding of war’s nature, or whether we believe
it has one, influences how we approach the conduct of war—how we
develop military strategy, doctrine and concepts, and train and equip
combat forces.” 3 An understanding of the nature of war establishes the
intellectual foundation upon which the character of warfare develops.
In other words, a flawed foundation compromises the entire structure.
Therefore, a common understanding of the nature of war should
be achieved before discussing types of warfare like drone, artificial
intelligence (AI), and cyber. Echevarria warns “many discussions of the
nature of war, however, fail to distinguish between war, as an act of
violence, and warfare, as the technique of applying that violence.” 4 This
oversight results in conflating the two terms. Just as a sailboat tossed
by the wind and the sea risks landing on rocks when the captain lacks
situational awareness, a discussion of future capabilities will result in
operational failure if strategists do not maintain a clear eye on the
nature of war.
Carl von Clausewitz compared warfare in each age to a chameleon
in the sense that societal values influence the character of warfare.
Moreover, Clausewitz reminds us “war is more than a true chameleon
that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” 5 For Clausewitz,
war is a phenomenon dominated by three interrelated tendencies
generally translated as enmity, reason, and chance and probability.6 Each
tendency is associated with a particular entity, specifically the civilian
population (enmity), the government (reason), and the military (chance
and probability). Aspects of each tendency exist within each category—
for example, the military realm, characterized by chance and probability,
also contains elements of enmity and reason. The distinction highlights
the inherent interdependent interactions among the tendencies and
defies reductionist attempts to treat the tendencies as variables within
an algebraic equation.

What is War?

War constitutes an extreme contest among conscious beings. The
clash of wills relates to the three tendencies, especially enmity, informing
the means selected (violence) to fulfill the aim (disarmament) and to
achieve the purpose (impose will). In this way, the level of enmity—or
hostility—acts as a wellspring supporting the will. Likewise, enmity
applies equally to supranational organizations and the individuals
3      Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 58.
4      Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 57.
5      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.
6      Clausewitz, On War, 89.
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occupying the battlefield. “Peace may be the ultimate object of war,”
as Clausewitz acknowledged, “but war . . . occurs whenever one party
resists the violent actions of another.” 7 In other words, war only occurs
when a defender opposes the attacker.
The nature of war also remains oriented on destroying the enemy’s
forces and seizing terrain, an interaction often overlooked in the current
preoccupation with drones and artificial intelligence technology. In order
to achieve war’s purpose, it is necessary to wage violence and render an
enemy powerless. Discussions of technological developments related to
drone, swarm, and cyber warfare obscure this reality—or at a minimum,
undersell how difficult it is to impose one’s will on the enemy—in favor
of focusing on supporting friendly force efforts to reduce fog and
friction and devising ways to keep humans off the battlefield.
Although empty battlefields have been a trend since at least the
mid-nineteenth century, battles and decisive engagements occur
among humans. This sentiment is not merely romantic but relates to
an appreciation of war as an extreme contest of wills among conscious
beings, which requires a series of purposeful engagements oriented
toward disarming the enemy and imposing one’s will.
The following section offers historical examples that illustrate
how concepts drive doctrine, and it explains the consequences when
either fails to embed the character of warfare within the nature of
war. Concepts drive doctrine by anticipating future requirements and
framing the discussion; however, the real work of converting concepts
into doctrine involves the painstaking task of socializing concepts. The
DOTmLPF-P analysis process, which examines doctrine, organization,
training, matériel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and
policy, exemplifies this complexity.8 In the United States, this effort
requires appealing to Congress for funding and gaining the active
support of the affected military services. Frequently, such concepts are
organized around some kind of technological innovation.
Likewise, advancements in technology are not sole factors that
enable military revolution. Future war discussions often base conclusions
on a capability’s game changing—and theoretical—contributions
at the tactical level. This posture limits the accuracy of efforts to
capture efficacy at the operational level. Historian Clifford J. Rogers
argued technological change accounts for only one of four essential
ingredients needed to generate a revolution in military affairs.9
Others noted, “Military revolutions recast society and the state as well
military organizations” whereas revolutions in military affairs (RMAs)
7      Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, 143.
8      “DOTmLPF-P Analysis,” Defense Acquisition University, June 16, 2017, https://www.dau
.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=d11b6afa-a16e-43cc-b3bb-ff8c9eb3e6f2.
9      Clifford J. Rogers, “As if a New Sun Had Arisen: England’s Fourteenth-Century RMA,” in The
Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300–2050, ed. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 18. Historian John T. Kuehn explained there is a “discriminator
of control” where “RMAs have a level of human control that military-social revolutions do not”
(message to author, July 19, 2017).
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take advantage of the transformative nature of military revolutions to
innovate a “new conceptual approach to warfare or to a specialized subbranch of warfare” since “the most effective mix is rarely apparent in
advance.” 10 Other components include systems development, operational
innovation, and organizational adaptation.11

Evolution of Warfare

In other words, technology alone is no more likely to result in a
military revolution than buying grapes allows you to make great wine.
Nonetheless, technological advancements are often touted as reducing
fog and friction, or at least making wars quicker and less violent. This
perspective, probably a hangover of the European Enlightenment,
received broad support even into the twentieth century.12 But Clausewitz
noted, “The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement
of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of
civilization has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to
destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war.” 13 This fact
remains true.

Industrial Weaponry
In the years leading up to World War I, European leaders, especially
in Germany, appreciated the lethality of modern weapons and expanded
rail lines to enable mobilization and concentration on a massive scale.
The ability to concentrate force, combined with increased lethality, was
argued to ensure wars would be short precisely because they would be
so violent. Strangely, armies, supported by inexhaustible moral fortitude,
were assumed to retain their ability to mount spirited offensives into
prepared defenses and withering machinegun fire; however, not all were
convinced.14 In 1899, a Polish banker named Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch
published a startlingly accurate, largely ignored, treatise that disagreed
with the popular opinion and sought to convince political leaders that
wars of entrenchment would dominate the immediate future.15 The
war’s opening moves offered a lethal laboratory for the ongoing debate
regarding the changing character of warfare.
The French army’s actions to prevent the Germans from reaching
the sea led to the so-called miracle of the Marne. Commanders on both
sides began to realize that instead of achieving martial glory through
bold offensives and skilled flanking maneuvers, men would remain
in destitute trenches stretching for hundreds of miles. Swift, violent
10     Knox and Williamson, Dynamics of Military Revolution, 12.
11    Rogers, “New Sun,” 18.
12    Arthur Herman, The Cave and the Light: Plato versus Aristotle, and the Struggle for the Soul of Western
Civilization (New York: Random House, 2013), 366–67.
13    Clausewitz, On War, 76.
14    Michael Howard, “Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914,” in Makers of
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1986), 518–19.
15    Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch, The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations: Is
War Now Impossible? (Toronto: William Briggs, 1900).
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actions were replaced with a methodical battle based on the artillery’s
significant firepower. This reality necessitated expending millions of
rounds in preparation for costly assaults, which even in the best cases
only facilitated small, disconnected penetrations.16
Concepts and doctrine preceding World War I appreciated the
devastating power of modern weapons; however, they failed to grasp
changes in the character of warfare, specifically the strength of the
defense. Additionally, armies on all sides discounted the effects of fog,
friction, and uncertainty as well as the depth of enmity animating the
will. In other words, they failed to take into account how the enemy
would respond and adapt. The nature of war did not change; however,
misreading the character of warfare obscured realities.

Tactical Foundations
The famed, and much studied, German blitzkrieg against France
in World War II succeeded primarily because French doctrine was
flawed. German tactical innovations during the interwar period solved
the problems of static defenses that characterized the Great War. The
majority of these innovations focused on calibrating a quantitative
balance among armored, mechanized, and infantry to penetrate
and exploit enemy defenses. The Wehrmacht’s penchant for tactical
actions, however, came at the cost of strengthening their intelligence
and sustainment capabilities. Arguably, this distaste for supporting
functions meant tactical innovations, over the long term, would miss
opportunities to link engagements in a meaningful way. Additionally,
whether due to cultural, geopolitical, or ideological reasons, German
war planners included too many invalid assumptions to support a
normative perspective.
In the end, Germany ultimately suffered a decisive defeat. As
historians Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett wrote, “No amount
of operational virtuosity . . . redeemed fundamental flaws in political
judgment. . . . Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but
political and strategic mistakes live forever.” 17 The examples provided
by World War II provide a myriad of lessons learned, not least of which
includes ensuring war plans reflect geostrategic realities. Germany’s
swift defeat of the French army indicated a greater appreciation for
the changing character of warfare; however, the Allied response
demonstrated the level of will achievable when the wellspring of enmity
runs deep.

Pentomic Concept
In the Cold War’s early years, the US Army, under the leadership
of General Maxwell D. Taylor, reorganized infantry and airborne
16      Robert A. Doughty, “French Operational Art 1888–1940,” in Historical Perspectives of the
Operational Art, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips (Washington, DC: Center of Military
History, 2005), 82.
17    Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, “Lessons of War,” National Interest 14 (Winter
1988/9): 85.
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formations into pentomic divisions. Without doubt this period was
transformative for the US military and came on the heels of the Korean
War and the French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. A strange
confluence of high-tech weapons and a resurgence of revolutionary
warfare spread across Eastern Europe and Asia. Americans felt a nuclear
war with the Soviet Union was a distinct possibility. Civilian and military
decision-makers faced a complex set of security challenges and often
disagreed on how to solve them.
For the Army, the pentomic design was “adopted as an interim
measure for the Cold War” and incorporated tactical nuclear weapons
to defeat Soviet invaders in large-scale battles occurring in denselypopulated European cities.18 The guiding doctrine emphasized the
concepts of dispersion, mobility, and flexibility.19 The intent was for
infantry formations on the battlefield to avoid the enemy’s nuclear
strikes by remaining dispersed, yet retain enough mobility to enable
concentration when ordered. The development of the Pentomic Division
sought to renew the Army’s relevance as a land force in a postnuclear
international system and required competing with the Air Force and
Navy for resources.
The Army instituted changes across the DOTmLPF-P continuum
and invested in advanced weapon systems including air defense, missiles,
space exploration, and a portfolio of tactical nuclear weapons with
innocuous names like Little John, Honest John, and Davy Crockett. “Yet
having acquired its missiles and nuclear weapons, and having adopted its
pentomic structure,” A. J. Bacevich reflects, “the Army found itself by
the end of the 1950s organized not to fight but almost solely to deter.” 20
The Army attempted to match its organization for “rapid technological
advance.” 21 And in doing so, “the Army dangerously lost its focus,
leading to rushed force designs and incomplete testing and wargaming
throughout the Pentomic division’s development.” 22
The military leaders responsible for leading the pentomic era were
the heroes of World War II and the Korean War. But, the noise
that promoted the changing character of warfare encouraged deviations
in force structures and weapon procurement. Ironically, these reductions
resulted in an Army that inadvertently violated its own ideal of flexibility
and promoted doctrine that lacked realistic application at the operational
level. Likewise, “severe equipment and technical shortcomings also
ensured that the Pentomic division was simply not prepared to succeed
in conventional warfare.” 23 In short, the Army was unprepared to fight
an atomic or a conventional war.
18      Virgil Ney, Evolution of the U.S. Army Division 1939–1968 (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for
Federal Scientific & Technical Information, 1969), 74.
19     Richard W. Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance: The U.S. Army Division in the Twentieth Century
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 25.
20      A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1986), 141.
21      Bacevich, Pentomic Era, 4.
22      Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 27.
23      Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 27.
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Bacevich adds to Arthur S. Collins’s observation that “ ‘our American
enthusiasm for more gadgets and fewer men has carried us away’ with
results that were wrongheaded and even dangerous.” 24 Ultimately, the
realities of this unworkable design gave way to a more realistic, although
equally tenuous, doctrine of active defense. Army leaders justified the
pentomic design to the public by heedlessly leaping between tactics and
strategy while ignoring the elements of fog, friction, and chance. The
key takeaway from this period is to recognize the danger of restructuring
organizations and doctrine to fit an invalid character of warfare,
especially when it precludes purposeful analysis and honest wargaming
at the operational level.

Operational Tactics
In the case of Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
sought to match a vigorous bombing campaign with diplomatic overtures
in an attempt to demonstrate American power and compel Hanoi
to negotiate. The approach failed because it was premised on flawed
assumptions and did not account for the extreme measures the North
Vietnamese were willing to take to continue fighting.25 This scenario is
an example of the complexity created by the interdependent relationship
of the three tendencies (enmity, reason, and chance) and increased by the
factors of fog, friction, and uncertainty.
Likewise, failing to anticipate an enemy’s response is characteristic
of flashy technological pitches claiming “shock and awe” will drain
the enemy’s will and paralyze its decision-making. This outcome rarely
happens, and it certainly does not last long enough to exploit the
advantage and achieve decisive victory. Domino warfare, for example,
and its related subcategories of effects-based operations, network-centric
warfare, and systemic operational design are entrancing as characters of
warfare but fail when they are nested within the nature of war.26 Each
one overlooks war as an extreme contest among conscious beings.
Effects-based operations and similar constructs fail because they
misjudge the relationship between combatants. When employed in
situations where actors are willing to modify their behavior to preserve
the system’s structure, effects-based operations work. In hierarchical
organizations with an observable power differential, such as those that
exist between a boss and employee or a parent and child, the construct
will be successful because one entity is willing to be subordinate to the
other. Therefore, one can impose his will without using physical violence
to disarm the opponent: there is no defense and thus no war.
This principle suggests that accounting for the enemy’s response
requires the ability to explain how tactical engagements are likely to
unfold and to set the conditions for subsequent actions. This capability
24      Arthur S. Collins Jr., “The Other Side of the Atom,” Army 10 (November 1959): 18–19,
quoted in Bacevich, Pentomic Era, 138.
25      Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1998), 271.
26      John T. Kuehn, letter to the editor, Joint Force Quarterly 55 (4th Quarter 2009): 7.
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requires developing both friendly and enemy operational approaches to
envision how an enemy may adapt to new technologies. As such, the
development of an enemy’s possible operational approach is iterative and
it must be refined as enemy actions either confirm or deviate from the
strategist’s assumptions.
The character of warfare calibrates the means necessary to achieve
the aim and fulfill the purpose; however, it must act according to the
nature of war and not seek to make war something foreign to itself.27
Clausewitz wrote, “Strategy is the use of the engagement for the
purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim
for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance
with its purpose.” 28 This concept underscores the necessity of thinking
at the operational level and not relying on sleight of hand or a deus ex
machina to shift between tactics and strategy.

Digital Battlefields
The Persian Gulf War demonstrated that the integration of
digitization and precision-guided munitions could accelerate decisionmaking and shorten the kill chain against a large, and presumably
modern, military.29 Coalition actions during the conflict expertly
calibrated efforts across war’s means, aim, and purpose. America’s
unanswered technological overmatch sought to replace fog, friction,
and uncertainty with high degrees of efficiency, lethality, and
synchronization. But, the total dominance exhibited by coalition forces
prompted several adversarial nations, including Russia and China, to
commission studies analyzing ways to overcome the emergent character
of warfare, which resulted in publications such as Unrestricted Warfare.30
Over time, America’s adversaries developed ways to mitigate and
to overcome the US military’s conventional superiority by calculating
our threshold for the employment of war’s means. Their goal is to
shift the character of warfare from digitization and precision-guided
munitions toward gray-zone activities while simultaneously preparing
for conventional war. Conversely, the intoxicating effects of the Persian
Gulf War revalidated the US obsession with high-tech systems and the
importance of maintaining that character of warfare.
America’s pursuit of new offsets seeks to minimize further, if not
eliminate, the factors of fog, friction, and uncertainty. Arguably, the
original intent behind the development of digitization and precision
munitions was to make war’s means more lethal and effective; however,
precision munitions can lull decision-makers into a false sense of
superiority while increasing sensitivity to perceptions of collateral
damage. Ultimately, the inability to discern between the nature of war
27      “Pity the theory that conflicts with reason!” Clausewitz, On War, 136.
28      Clausewitz, On War, 177.
29      Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation
Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 9.
30      Liang Qiao and Xiangsui Wang, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America
(Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999).
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and the character of warfare constrains military actions and often results
in protracted limited wars for limited aims.

Advancing Technology
Osama bin Laden’s terror attacks on September 11, 2001, sought
to inflict maximum violence against American citizens on American
soil. His purpose was to bring the United States to its knees and force
an immediate withdrawal from the Middle East. Obviously, the attacks
had the opposite effect and he was killed. Despite Saddam Hussein’s
execution for crimes against humanity, bin Laden’s death during
a US raid of his compound, and the rapid overthrow of the Taliban
in Afghanistan, America remains embroiled in a long-term struggle
against fundamentalism.
The conflict continues to transform and spread to new geographic
locales. The fight is waged against an enemy that lacks—and exploits—
America’s technological dominance. Nonstate actors, who lack high-tech
capacities and cannot prevent friendly access to the sophisticated
architecture undergirding command and control, movement and
maneuver, and munitions guidance, provide nations, like the United
States, with opportunities to test new capabilities.
This superiority can lead to a reliance on systems that makes the
means of war easier to employ against terrorists, but the practice may
codify a character of warfare unsuitable against a near-peer threat.
Historian John A. Lynn noted, “The culture of technological gullibility
invites defeat by ignoring the unchanging reality of war as the domain
of chance, violence, and politics.” 31 This technological gullibility can be
overcome by paying increased attention to the operational level of war
and by envisioning how a thinking enemy, possessing a will buoyed by
enmity, may react to and resist war’s aim and purpose.
Likewise, when faced with a near-peer enemy, technological
advancements aimed at increasing information flow may result in the
opposite effect. Arguably, after a certain point, an increase in information
intensifies fog and friction and delays decision-making. The irony is
most commanders want more information to validate assumptions and
mitigate risk. This phenomenon is not new. Clausewitz wrote, “Many
intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and
most are uncertain.” 32 Unfortunately, in a future war against a near-peer
enemy, an increase in information is likely to increase burdens on the
commander, add layers of bureaucracy, and lengthen decision-making
timelines. In short, technological pronouncements claiming the ability
to increase information flow and shorten decision-making should be
met with skepticism.
Technological advances that attempt to subvert or obscure the
nature of war are misleading. Readers of Thucydides’s Peloponnesian War
31      John A. Lynn, “Forging the Western Army in Seventeenth-Century France,” in Knox and
Murray, Dynamics of Military Revolution, 56.
32      Clausewitz, On War, 117.
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are confronted with the realization that the motives of fear, honor,
and interest (or profit) remain just as applicable today as they were in
ancient Greece.33 Likewise, his reconstruction of key speeches highlight
human nature’s willingness to replace an understanding of the nature of
war with a self-reflecting character of warfare oblivious to the factors of
fog, friction, and uncertainty.

Quo Vadis?

Humans end wars. This fact relates to war’s purpose and the
requirement to impose one’s will on the enemy. Drones and robots
certainly have utility as a means to wage violence in pursuit of rendering
an enemy powerless, but human political leaders are not likely to
surrender to robots. Additionally, the inclusion of drones and artificial
intelligence in warfare are likely to make war messier and increase
enmity among all entities. Why is this the case? Experience in Iraq
and Afghanistan confirmed the natural aversion toward suffering
remote attacks: improvised explosive devices have deleterious effects
on friendly forces, complicating the operational environment, making
simple tasks more difficult, and necessitating more moral and matériel
resources. This complexity erodes political will.
Likewise, in the face of effective manned and unmanned air strikes,
the enemy has adopted extreme operational security measures. Western
scholars and government officials continue to debate the legality and
ethics of improvised explosive devices and drone strikes. But, the negative
consequences of engaging in protracted war are well documented by Sun
Tzu, who advised against them, and Mao Zedong, who used them with
success against the Japanese.34 This dichotomy is one of the reasons
defense is the stronger form of warfare. Protraction blunts the attacker’s
means and stalls the aim, which prevents achieving the purpose.
Improvised explosive devices and air strikes are low-tech compared
with robot-led warfare; however, human responses to the low-tech
weapons may indicate future responses to the presence of high-tech
assets on the battlefield. As experts grapple with the character of
drone and artificial intelligence warfare, the logical starting point
must emphasize that humans end wars. A failure to orient on this fact
risks deviating toward a purely tactical discussion on the character of
robotic warfare as opposed to the more meaningful study on integrating
such warfare into the nature of war. Again, this detail relates to war’s
purpose: drone swarms may be able to start wars, but they cannot end
them. Humans retain this responsibility. Authority can be delegated,
responsibility cannot.
33      Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. C. F. Smith (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1919).
34      Sun Tzu observed “no country has ever benefited from a protracted war,” and Mao Zedong
advised “energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war so that should the Japanese
occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall still gain final victory.” Sun Tzu, The Art
of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 41; and Mao Tse-tung,
On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2005), 69.
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War only exists if the enemy fights back. Offense does not make
a war, defense does. As Clausewitz writes, “The animosity and the
reciprocal effects of hostile elements, cannot be considered to have
ended so long as the enemy’s will has not been broken.” 35 If an entity uses
robots to conduct a massive offensive and destroys the opponent’s entire
robot army, does the war end? Or did a naïve population just realize
they would have to fight the war themselves? Are they ready? What is
the legal justification of the casus belli and enmity animating their will?
In the event of a successful large-scale offensive using robots, the
opponent will not likely stop fighting because of drones or robots.
The defenders’ enmity will likely increase, thereby hardening their
will. Arguably, a robot attack is a humiliating and dehumanizing, if
not outright fearful, prospect. In fact, it is more likely incorporating
autonomous drones and robots will increase enmity to a fever pitch.
In other words, a series of drone battles only delays, and exacerbates,
the inevitable clash of human wills. As Clausewitz mentioned, “Theorists are apt to look on fighting in the abstract as a trial of strength
without emotion entering into it.” 36 A myopic focus on machine warfare
may actually cede the physical and moral initiative to an enemy unable,
or unwilling, to field a robot army, and may increase the intellectual gap
between the military and the civilian society.
Likewise, the United States remains focused on preserving Pax
Americana. This priority requires containing or deterring adversaries,
supporting allies, and maintaining the status quo, but it also induces a
degree of strategic malaise that negatively impacts risk assessment and
resource allocation, often leading to protracted conflicts for limited aims.
A ceaseless flow of operational requirements results in a high degree
of force dispersion, with a constrained ability to concentrate forces,
without accepting significant risk in another area. This strategy assumes
forces will be reallocated as necessary, but also encourages organizations
to adopt a “react to contact” approach.
Arguably, the current paradigm promotes sensitivity to shortterm disturbances, especially when the problem is solvable with forces
already assigned. This model is less effective for addressing underlying
causes over the long term because maintaining the status quo requires a
dispersed force lay down. Increasing force levels, even by a small margin,
usually necessitates shifting assets across combatant commands, a move
that requires justification—and political will—even for very short-term
situations. This construct cedes the initiative to the enemy who watches
and learns, operating below the traditional US thresholds for employing
war’s means. This dichotomy subverts one’s appreciation for the nature
of war, replacing it with a ceaseless search for a character of warfare
that promises to solve short-term security issues and maintain the status
quo. Again, this perspective leads to normative vice empirical theorizing
that becomes dominated by a discussion on how a capability or activity
35      Clausewitz, On War, 90.
36      Clausewitz, On War, 138.
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supports friendly actions instead of the connection with war’s aim and
purpose. In short, a discussion on future war should remain wedded to
an understanding of the nature of war.
Finally, the current emphasis on promoting high-tech platforms
in professional journals, popular science fiction, and the media limits
the discussion to the tactical level. Likewise, conflating the character of
warfare with the nature of war prevents appreciating how capabilities
function at the operational level of war. Therefore, accounting for the
operational level—instead of leaping between tactics and strategy—
elucidates how a thinking enemy will respond and adjust.
The United States pursues increasingly lethal means for waging war
while also striving to reduce occurrences of warfare to the smallest amount
possible. This endeavor is not a contradiction, but if unaccounted for,
distorts the conceptual nature of war and character of warfare. Historical
examples demonstrate the risks of failing to appreciate war’s nature and
the importance of thinking like an operational artist. Thus, this article
does not diminish the importance of technological innovation outright
but serves as a reminder that the blind pursuit of the next “decisive”
capability, or offset, may come at the cost of personnel readiness, diverse
platforms, and appreciation of war’s objective nature.
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Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War
By Paul Scharre
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

A

rmy of None represents a ten-year intellectual effort that draws upon
Paul Scharre’s deep subject matter expertise related to autonomous
weapons systems and the concurrent ethical and policy considerations
that come with their development, fielding, and use. Scharre—a former
US Army Ranger with multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense working group leader for Department
of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, November 21,
2012—is a senior fellow and director, Technology and National Security,
Center for a New American Security.
Scharre accedes to technological determinism and military
pragmatism; he recognizes autonomous systems and artificial
intelligence (AI) have gradually emerged in the arsenals of the world’s
great powers and will proliferate over time into those of lesser political
entities and even the more bellicose nonstate actors. The work focuses
on this military evolutionary process and the many issues surrounding
it. Just as AIs could conceivably engage in sociopathic behaviors for
end-state fulfillment, it could be said that Army of None also possesses
its own inherent contradictions that, at times, provide us with a sense of
an analytic amorality (238). This is because the author is attempting to
balance military necessity—the United States must gain dominance in
these new systems—while simultaneously promoting liberal democratic
and basic human values.
The book is divided into six parts with the following thematic
foci—part 1, “Robopocalypse Now”; part 2, “Building the Terminator”;
part 3, “Runaway Gun”; part 4, “Flash War”; part 5, “The Fight to Ban
Autonomous Weapons”; and part 6, “Averting Armageddon: The Weapon
of Policy.” Within each of these parts of the book, three to five chapters
are clustered together to develop a thematic focus of the twenty-one
book chapters. The book also contains an introduction, robust notes (tied
to sentence fragment quote strings), acknowledgements, abbreviations,
an index, 31 black and white photos, and various tables, figures, and
diagrams. However, no formal reference listing exists for the reader to
do follow-on topical reading. Scharre’s institutional knowledge of the
subject matter and “topical access” derived from numerous Department
of Defense and related organizational personage interviews—with
policymakers and officials, scientists and weaponeers, and philosophers
and ethicists—provide context and additional insider accuracy to his
writing and analysis.
The work logically progresses from one part to the next. For those
new to AI, a host of new concepts and terminology are provided such
as that of “perverse instantiation,” “ethical governor,” and “centaur

New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2018
448 pages
$27.95
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warfighters” (239, 281, 322). An interweaving of real world military
history, operations, and technology with science fiction works and
movies makes for a lively juxtaposition of the real and the imagined.
An interesting component of this detailed book is that glimpses of
countermeasures to armed AI robots appear within it. These include
“hidden exploits”—deep neural nets perceiving image patterns that
humans don’t, which allow AI to be manipulated and attempt to trick
AI into misunderstanding human intent by mimicking conditions such
as hors de combat or surrender behavior (183–88, 258–60). Additionally,
the preconditions have been laid within the work to look deeper into
human, centaur (human/AI), and AI ground force combinations and
their pros and cons for future combat scenarios. A continuum of military
tradeoffs exists with speed, complexity, and morality representing some
of the dominant factors. While humans in and on the loop are always
preferred, the demands of some future engagements will quickly surpass
human cognitive loads that will likely take us into Faustian dilemmas
related to the costs of victory and how it was achieved.
Coming from a professional military and defense analyst perspective,
criticisms of the work are relatively muted as it is well researched and
written. Arms control advocates of the “Stop Killer Robots” variety,
however, see this subject matter very differently and are aghast that
Scharre and others like him who represent great power interests have
moved beyond the debate and are accepting these systems as a fait
accompli. Still, it must be remembered that relying too much on AI
in the future—especially that of the more artificial general intelligence
variety—is reminiscent of World War I-like mobilization protocols, which
once tripped, were out of human ability to stop (231–33). Additionally,
Terminator and Skynet archetypes, which draw upon historical lessons
related to armed slaves turning on their masters, will also always haunt
us vis-à-vis armed autonomous systems.
Even with such concerns, this is a superb and accessible book actually
deserving of the media hype surrounding it. It is set at an affordable price
(and even more so when the cheaper paperback version is released). The
reviewer readily endorses the work for war college and graduate level
national security courses. He also concurs with the assessment of many
other defense professionals that Army of None represents a tour de force
concerning autonomous weapons, the moral implications stemming
from their use, and the combat potentials—and pitfalls—of utilizing
militarized AI itself.

Strategy, Evolution, and War: From
Apes to Artificial Intelligence
By Kenneth Payne
Reviewed by Dr. Richard M. Meinhart, professor of defense and joint processes,
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army War College

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2018
296 pages
$98.95

S

trategy, Evolution, and War by Kenneth Payne deeply explores the
evolution of strategy in war from a human perspective while
considering how artificial intelligence (AI) may influence tactical and
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strategic perspectives of future strategy development. The book’s front
cover engages the reader’s mind in an inquisitive manner with the subtitle
From Apes to Artificial Intelligence and an image of an artificial person with
a weapon developed from a few hundred 0s and 1s. Key strategy insights
from a war perspective that integrate different theories, strategists, and a
variety of historical and current examples are well supported by almost
400 academic sources. The complexity associated with Payne’s many
insights requires careful reading and reflection to fully appreciate and
apply them.
In the introduction’s first two paragraphs, Payne succinctly identifies
the book’s focus and conclusion. He defines strategy as “the purposeful
use of violence for political ends.” Hence, the book’s focus is on war
versus other strategy-related endeavors. He then states “strategy is soon
to undergo something of a dramatic transformation because machines
will make important decisions about war and will do so without input
from human minds.” He summarizes the psychology of strategy, its
historical evolution from ancient Greece to nuclear weapons, and the
tactical and strategic influence of artificial intelligence that sets the stage
for the book’s eight chapters, which are organized in three key parts:
“The Evolution of Strategists,” “Culture Meets Evolved Strategy,” and
“Artificial Intelligence and Strategy.”
The first chapter, “Defining Strategy as Psychology,” provides
context for strategy’s overall psychological evolution from human and
cultural perspectives dating from classical Greek Thucydidan insights on
the Peloponnesian War to a more distinct strategy in Europe’s eighteenth
century with key examples associated with Carl von Clausewitz and the
Napoleonic Wars. Building on the psychology of strategy, the next chapter
delves deeper into the inseparability of strategic and human evolution.
Payne provides examples of how cognitive abilities and consciousness
have changed from chimps to humans, who organize into larger social
groups, and the strategy implications of warfare. The last chapter of part
1 examines how a leader’s strategy, which is ultimately a distinct choice,
can be greatly influenced by heuristics and biases. He discusses different
biases that can favor groups or actions, including risk assessment, that
can influence decision-making. Included in this cognitive discussion are
examples of the connectedness of emotions and consciousness when
making strategy decisions as well as ways to ameliorate heuristic errors.
Part 2 provides three chapters on the history of human culture and
war affecting the psychology of behavior and strategy based upon ancient
Greece and the Peloponnesian War, Carl von Clausewitz on warfare
and strategy associated with the Napoleonic Wars, and the influence of
nuclear weapons strategy. The discussion on ancient Greece illustrates
how writing and inquiry provided cultural and strategic insights on
the interaction of weapons, warriors, and society changing overtime.
The chapter on Clausewitz and the Napoleonic Wars explores how the
character of war changed to generate and employ force including fog
and friction as well as determining a center of gravity. While technology
and weaponry changed, key strategy insights included the intimate
connection between armed forces and society. The last chapter of part 2
provides examples of how nuclear weapons were profoundly disruptive
and influenced thinking on the use of force through examining the Cold
War in general and the Cuban missile crisis specifically. A key point
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Payne makes is that nuclear weapons influenced the rationality and
consciousness of strategy decisions due to the consequences of using
such weapons. But overall, he did not consider this psychologically
revolutionary for strategy.
While the book’s first two parts discuss strategy from psychological,
historical, and human perspectives that have been widely examined in
multiple academic venues, part 3 examines the potential AI will have
on strategy from both tactical and strategic perspectives. The chapter
entitled “Tactical Artificial Intelligence Arrives” focuses on battlefield
strategy using AI technology, algorisms, and computing power versus
human decisions on when and how to attack in multiple warfighting
domains. Key points Payne makes are that tactical AI lacks a sense
of meaning, AI decisions will be much quicker with an offensive
versus defensive focus, and AI tactical decisions can have strategic
consequences. He also identifies how AI technology may dramatically
shift the balance of military power between states and how humans
may be out of the decision loop, which undercuts a mission-command
philosophy. The “Artificial General Intelligence Does Strategy” chapter
is somewhat speculative regarding what-might-happen or what-couldhappen events. He identifies that AGI’s potential future development
and strategy implications should be considered even though “defining
AGI (artificial general intelligence) is no easy matter as the concept
is rather underspecified,” and there are differences between AGI and
human intelligence.
Strateg y, Evolution, and War insightfully examines strategy’s evolution
in warfare and potential for the future. The influence of nuclear weapons
on strategy in the recent past is very relevant to national security and
military professionals as nuclear capabilities and strategy are currently
being discussed in today’s national security environment. Similarly the
use and potential growth of AI can have far-reaching effects on future
warfare strategy decisions. In today’s evolving security environment,
these factors must be well understood by senior leaders to preclude blind
spots in decision-making relating to the future of AI across the many
levels and domains of warfighting.

Outsourcing War to Machines: The
Military Robotics Revolution
By Paul J. Springer
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

Santa Barbara, CA:
Praeger Security
International, 2018
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$63.00

T

he author of Outsourcing War to Machines, Dr. Paul J. Springer, is a
military historian and a professor at the Air Command and Staff
College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He also authored Military
Robots and Drones: A Reference Handbook and contributed to two more recent
works on cyberwarfare. His new effort refocuses his academic efforts on
robotic systems, including unmanned and primarily human teleoperated
equipment, that can be utilized for a variety of military missions. As
such, the work “provide[s] context to the rise and deployment of military
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robotics. It raises issues with the legality and morality of using these
advanced systems and critiques the ways in which they have been used
in recent conflicts” (3). The work is contemporary and US-focused
given our extensive use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
and armed drones in the Global War on Terror and the fact that we are
promoting most of the technological advancement in this area.
The book’s initial chapter lays out research design, breaks down
topics in each chapter, and offers background information related to
definitions, artificial intelligence (AI) and cognition, and war on terror
antecedents. The second chapter provides an overview to revolution in
military affairs (RMA) thinking and how military robots may be viewed
as representative of such a new revolution. The third chapter represents
a historical overview of robotics from the ancient past up to the point
that the decision was made to first weaponize a Predator drone in 2001.
Chapter 4 focuses on the dominant robots that have been deployed in
the Global War on Terror, which include the Reaper, multi-function
agile remote control robots (MARCbots), and PackBot systems. The
rise of mercenary forces and the lethal targeting of American citizens
overseas who have committed treason are also covered. The fifth
chapter highlights how military robots are viewed within the laws of
armed conflict, how their use may require changes in such laws, and
how technology is changing American use-of-force behaviors. Chapter
6 looks at armed robots vis-à-vis ethics in war, analyses the relationship
of these systems to concepts of proportionality, discrimination, and
military necessity and highlights the amoral nature of machines based
on programming logic. Chapter 7 provides a contemporary treatment
of cyberwarfare—this tangential topical focus will be addressed later in
the review. The final chapter provides what is acknowledged to be a light
treatment of military robotics futures.
The strengths of the work are that it is well written and logically
laid out by an expert in this subject matter. Further, I found the work to
be well researched and referenced. It is also priced reasonably well for a
hardcover academic text. Many of the discussions provided in the book
made for engaging reads such as the historical treatment of the subject.
A specific weakness with the work, however, exists with chapter
7, “The Global Competition.” The author principally focuses on
cyberwarfare related to Russia, China, Israel, and Iran instead of on
emerging armed robotics trends and considerations. This gives the
reviewer the impression that cyberwarfare filler was utilized, rather than
undertaking new research to flesh out that chapter. The relationship
between the emergence of military robotics to the phalanx, gunpowder,
and nuclear RMAs in chapter 2 could have also been analyzed more in
depth—especially at the force structure, strategic, and most importantly,
political organizational form level. The phalanx was an early product
of city-states while gunpowder-based weaponry was a manifestation of
dynastic states that later transitioned into nation-states. Nuclear weapons
represent a late nation-state military capability. This begs to question
what political organizational form military robots—most importantly
weaponized AI-based ones—may portend.
Overall, the work intentionally focuses more on the context and
history behind the military robotics revolution rather than attempting
to analyze or project where that revolution may be heading—an
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established scholar, Springer specifically points out the folly in making
such predictions (195). One of the concluding insights he offers is that
“an outright ban on military robotics is unlikely to have much of an
effect” (214). Further, outright slaughter will likely be required before
any meaningful international bans will be enacted. Related concerns are
made earlier concerning the dangers these systems represent—especially
in regard to militarized robotics and artificial intelligence—with the
2015 petition circulated against such new revolutionary weaponry (220).
In summation, Outsourcing War to Machines will likely continue to exist
in the shadow of Paul Scharre’s higher profile, more popularized, and
affordable work Army of None. Springer’s book, however, fulfills a much
needed contextual and historical grounding in this topic that the student
of war should undertake prior to reading more focused efforts on robotic
and autonomous systems on the contemporary and future battlefield.
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Military History
Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and
the Changing Character of War
By Ben Barry
Reviewed by Andrew Byers, co-founder, Counter Extremism Network

B

en Barry, OBE, a retired Brigadier and Senior Fellow for Land
Warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, has set
out to draw lessons for future US and allied military operations, as well as
arguments about the changing character of war, from the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Harsh Lessons is comprised of five substantive chapters
to analyze “the changing character of conflict in the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, with a view to identifying pointers to the future character
of conflict” (12). By “character of war,” Barry means the Clausewitzian
sense, “which encompasses the varying ways and means by which war is
fought” (11).
Barry argues the United States came close to strategic defeat in both
Iraq and Afghanistan—taking several years to realize that its ends, ways,
and means in both conflicts were insufficient for the task. It is from
US failures, as well as its successes, that Barry draws his lessons for the
future of war.
Chapter 1 provides brief histories of the two conflicts from 2001
through 2015, offering a good, if brief, overview of the two wars—
this chapter is not the definitive history of either conflict, nor does it
try to be. To Barry, these wars have validated the interdependence of
war and politics at the tactical level as well as the effectiveness of the
“clear, hold, build” approach in Afghanistan. He argues US defeat in
both wars was narrowly avoided by adding personnel surges to conduct
counterinsurgency campaigns though he acknowledges that security
deteriorated in both cases after responsibility was transferred to Baghdad
and Kabul. This outcome suggests a major disconnect in the viability of
long-term stability operations and the need for local partners able and
willing to provide effective security for civilian populations.
I am skeptical of one claim that Barry makes: the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have validated US counterinsurgency doctrine (34). This
claim seems especially spurious in the case of Afghanistan, a conflict
that drags on seventeen years (at the time of this writing) after it began.
Afghanistan is surely not a strongly positive case study in the efficacy of
US counterinsurgency operations.
Chapter 2 explores the formulation and execution of strategy in
both conflicts, command and control, and alliance/coalition command.
In the case of Iraq, Barry argues there were interlinked strategic failures:
failure to plan adequately for postconflict stabilization, failure to respond
to actual (rather than anticipated) conditions after successful regime
change, and failure to impose security rapidly in Baghdad, the country’s
political center of gravity. Barry also highlights the need for unity of
effort, which proved to be a significant problem in Afghanistan—only
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in 2010 were all US troops placed under a unified command. This
chapter does highlight one problem with the book: at times, there is too
much blurring of the two conflicts, with Iraq and Afghanistan treated as
a single pool of experiences and lessons to be learned without adequately
differentiating them.
Chapter 3 analyzes the military capabilities, tactics, and operations of
both sides in the two conflicts. The strength of this chapter is in Barry’s
identification of key areas in which a lack of understanding or expertise
proved especially deleterious—for example, lack of understanding of
cultural differences, such as the problems stemming from the use of
dogs inside Iraqi homes; poor intelligence at the tactical level; and a
lack of expertise in handling detainees, who could have been important
sources of intelligence if treated properly. Barry also points out the
limited use of lessons learned from one conflict to another.
Chapter 4 discusses the concept of military adaptation in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the need to rapidly change equipment, organization,
and methods during war. In both cases, this is largely a story in which
insurgents rapidly adapted while the United States and allies struggled to
adjust to the conflicts’ changing conditions and opponents’ actions and
capabilities (such as the use of improvised explosive devices).
Chapter 5 explores the utility of force, which allows Barry to
examine the conduct and character of contemporary warfare. Here he
emphasizes the complexity of war and the unpredictability of enemy
actions, providing further discussion of the strategic corporal concept.
Just as small unit leaders and actions taken at the tactical level can have
disproportionately great effects, they can also have vastly negative effects
on the overall war effort, as scandals like the abuse of prisoners at places
like Abu Ghraib demonstrated.
Barry’s conclusion provides a synthesis of his major arguments on
the nature of these wars and likely prospects for future conflicts. He
argues the United States deployed inadequate forces and overall effort
in building state capacity, after regime changes. In part, this was the
product of overconfidence, slowness to adapt to the changing character
of war, and too much attraction to the revolution in military affairs,
which offered little help in stabilization operations. One of Barry’s
conclusions deserves repeating: unless regime change is followed
by successful stabilization efforts and state institution-building, the
resulting conditions are likely to be no better and possibly worse than
prior to the campaign (141).
Harsh Lessons is recommended because of its valuable insights about
US and allied experiences in the two conflicts. Reading it sparks a great
many conversations about the course of these wars, and what they
may presage about the future of warfare. While we must be cautious
about “overlearning” the lessons of past conflicts—no future conflict
will unfold the way that either Iraq or Afghanistan did, and future
conflicts with near-peer adversaries will likely look nothing like these
campaigns—Barry’s effort here is a worthy one.
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Israel’s Long War with Hezbollah: Military
Innovation and Adaptation under Fire
By Raphael D. Marcus
Reviewed by Alma Keshavarz, associate, Small Wars Journal—El Centro

R

aphael D. Marcus examines the military history of the conflict
between Israel and Hezbollah since 1985. The first part of the
book assesses strategic adaptation with an emphasis on Israel’s
deterrence policy towards Hezbollah. The second examines operational
adaptation with a focus on what shaped the Israel Defense Forces’s
(IDF’s) planning and Hezbollah’s transformation. Marcus explains how
the IDF continuously adjusted its defense policy and its understanding
of Hezbollah with each conflict. The author examines key battles and
assesses the strategy from the perspectives of Israel and Hezbollah as well
as the development and application of the IDF operational warfighting
concept in Lebanon. Marcus leads the reader from the beginning of the
conflict, through the counterguerrilla campaign, to the Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon, and throughout the war.
The first four chapters of the book provide Hezbollah’s background
as an unorganized militant group that spearheaded the use of suicide
bombings and relied heavily on kidnappings and terrorist attacks.
Early in its development, Hezbollah was trained by Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in “explosive demolition, field
intelligence, reconnaissance, and other military skills” (44). Throughout
the first decade of Hezbollah’s existence, the group engaged in guerrilla
warfare, which the IDF fought conventionally. As the author notes, the
IDF “conceptually viewed Hezbollah as a routine security threat that
was easily dealt with in reactive, low intensity operations” (50). Following
the IDF’s assassination of Hezbollah’s leader, Abbas al-Musawi, in
1992, Hezbollah sought retribution. But high casualty rates during the
first decade of the conflict also encouraged the group to reevaluate
its technique and strategy towards the IDF. During the 1990s Hassan
Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s current secretary-general, came to the forefront
of Hezbollah’s strategic command. Under his leadership, the group
evolved from a “terrorist militia to a guerilla force to a commando force”
(72). In response, Israel developed the Egoz, which was designed as a
clandestine reconnaissance unit that became proficient in concealment
techniques, intelligence collection, and urban warfare. This new elite
unit was able to embed in southern Lebanon for long periods.
While Hezbollah continued to transform its strategy, the IDF was
slow to respond. This is a major theme within the book. Defense Minister
Moshe Arens finally adapted the IDF’s strategy in the late 1990s with a
policy of deterrence. But leveraging the Lebanese government against
Syria and Hezbollah was not enough. Domestic pressure led Prime
Minister Ehud Barak to unilaterally withdraw the IDF from Lebanon in
May 2000, which showed the major rift in civil-military affairs in Israel.
As Marcus notes, the IDF’s strategic mistake was “the mischaracterization
of the nature of the enemy and slow conceptual adaptation” (113).
Eventually the IDF changed course and, in 1999, paid greater attention
to the threat by acquiring new weapon systems, adjusting its defense
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budget, and addressing manpower issues. These changes equated to an
Israeli revolution in military affairs (RMA). The author references the
IDF perspective on successful US military operations at the onset of the
Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, which “validated the utility of the RMA and
associated precision technologies” (136). The second half of the book
delves deeper into this concept and the Second Lebanon War.
Throughout the course of the book, Marcus demonstrates
Hezbollah’s effort to take the lessons learned and adapt them to IDF
strategy. Although Hezbollah continued persistent rocket fire despite
being bombarded by the IDF in 1993 and 1996 conflicts, the author’s
focus on the 2006 campaign is most noteworthy. Marcus described the
IDF’s trajectory from the beginning of the conflict with Hezbollah and
explained how the force did not manage to respond accordingly. Israel
did not lose the war, but neither did Hezbollah; for Hezbollah, it is
“victory by not losing” (207). Air campaigns were not sufficient and the
authorization to use limited ground operations came later than it should
have. What made the fight more difficult for ground operations was that
some Hezbollah fighters were uniformed and others were not. It later
became apparent that Hezbollah fired rockets from civilian dwellings.
Survivability, Iranian assistance, and embedded fighters were some of
the challenges the IDF faced. Hezbollah’s operational approach blended
irregular and guerrilla elements and the IDF was not prepared to fight
this type of campaign.
Ultimately, Marcus adequately presents the military history of the
Israel-Hezbollah conflict. He features the processes of Israel’s political
echelons and military officials as well as Hezbollah’s leaders, and how
both sides adapted their strategies and warfighting techniques with each
conflict. Israel’s Long War explains the IDF’s difficulty with military
adaptation and conceptualizing the Hezbollah threat. While there are
a number of available works covering the long Israel-Hezbollah history,
Marcus’s work is in the minority that details the operational and strategic
aspects of both sides. The book is a significant contribution to the study
of this conflict and of Hezbollah. But it also serves as a case study on how
militaries—both state and nonstate—can learn from battlefield mistakes
and evolve to match threats. The afterword briefly discusses Hezbollah’s
continued transformation with Iranian and Russian assistance in Syria.
Hezbollah has endured losses since the Syrian Civil War started in 2011,
but it has also gained invaluable battlefield experiences against the Islamic
State and other groups countering Bashar al-Assad’s forces. This book
is worth the attention of anyone interested in learning the intricacies of
the civil-military dynamic and those who seek a deeper knowledge of the
military history surrounding the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.
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The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed:
Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991
By Gregory Fontenot
Reviewed by Colonel Tarn Warren, former chair, Department of Military
Strategy, Planning and Operations, US Army War College

C

olonel Gregory Fontenot’s The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army
Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991 brings to life
the “Big Red One” by telling the story of a US infantry division, reborn
from the post-Vietnam malaise, forged into an effective fighting unit,
tested in fast-paced conventional combat, and emerging victorious. The
book provides a historical narrative that will interest a wide range of
readers, from young soldiers and leaders to national policymakers. Indeed,
the author exposes several lessons that should leave lasting impressions
on those who would contemplate warfare and those who would serve in
it. He also thickens the historiography of this topic and uses a wide range
of primary and secondary sources, that include hundreds of personal
interviews, to tell the story and make his points.
The book starts big, gains focus by plowing through incredible
tactical details, and ends big, again with valuable insights. Appropriately,
the author begins by providing some context. He adeptly describes the
post-Vietnam Army-wide challenges and their negative impact on such
elements as force development, training, logistics, and morale. The
1st Infantry Division (1st ID) was hit particularly hard because it was
not considered a high-priority unit. As a result of these problems, the
book describes how senior Army leadership in the 1970s and 1980s
implemented new concepts, doctrine, programs, and equipment such as
AirLand Battle, Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises,
Field Manual 100-5, various weapon systems, and the National Training
Center to attempt positive transformation of the force and regain highend combat effectiveness. More specifically, the author relates how
two successive division commanders, General Gordon R. Sullivan and
Lieutenant General Thomas G. Rhame, made the most of few resources
to slowly improve, in fits and starts, the 1st Infantry Division’s combat
readiness up to the beginning of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Fontenot
makes it clear they did much with little.
Leading up to the Gulf War, the narrative provides some needed
background on Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s war with Iran, and Iraq’s strategic
view at that time. Shifting to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the
US-led coalition responded and the Big Red One played a significant role.
Now the book dives deep and stays there among the division’s tactical
units until the end, popping up at brief intervals for some strategic air.
Fontenot places the reader in the midst of the 1st Infantry Division’s
battalions and brigades as they struggle to uncoil from Fort Riley, rail
to port, load ships, sail and fly to Saudi Arabia, unload, and move 500
kilometers to their assembly areas. A Herculean effort, to be sure, made
tougher by never having enough of anything. Throughout, the book
also commendably exposes how the fog of war and demands of combat
impact key-leader decisions, relationships, and command and control at
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all levels from US Central Command down through VII Corps to the
1st Infantry Division and its subordinate tactical units.
Readers are immersed in the intensive preparations for the attack
north and the great “left hook” to roll up the enemy’s right flank. With
precision and clarity, Fontenot weaves a narrative of leaders and soldiers
dealing with confusion, scarcity, surprise, culmination, euphoria,
and ultimately, victory—all buoyed by faith in purpose and mission
command. Importantly, the book is candid and balanced, exposing
failures and fratricide. The author does not cheerlead; instead, through
the words of those who were there, he reminds us that the preparation
for, and conduct of, large-scale combat operations is hard, really hard.
With an entire mechanized corps on the move, the author makes
a big desert small. The author devotes several riveting chapters to
the Big Red One’s initial breach and subsequent offensive operations,
moving the point of view from tank turrets, to resupply columns, to
higher operations centers, and to his own tank battalion. As the 100hour war unfolds, the story grips the reader with first enemy contacts,
lost fuel convoys, and navigating at night in a featureless desert without
global positioning systems, all in pursuit of the Iraqi Republican Guard.
After more than three straight days of combat, fatigue bites hard, and
with units stretched out over hundreds of miles, effective command
and control is severely strained, if not absent. Fontenot convincingly
describes the culmination of VII Corps and the 1st ID on February
28, now well inside Kuwait, due mainly to a lack of gas and sleep. The
story concludes with the Big Red One’s hasty and difficult transition
to improvised stability operations in Kuwait and the long road home,
ending back at Fort Riley.
The book concludes with some important points for Army leaders
at all levels. First, rigorous training pays off—eventually. The huge
investments in concepts, doctrine, equipment, and the National Training
Center helped foster success against the fourth largest army in the
world at the time. Second, good leadership is decisive amid the chaos of
combat, and the US belief in mission command and commanders’ intent
remains a key, if not unique, strength. Third, Fontenot vividly relates
how strained operational and tactical sustainment can be a greater threat
to success than enemy resistance. These lessons have particular relevance
today as the United States Army refocuses on near-peer competitors.
The main criticism of this book is that it could have been shorter and
delivered the same effect. The breadth and volume of tactical detail
was at times too scattered, somewhat affecting coherence. Nonetheless,
through dedicated research and gripping personal accounts, Fontenot
tells a worthy war story with timeless lessons for future conflict.
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Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940
By John Kiszley
Reviewed by Dr. James Corum, lecturer, Department of Politics and
Contemporary History, Salford University, United Kingdom

T

he campaign in Norway, which lasted from April to June 1940, is one
of the understudied campaigns of World War II. After all, Norway
never assumed the decisive importance that both the Germans and the
British thought it would have. After the German offensive in the west in
May 1940, it was seen as something of a sideshow. Yet the Norwegian
campaign highlights an incredible level of deficiencies in the British
wartime command and control system at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels at the outset of the war. It was a campaign that the British,
French, and Norwegian forces might well have won if only they had
possessed a basic competence in joint operations and a command system
capable of effective and rapid planning and response. Unfortunately, the
Germans possessed an effective command system and understanding of
operational warfare in 1940 while the British did not.
Retired Lieutenant General John P. Kiszely, an officer with an
impressive background in command and higher staff positions, has
written about the 1940 campaign in Norway with a new perspective
that focuses on British leadership and command. Few historians would
have the insights into the personalities of high command that General
Kiszely has, simply because the author spent years in the senior staffs
in Whitehall and has a clear understanding of what commanders need
to know and do. Thus, his analysis, based on a careful reading of the
minutes of the staff conferences, is pretty damning in terms of the
performance of Britain’s military chiefs in April and May 1940.
In this thoroughly researched and documented study, General
Kiszely dissects the campaign and explains how the world’s top navy,
alongside a very capable air force and a less capable army, could fail
so badly. A British campaign that included poor planning, muddled
decision-making, failed coalition operations, and a lack of any operational
concept or interservice cooperation plagued the allies from the start.
The title describing the British fight in Norway as a “fiasco” is apt, and
in Kiszely’s analysis none of the major British strategic players—the
service chiefs, the military staffs, the war cabinet and First Lord of the
Admiralty Sir Winston Churchill—performed well.
Both the Germans and the British saw Norway as strategically
important, and the military staffs of both countries began planning
for major operations there in December 1939. The contrast in planning
is remarkable. The German navy, Luftwaffe, and army staffs worked
closely together, understanding this campaign would be the first
campaign in warfare in which all three services would play a major and
essential role. The German plan identified the forces to be allocated,
which included almost all the German navy’s surface fleet, a few recently
raised infantry divisions not needed for the upcoming spring offensive,
and a sizeable and well-balanced air component. German operational
planning anticipated some of the obvious requirements of the campaign.
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Widely separated task forces would require a lot of communications, and
the Germans built a considerable signals force into their initial landing
plan. A joint operation would require close interservice cooperation, and
the German staffs established an effective liaison and command system
under a theater headquarters. At the lower level, the German army
task forces ensured they had a good mix of supporting arms, especially
antiaircraft and engineers, in the first attack wave.
The contrast with the British approach to planning is striking. At
the lower levels, the British Army planning for deploying forces to
Norway were abysmal. Little thought was given to ensuring adequate
communications, liaison with the other services, or in ensuring adequate
antiaircraft cover. In short, pretty basic stuff was ignored. There was no
British theater headquarters or commander, and when the fight came,
the different British landing forces in central Norway and Narvik all
reported to different commanders in London.
On paper the British seemed prepared for joint warfare. Britain had
the Military Coordination Committee with some exceptionally capable
officers assigned to it. But at this stage of the war, the committee had no
real staff and limited powers, and its role had not been clearly defined.
The war cabinet providing strategic policy was too large to be effective.
Interservice rivalry was intense. Poor communications kept the military
chiefs in London in the dark about the conditions in Norway. The British
did not appoint a senior liaison officer to the Norwegian Army and
this considerable force, eager and ready to fight, was virtually ignored
in British operations. The British effort at the tactical level included
some successes in the fight for central Norway and in the Royal Navy’s
destruction of ten German destroyers at Narvik. But the confused
headquarters in London failed to exploit tactical success.
General Kiszely demonstrates how the personalities of the service
chiefs can have a decisive impact on a campaign. In the case of the British
service chiefs, all were seasoned professionals with good reputations,
but none were perfect, and all exhibited serious flaws in their command
style. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, was already worn out
and exhibited little interest in issues that did not directly involve his
service. Chief of the Air Staff Sir Cyril Newall was known as a talented
administrator, but had a weak understanding of doctrine and operations.
Like Pound, he declined to get involved in issues of joint operations.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Edmund Ironside had a superb
military record but had always served as a field commander, had never
served on the senior staff, and had no experience in strategic level
planning. The senior officers of each service well knew much better
candidates for these jobs were available.
The technology of war has greatly changed since 1940, but the
human aspects including the essentials of command, planning, and
coordination have not changed. This is why I highly recommend this
book as essential reading for all military officers and civilian leaders
to understand the dynamics of decision-making, operational planning,
and execution in modern conflict. As we have learned from some
recent conflicts, experienced and highly educated senior officers can get
campaign planning and execution horribly wrong. Sometimes we need
to highlight a campaign that offers some concentrated lessons on the
basics of senior leadership and organization.
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The Fighters: Americans in Combat in Afghanistan and Iraq
By C. J. Chivers
Reviewed by Russell W. Glenn, director, Plans and Policy, G2, US Army Training
and Doctrine Command

T

he Fighters provides an overview of US military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq via the experiences of six American military
personnel—three from the Army (a helicopter pilot, member of the
special operations community, and infantry soldier), two from the Navy
(a corpsman and an aviator), and one Marine Corps officer (infantry
platoon leader)—with a total of more than seventeen years of combat
experience in those countries. Chivers, a former marine, repeatedly visited
the two theaters, meeting four of his subjects there and complementing
his reconstruction of the events with additional interviews in the United
States. Individuals contacted in these later instances include the subjects,
servicemembers from their units, and family members. The result is
combat related through the eyes of men and women who have seen the
elephant and others close to them, individuals who make known their
doubts regarding the conduct, purpose, and chances of success in the
two ongoing contingencies.
This is ever a view from the bottom up. The perspectives are
personal, the takes tactical. Readers will find little consideration of
concerns at the operational and strategic levels of war. Such a focus is
deliberate. Combined with the multiple standpoints through which we
view each combatant are moments wherein Chivers relates the same
event through very different lenses. For example, one member of a
trio is killed in a rocket attack as the men approach a PX trailer. His
companions reflect on the event as they recover from their own wounds,
one finding confirmation of his faith in survival, the other marveling
at the play of chance as dictator of whether one lives or dies, mends
or is forever crippled. The tactical perspective also offers validation of
the unfortunate truth that lessons learned are too often lessons later
forgotten.
Some readers will, at times, find themselves dissatisfied as The
Fighters’ prose slips into the subjective. That Chivers has little sympathy
for decision makers at higher echelons is immediately apparent in the
preface where he concludes the lives of Afghanistan and Iraq veterans
have been “harnessed to wars that ran far past the pursuit of justice”
and were “betrayed not by their neighbors, but by their leaders” (xxii–
xxiii). The naval aviator repeatedly expresses fear and remorse that his
strikes might have killed innocents; he is thankful when a sortie does not
require him to release munitions. Readers would have benefited from
deeper probing into why a leader so fearful of war’s play of friction and
chance chooses to return to theater on multiple tours.
Successfully mining the ore of human emotions during combat
is a task often undertaken but rarely accomplished. Many of the elite
works, perhaps most, are firsthand accounts. E. B. Sledge’s With the Old
Breed does so with gripping and gritty recollections from World War II
foxholes in the Pacific as We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, coauthored
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Breed does so with gripping and gritty recollections from World War II
foxholes in the Pacific as We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, coauthored
by journalist Joe Galloway and then Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore, does
primarily from LZ X-ray in the la Drang Valley of Vietnam. Clinton
Romesha’s Red Platoon more recently antes up with its gut-wrenching
recall of fighting at Combat Outpost Keating in Afghanistan. Students
of leadership still await a post-Second World War equivalent of Defeat
into Victory, Field-Marshal Viscount Slim’s masterful blend of tactical,
operational, and command considerations in recounting the campaign
that ousted the Japanese from WWII India.
The task is harder yet when the telling is not from a first-person
combatant’s pen. Recent accomplishments that hurdle this obstacle
include Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down, David Zucchino’s Thunder
Run narration regarding the first days of US forces in 2003 Baghdad,
and the likewise exceptional yet little known, Dead Men Risen regarding
the British Army’s Welsh Guards in Afghanistan by Toby Harnden.
Other offerings can add to our understanding, if less so. They might
accomplish this end via an occasional unique observation that provides
insights regarding the ever-evolving being that is the combat soldier.
These remind leaders of the view from the sharp end of the spear,
that of the combatants who benefit from or suffer the consequences
of decisions made at higher echelons. It is an invaluable perspective
however maintained.
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Irregular Warfare
Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement
By Alexander Thurston
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

A

lexander Thurston has written an excellent study on the
development, evolution, rise, and decline of the African terrorist
group Boko Haram, which operates in Nigeria with some spillover into
Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The group’s name is based on the Hausa
word Boko meaning Western education (and implying culture) and the
Arabic word Haram referring to things that are forbidden by Islam. Over
time, the group, which was always radical, became increasingly violent
and eventually inured itself to the deaths of Muslim bystanders to its
actions. It also unsuccessfully attempted to join al-Qaeda but later was
able to affiliate with the Islamic State at a nominal level. Thurston’s study
addresses numerous factors contributing to the rise of Boko Haram and
its turn to violence in 2009 as well as its later expansion and setbacks.
The author notes that Boko Haram originated with radical Salafi
preacher Mohammed Yusuf who operated from the city of Maiduguri
in northern Nigeria. As the leader of Boko Haram, Yusuf preached a
doctrine of religious exclusivism and railed against democracy (which
he said was used to replace the rule of God), secular laws, Christians,
and Muslim minorities such as Shiites and Sufis. He presented his fiery
sermons to audiences of ordinary people in northern Nigeria’s vernacular
languages, establishing a populous niche that helped him advance his
own status and agenda.
In the early 2000s, the government considered Yusuf to be a minor
nuisance and did not seriously oppose him. Yet, his movement was
growing, and his sermons often addressed topics of concern to some
Muslims. Yusuf’s criticisms of Nigerian government corruption seemed
honest, and many parents were also afraid that Western-style schools
would lead their children to become Christians or atheists.
When oil revenues fell in the early 1980s, the governmental program
for universal primary education collapsed leaving many young people
unable to obtain either a Western or Islamic education. Under these
circumstances, a number of young men entered into criminal gangs,
substantially increasing violence in northern cities and shantytowns,
making life there almost intolerable. Moreover, by the mid-1980s, some
Nigerian Muslims believed their country had failed at all major secular
forms of government: parliamentary, presidential, and military, as well
as capitalism and small amounts of socialism. Islamic government may
have seemed like a way to roll back kleptocracy and nepotism and to
reestablish some level of order.
As the northern crisis deepened, Nigerian leaders became
increasingly concerned about Boko Haram and eventually moved
against it within the larger context of an antibandit campaign. The
campaign during 2009 was authentic, but it was also used as cover to
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strike the organization, with several battles paralyzing Maiduguri before
the government defeated the radicals. In this struggle, hundreds of Boko
Haram members were killed, and Yusuf was captured and killed in what
was almost certainly an extrajudicial murder. After these events, the
Nigerian leadership believed that the danger had passed. But it had
not. The new Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, was determined
to rebuild in a way that radically expanded the use of violence. Under
his leadership, the organization evolved from the broken fragments of
a mass preaching movement into an exceptionally brutal terrorist and
guerrilla-warfare organization.
Correspondingly, Boko Haram prioritized efforts to obtain militarygrade weapons and learn how to manufacture bombs. It also had
considerable success in attacking prisons, freeing at least hundreds of
incarcerated members to replenish the organization’s ranks. By 2013, the
organization sought territorial conquest and displayed a willingness to
confront Nigerian forces in open battles. In late 2014, Shekau declared
that territory under Boko Haram’s control was no longer part of Nigeria.
Rather, it was a new territory defined by devotion to true Islam.
As the struggle developed, Boko Haram also faced a number
of problems in part due to its extensive and often arbitrary brutality
and murder. Concurrent with his many successful efforts to rebuild
the organization, Shekau also adopted broad and savage criteria for
declaring other Muslims to be unbelievers who had to be killed. Such
actions provoked fear and backlash among the northern population and
became a problem for Boko Haram when the government created an
official vigilante force to assist military units and provide them with local
intelligence. Further complicating the situation, in late 2011 breakaway
members of Boko Haram formed a less murderous splinter group.
Disaffected senior members would later accuse Shekau of killing
civilians on a whim or for his personal benefit. The most infamous of
the Boko Haram attacks, the kidnapping of 276 Chibok school girls in
mid-April 2014, led to increased Western military aid to the Nigerian
government for its struggle to destroy the organization. In early 2015,
the Nigerian president, under severe domestic and foreign pressure,
initiated an offensive to destroy Boko Haram that also involved the
militaries of Chad, Niger, and some foreign mercenaries. In December
2015, the Nigerian president announced the defeat of the group, which
had lost most of its territory, but clearly continued to exist.
In considering this struggle, Thurston also discusses Boko Haram’s
ties with radical groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the
Islamic State. He acknowledges information on such ties is limited,
and his conclusions have to be tentative. According to Thurston, Boko
Haram seems to have maintained only limited contact with al-Qaeda
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But the group sought to improve these
ties to obtain weapons, money, and training. They further sought to
reach out to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of the
core organization’s most important affiliates. AQIM may have initially
provided limited support, but Shekau appears to have undermined his
case for further aid by ordering the murder of several Nigerian jihadists
within Boko Haram, whom AQIM knew and respected. Al-Qaeda
central appears to have decided against any agreement with Shekau as
he increasingly appeared headstrong, erratic, and willing to engage in
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gratuitous violence against even very conservative Muslims. Thurston
also doubts that the Islamic State provided much support to Boko
Haram even after it declared loyalty to the Caliphate in March 2015. At
that point, Islamic State leaders might have viewed Nigeria as a marginal
sideshow, although this situation may yet change.
Thurston doubts the Nigerian government will permanently defeat
Boko Haram or its descendants as long as poverty, unemployment,
and corruption dominate northern Nigeria. He also states that harsh
Nigerian military tactics can harm civilians and inadvertently strengthen
Boko Haram. Unfortunately, his search for alternatives does not come
up with much. He likes the concept of a deradicalization program, but
such efforts have often failed outside of Saudi Arabia, where they are
exceptionally well funded in ways that few other countries can duplicate.
Nevertheless, Thurston is clearly correct that efforts to destroy Boko
Haram will need a political as well as a military component and that
the government needs to make a strong effort to win the loyalty of all
its northern citizens. Finally, a central lesson of this study is that Boko
Haram rose from the ashes once in its history and could do so again as
the result of Nigerian and world complacency.

Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle
Since the Great African War
By Kris Berwouts
Reviewed by Diane Chido, author of Intelligence Sharing on Transnational
Organized Crime in Peace Keeping Environments

T

he Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) strives to prove the
central theme of George Friedman’s book, Flashpoints: the most
dangerous thing in the world to be is rich and weak. With nearly 20 years
of experience working and living in the country for which he expresses
great love and despair, author Kris Berwouts endeavors to overcome the
casual observer’s tendency to miss the region’s complexity and nuance
and to dismiss the frequent and intense violence as “senseless savagery.”
He provides a cogent analysis of the three root causes of conflict as the
dismemberment of the Congolese state, the extension of the Rwandan
conflict, and the illicit exploitation of Congo’s natural resources.
The key takeaway of this book is an appreciation of Congo as a
nation of extremes. It is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa. It has
the greatest variety and amount of natural resources. It has borne the
deadliest series of conflicts since World War II. And, its 2006 election
was so heavily supported by the European Union that it has been called
the most expensive poll in history. The dizzying array of violent armed
groups, which Berwouts terms “social bandits” exacerbating violent
conflict in Congo, caused this analyst to long for a social network map,
but the acronym list provided a critical reference.
For a brief historical recap, King Afonso I ascended the Congolese
throne in 1506, soon after the first Portuguese settlers arrived, and
reigned for the next 40 years as the slave trade gained momentum and
utterly transformed the region. Afonso sent many letters to King John
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III in Lisbon imploring him to only send priests and teachers to Congo
and not the traders with their Western wares for which “a monstrous
greed” had adversely affected his subjects.
Foreshadowing modern Western involvement that would have little
regard for what the Congolese want or need, the slave trade continued
and with the reign of Belgian King Leopold II from 1865, conditions
for the population of Congo only became increasingly worse. Although
Western interest in exploiting Congo has not waned and should not be
excused, regional and domestic corruption and avarice are the more
immediate causes maintaining this “violent peace.”
Mobutu Sese Seko’s harsh autocratic 32-year rule continued the
enslavement of the population and provided very little healthcare,
education, or economic opportunity, much less political freedom under
the one-party system. Deep entanglements with neighboring Rwanda
also prevent peaceful development, as does the unfortunate role of
the Congolese defense forces as more of a problem than a solution to
Congo’s many ills.
Berwouts argues the end of the Cold War and Mobutu’s departure
in 1997 caused Congo’s current disarray and frequent violence as societal
institutions and networks were dismantled in a rush to democratization,
as in contemporaneous Yugoslavia, while the autocratic rule at the top
lost its patrons and was no longer able to suppress the fires of nationalist
secession. Although the overt genocide in Rwanda during 1994 appeared
to be managed, the struggle between Hutus and Tutsis has continued
with Congo as a new battlefield.
While Mobutu was deathly ill, Rwanda and Uganda supported
Laurent Desire Kabila as the only warlord who, while enriching himself
in Tanzania, had not been a Mobutu crony. The first phase of their
great African war fought on Congolese territory installed Kabila as
president about 10 days after Mobutu had left the country for medical
treatment. By July 1998, Kabila was viewed as Rwanda and Uganda’s
puppet, so he ousted Rwandan officials to save his domestic reputation.
These former allies returned with their armies in an effort to replace
him. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) sent a
multinational contingent to restore stability, but the war still resulted in
massive displacement and the creation of huge and vulnerable refugee
camps that remain targets for political wrangling and violence. Thus
delivered, Kabila presided over the fractious DRC until his assassination
in 2001. He was then succeeded by his son, Joseph, who has held
power since.
Berwouts painstakingly describes the various players and their
wrangling, with elections and a fragile peace process as a backdrop,
emphasizing that the cause of the continuing violence was not the great
African war but rather the ready availability of exploitable resources that
enable all of the elite and armed factions involved to continue to fund
themselves and their personal battles for territory and power. Their
nationalism is a thin veneer as they form alliances of convenience across
ethnic lines, thus reducing the population to the status of pawns.
The failure of colonial Europeans to understand the natural fluidity
of identity led to the creation of national and subnational borders
that were assumed to be related to the populations that lived in given
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locations, but for the populations, ethnicity was not a binary concept.
The new maps and their enforcement created territorial enclaves
that solidified identity, and thus today’s identity-based politics. These
associations were exacerbated by the Belgians importing labor, creating
a sense of nativism versus foreigner, even within the same ethnic group.
With democracy and land ownership came new a concept that
the size of a constituency mattered for elections, so implementing
exclusionary rules for determining who is a citizen with voting and
landowning rights coupled with targeted violence made perfect sense.
Such outcomes resulted in communities and individuals with economic
interests who perceived a need to form armed militias. Thus, it is clear
that the savagery is by no means senseless.
Berwouts concludes that the international community continues
to “benevolently” impose new peace and stability efforts on DRC and
the region as a whole that ignore local realities. A lack of political will
within the domestic arena, along with the failure of the international
community to hold DRC to recommended security sector reforms, as
well as police and military leaders who see their territories as personal
piggybanks, have led to a continued vortex of violence and exploitation.
Berwouts describes the use of rape as a calculated weapon of war
that has three decisive effects. First, women are used as a spoil of war
to define the victor. Then in the spirit of genocide, as a direct attack on
the reproductive capacity of the target group. And finally, just when it
seems the conflict is over, security forces, and even local members of
a community, engage in such acts with impunity, thus solidifying the
poison of conflict in the population’s culture.
With greed, a lack of legitimacy and governance, and stalled security
sector reform, Congo has been exploited since its “discovery” without
pause for its valuable resources, including its people. In fact, Berwouts
posits “kleptocracy” was coined to describe Congo, leaving the reader
with a feeling of dread for the country’s future.

Militarised Responses to Transnational
Organised Crime: The War on Crime
Edited by Tuesday Reitano, Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, and
Sasha Jesperson
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army

M

ilitarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime is drawn from
a series of conference papers—delivered at expert seminars in
London in November 2015 and in Geneva in February 2016 by sixteen
contributors—along with introductory and concluding contextual essays
penned by two of the editors. British and European scholarly thinking
and perceptions primarily influence the work that has direct linkages
to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime based
in Geneva and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
based in London.
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The book focuses on militarized responses to organized criminal
actors engaging in four forms of illicit activity: wildlife crime, piracy,
smuggling of migrants, and drug trafficking. It concerns the decades
old “blurred crime and war” operational environment—both these
activities and the responses to them are covered within. A key statement
found in the introduction related to militarized response to transnational
organized crime (TOC) is as follows:
Militarised approaches are at one end of a spectrum that extends to
people-centred development approaches. In light of the discussions around
comprehensive approaches, responses to organised crime should sit near the
centre of this spectrum. They should constitute a mix of security responses
that combine intelligence, law enforcement, and the direct pursuit of criminals with development strategies that engage with the factors that make a
country vulnerable to organised crime. (3)

Unfortunately the “spectrum” insight is not further developed
within the work—nor is a more in-depth treatment of the proposed
integrated response later advocated in the concluding chapter (346–47).
Conceptually, the term “ungoverned” as opposed to “alternatively
governed” spaces is utilized for a sectional header, which represents a
missed nuance (5). Nature abhors a vacuum, and when the state was
never present in an area or has since been forced to retreat, criminal
actors actively fill the void with their own form of street governance.
We also get a sense of the sizes and monetary values of some of the
economies related to the different illicit activities focused upon, but this
was never made fully clear within the book. The intractability of these
illicit activities is summed up at the end of the work: “The conclusion
therefore is for the urgent need to build awareness and capacity in
policymakers to view organised crime as a nuanced threat—one that
often has deep socio-economic roots and few easy solutions” (348).
This, however, then takes us down the path of requiring a
“multidimensional harm reduction narrative” and monitoring “the
evolution of war talk” to help mitigate the propensity for militarized
response (348). What results is a catch-22 situation regarding
development—formal economy creation is desperately needed to
address underlying socio-economic conditions in areas where organized
crime is taking root, but development is not taking or simply cannot
take place. In a globalized economy where multinational corporations
and sovereign wealth funds are constantly shifting assets to achieve the
highest annualized returns—and at times either indirectly or directly
profit from the illicit economy—investing in development for its own
sake is a minor consideration. As a result, with organized crime either
outgunning or co-opting the policing and law enforcing institutions
of beleaguered states, the only remaining viable responses to such
activity are either military (institutional) or vigilante (armed citizen) or
mercenary (paid corporate contractor).
The work itself is composed of two introductory essays, four thematic
illicit activity sections (wildlife crime, piracy, migrant smuggling, and
drug trafficking) each comprised of four essays, a conclusion, and an
index. Endnotes and the authors biographies are provided at the back of
each of the nineteen essays found within the book. A number of figures
also exist within the well-referenced work. Of the four thematic essay
clusters, the reviewer found wildlife crime to be the most interesting
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followed by piracy, migrant smuggling, and then drug trafficking—
though this may well be due to his in depth knowledge related to the
latter. A most illustrative essay, by Julian Rademeyer, on rhino poaching
in South Africa’s Kruger National Park provides an overview of what
has become an increasingly militarized and unwinnable conflict between
park rangers and gangs of armed poachers (43–59). That these poachers
should be celebrated by locals in songs and considered victimized when
killed—as opposed to the dwindling herds of rhinos preyed upon or the
rangers defending them—adds a surreal nature to these criminal acts.
A minor difficulty with the work is that the individual essays are
drawn from two expert seminars then grouped together in thematic
clusters. This creates a bit of uneven coverage of the topical areas of
emphasis as well as generates some noticeable differences in the quality
of the contributions themselves. Another more pressing issue with the
work is its steep cost. This suggests that it will be accessed primarily
through university libraries or interlibrary loan, which will greatly limit
its impact.
A final assessment of Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised
Crime is that it only has marginal utility for the majority of senior defense
community members. Unless such a community member has a specific
need to address militarized responses to TOC (either generally or related
to a specific form of illicit activity), the work is too specialized a read.
Further, the overall gestalt of the work, which is more military response
debate, focused essentially long on what is wrong with such responses
but offered little on what to do about them (3). Thus, interest will be
higher among academic readers. Given the volume is meant to fill an
analytical and research gap in this area of policy studies, it should be
considered more an exploratory effort than a more mature study for
defense community application.
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Security Studies
The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel
By Uri Bar-Joseph
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

T
New York: Harper, 2016
400 pages
$29.99

he Angel is an interesting and important examination of one of
Israel’s most successful espionage efforts. This operation began
in 1970 and involved the penetration of the highest level of Egyptian
political and military decision-making by a spy within Egypt’s political
elite. The author of this study, Uri Bar-Joseph, is an Israeli scholar with
a background as a military intelligence officer and access to a variety of
declassified Israeli military files. Bar-Joseph identifies Ashraf Marwan
as Egypt’s most important traitor as well as the most valuable spy in
Israeli history. Marwan was the son-in-law of Egypt’s President Gamal
Abdul Nasser, and became a key advisor to President Anwar Sadat after
Nasser’s death. Perhaps surprisingly, Marwan played only a marginal
role in the Nasser government since his father-in-law disliked him and
thought he had married his daughter, Mona, as a career move. Nasser also
obtained evidence that Marwan had received money through personal
corruption and then angrily pressured Mona to divorce her husband.
Mona steadfastly refused to do so, and Nasser grudgingly allowed his
son-in-law to continue work as a minor official in the president’s office
under the supervision of Sami Sharaf, Nasser’s despotic chief of staff.
Unsurprisingly, Marwan was miserable in his job, which (along with
his wife’s salary) allowed him only a frugal middle-class lifestyle, far
less than what he had expected at the time of his marriage. He probably
hated Nasser, who continued to view him with contempt, and he also did
not enjoy enforced private austerity. Thus, for whatever mix of reasons,
in the summer of 1970, Marwan chose to contact Israeli intelligence
operatives via the embassy in London, England, where he occasionally
traveled and volunteered for service as a paid Mossad spy. All intelligence
agencies are suspicious of such “walk-ins,” but the Israelis were also
intrigued. Although Marwan was not an important decision maker
within Nasser’s staff, he did have access to important documents, and
quickly demonstrated his ability to obtain valuable information, which
seemed genuine and could be at least partially validated by other sources.
Mossad gave Marwan the codename of “The Angel” which referred to
the 1960s television series, The Saint, broadcast in Israel as The Angel.
Nasser’s September 1970 death gave Marwan an opportunity for
advancement within the Egyptian hierarchy, but only if he could find
a patron who viewed him as useful and perhaps was not so puritanical
about corruption. He placed his hopes on President Anwar Sadat,
Nasser’s vice president and successor, who was widely viewed as a
caretaker who would quickly be brushed aside by powerful opponents.
Moreover, Sadat, unlike his rivals, did not have a network of loyalists
and had to take his help where he could get it. Threatened with ouster,
Sadat made his move in May 1971 when he undertook what he called
the “Corrective Revolution” and removed his most powerful enemies
TOC

Book Reviews: Security Studies

101

from positions of power. Bar-Joseph maintains that all sources on this
power struggle agree that Marwan “played a central role in helping Sadat
overcome his opponents and establish his rule over Egypt” apparently
by providing the president with incriminating documents about his
rivals (88). These assessments of Marwan’s actions in the crisis appear
to have been borne out by his rapid and dramatic promotion to the
important posts of presidential secretary and Sadat’s personal emissary
to Libya and Saudi Arabia. Without Nasser’s restraint, Marwan again
began enriching himself through graft, while maintaining his lucrative
financial sideline of selling secrets to Israel.
The most pressing question for Israeli intelligence at this time was
under what conditions would Egypt consider itself ready to attack Israel,
even if only for limited war aims in Sinai. According to Bar-Joseph,
Marwan provided important and detailed documents indicating how
Egyptian forces planned to cross the Suez Canal. This information
on Egyptian strategic thinking helped provide the framework for
“the Concept,” an overarching paradigm that guided Israeli strategic
planning and military decision-making from late 1970 until October
1973. The Concept dictated that the Egyptians would not attack into
the Sinai Peninsula without first developing a way of compensating
for Israeli air superiority other than surface-to-air missiles on the west
bank of the Suez Canal (many of which were at fixed sites). Additionally,
according to the Concept, Sadat would fear attacking Israeli forces under
any circumstances without a deterrent force to threaten Israeli cities and
thereby prevent a process of escalation that might include bombing
of Egyptian targets throughout the country. Such sites could not be
protected by the Egyptian Air Force. Bar-Joseph bluntly maintains that
Israeli military intelligence was then under the command of a group of
officers whose commitment to the Concept was “unwavering, almost
religious” (189).
In early 1973, Marwan reported that Egypt was becoming
increasingly interested in a limited war to challenge a status quo that its
leaders viewed as intolerable. Sadat had by then made some progress in
obtaining appropriate aircraft and Scud missiles able to provide some
sort of minimal deterrent against Israeli strikes on Egypt’s urban areas.
In this environment, Marwan became a key source of information
about Egyptian changes in strategic thinking and the development of a
workable plan for attacking Israeli forces. Unfortunately for them, many
Israeli military leaders refused to abandon or even modify the Concept,
which was by now deeply rooted in their strategic outlook.
Additionally, Sadat closely protected the exact date of the attack, and
Marwan found out only by accident one day before the initial Egyptian
and Syrian strikes. He passed this information on to his Israeli contacts,
although some key military intelligence officials doubted the warnings.
Under these circumstances, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir made
the hard choice of overruling her defense minister and fully mobilized
Israeli reserve forces. Bar-Joseph maintains that this action prevented
an even larger Israeli defeat than occurred in the first week of the war,
before Israel was able to turn the situation around.
After the war, Marwan’s relationship with Sadat cooled, and he was
dismissed from his role in the president’s office in March 1976 in order
to lead an industrial consortium. Marwan’s power within the Egyptian
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leadership then ended when Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and Vice
President Hosni Mubarak (whom Marwan disliked) took power.
Correspondingly, Marwan moved to London in 1981 where he sought
to make money, making good use of his contacts throughout the Arab
world and continuing to provide what information he could to Mossad.
At this time, Marwan faced some serious problems as information
started to leak about his activities with Mossad. Bar-Joseph accuses a
former head of Israeli military intelligence of leaking this information
on the basis of his belief that Marwan was a double agent, a charge he
dismisses as “baseless fantasy” (228).
As sometimes happens with spies, in June 2007, Marwan died a
mysterious death when he jumped, or was pushed, from the balcony of
his London apartment. Bar-Joseph believes he was killed by Egyptian
intelligence, although Marwan’s widow, Mona, later told the Observer that
Mossad had killed him for being a double agent for Egypt. Bar-Joseph
strongly maintains that Mossad leaders saw his death as a disaster since
they now looked incapable of protecting their spies, something that
could seriously undermine future recruitment.
Bar-Joseph’s book is well researched and well reasoned, but early
books on complex and multidimensional intelligence operations
using authoritative but incomplete sources can often be unreliable.
Bar-Joseph is aware of this shortcoming and expresses his hope that
this work survives the test of time. While some formerly classified
Israeli information on this matter has been released, Mossad files on
Marwan remain closed, and the organization has little incentive to
release them in the foreseeable future. Bar-Joseph has therefore written
the most complete and authoritative book that can be expected under
contemporary circumstances, but there may be many plot twists to this
story that remain unknown, at least for now.

Building Militaries in Fragile States:
Challenges for the United States
By Mara E. Karlin
Reviewed by MAJ Jonathan Freeman, strategic planner, Headquarters, US Army

T
Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2018
283 pages
$75.00

hose interested in building partner militaries should be delighted
to find that Mara E. Karlin’s book is extremely well written and
very well organized. A reader can easily navigate through the chapters
and the concepts. Those who have read a fair share of national security
policy-oriented books will appreciate the author’s writing style and clear
language, which make the book a relatively easy read.
In focusing on internal rather than external threats, Karlin
magnifies the focus against the popular idea within the national security
community that more is always the answer. As someone who deployed
to Iraq in 2007 as part of the Military Transition Teams, I understood
and appreciated the more nuanced argument: “To effectively strengthen
partner militaries in fragile states, the US military must transform its
engagement with them” (2).
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Karlin’s case study selections are excellent. Though her choice of
Vietnam as an example of failure was a little obvious, she did a very
good job of staying on her point and avoiding the likely pitfalls. While
the choice of Greece as an example of successful buildup of partner
militaries is interesting, the dichotomy of the two Lebanese cases makes
this book unique. In the first case, Karlin makes a solid argument
that US support for the Lebanese military partially failed due to the
involvement of regional actors. The second case, however, truly displays
the complications of building partner militaries when she discusses
how the Lebanese both criticized US assistance although the Lebanese
officials and also failed to take full advantage of that assistance. A perfect
example was the number of Lebanese officials that declared they were
more pleased with American training than equipment, while placing an
officer recently trained in counterterrorism in charge of the gym at the
Beirut officers’ club.
The critiques of Building Militaries in Fragile States involve the
definitions, charts, graphs, and the Vietnamese case study. The
definitions avoid taking a strong stance, which makes the book read
more like a history than a social science-based policy book. Whether
referring to military assistance, security force assistance, or something
else entirely, Karlin is in a unique position to enlighten her readers
about her definitions of concepts, and even how those definitions
evolved during her career in academe and policy. The charts and graphs
seemed to be more of a distraction than a visual enhancement for the
argument. More than likely, these unnecessary illustrations were added
at the behest of senior academics.
Lastly, the Vietnamese case study was problematic. Though the
conclusions are understandable and correct, the manner in which Karlin
comes to them will likely concern people far more knowledgeable of
Vietnam than me. Karlin operates on the theory that the failures in
Vietnam of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups and the Army of
the Republic of Vietnam were due primarily to the lack of focus on
internal security and the toxic leadership of Lieutenant General Samuel
T. Williams. Appreciating that this study focused on the military, there
can be no denying that government corruption of the Republic of
Vietnam was a major factor in losing hearts and minds. From the aspect
that the failure of Vietnam was due to Williams’s specific personality,
there was little mention of either President Diem Ngo Dinh or Major
General Edward G. Lansdale, both of whom could have easily had the
failure of Vietnam laid at their feet.
In summary, Building Militaries in Fragile States is an excellent policy
book trying to wrestle with a problem that has confounded the United
States for many, many years. Karlin speaks from a unique academic
and policy background, making a case that few can. She neither tries to
cheapen her argument with easy fixes or silly analogies but charges all
academic, government, and military professionals to continue searching
for answers. Her main point emphasizing how is one that policymakers
should, and hopefully will, be more considerate of. For those interested
in becoming acquainted with the topic or those trying to consider
different solutions to age-old problems, I highly recommend this book
both for its content and readability.
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